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Edited for the
Academy of Political Science
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of Columbia University

Normality as a Factor in Contemporary Political Life
MORTON LEVITT
BEN RUBENSTEIN

1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves
ROBERT L. BEISNER

Britain and America: Some Requisites of Executive Leadership Compared
ALEXANDER J. GROTH

The French Revolution in Comparative Perspective
BRUCE MAZLISH

Machiavelli and Madison: Perspectives on Political Stability
DAVID E. INGERSOLL

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Introduction

Readers of this issue of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY will notice that the articles here presented form a pattern, a pattern not of content or focus, but of methodology. Each article, regardless of the author's discipline or the particular point he has sought to make, has employed a methodology of comparison. As long ago as 1928, as Bruce Mazlish of M.I.T. points out in his article on "The French Revolution in Comparative Perspective," Marc Bloch predicted that "the comparative method will accomplish great things, and I consider its perfection and general use one of the most pressing needs of present-day historical science." The editor hopes that this issue of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY will help to promote what Marc Bloch too optimistically foresaw.

Each of the articles uses comparative techniques to put across points that benefit from being measured against other institutions, experiences, or events. In the lead article, Morton Levitt and Ben Rubenstein leave comparison largely implicit until their final sentence, but from their opening quotation to their last paragraph, it is clear that they consider questions of psychological abnormality meaningful only in terms of stated or unstated norms of behavior. Using the comparative method more directly, Robert L. Beisner makes telling points about American anti-imperialists of the present day by contrasting them with their sometime counterparts after the Spanish-American War. Professor Mazlish also treats historical

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events that merit comparison, but he, unlike Professor Beisner, is concerned with events that took place in different countries as well as at different times.

The two remaining articles apply comparative methods to questions of political science rather than history or psychology. Alexander J. Groth offers valuable insights into both British and American executive leadership by measuring the salient features of each in the light of the other, while David Ingersoll brings us a perceptive assessment of two great political analysts, Niccoló Machiavelli and James Madison, by showing the similarities and differences of their views on political stability.

There is no intent to make this issue a precedent for future numbers of the QUARTERLY; we shall continue to welcome articles of any methodology. But the editors hope that the readers will find interesting and stimulating—as has the editorial staff—the varied applications of comparative methods represented in these pages.

A. T. V.

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Normality as a Factor in Contemporary Political Life

MORTON LEVITT
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I

> All kinds of scrambled thoughts—all of them confused, some of them irrational, many of them which I cannot recall, and some of which I would not have seriously entertained under normal circumstances—went through my mind during this period. They were reflected in the various inexplicable, inconsistent, and inconclusive things I said and did, including such questions as whether the girl might still be alive somewhere out of that immediate area, whether some awful curse did actually hang over all the Kennedys, whether there was some justifiable reason for many to doubt what had happened and to delay my report, whether somehow the awful weight of this incredible incident might in some way pass from my shoulders.
>
> Senator Edward M. Kennedy
> New York *Times*, July 26, 1969

The incident at Chappaquiddick in the summer of 1969 cast doubt on the political future of Senator Edward Kennedy. The debate on all levels centered on the issue raised by his own account of the events of that day—that is, his emotional suitability for high office. Senator Kennedy is not the only public

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figure to have been publicly scrutinized from this perspective, nor is this an altogether new factor in American political life. The physical health of candidates for high national office has long been a concern of the electorate, and from time immemorial, candidates for political office have been subjected to random slurs on their mental stability. The attention that has focused since 1964 on the candidates' mental health is, however, unprecedented.

What made the 1964 campaign unusual was that Mr. Goldwater's emotional adjustment was made a major issue, and his prospective performance as president was subjected to a clinical evaluation by a group of distant experts. Armchair psychology prospered during the Johnson era as well, which abounded with reports of the President's wild swings in mood, demands for complete loyalty, and extreme defensiveness. During the campaign of 1968, the American Political Science Association meeting heard an exciting paper which reviewed Richard Nixon from a behavioral perspective and found him wanting. But even more to the point here, after the election columnist Drew Pearson questioned Mr. Nixon's fitness to serve as president on the grounds that he had consulted a psychiatrist while vice-president and the doctor, according to Pearson, had said that Nixon "did have a problem—not standing up under great pressure."[1]

Pearson's statements brought denials from all the principals, but the report does raise some interesting issues. Is Mr. Nixon psychologically fit to be president, or does his reported consultation with a psychiatrist raise legitimate questions of his suitability? Is he normal? From this arises a second group of questions: Is Mr. Nixon more or less normal than Mr. Humphrey? Are either of the major 1968 candidates more or less normal than Mr. Johnson? And finally, is psychological normality requisite for election to high national office?

These are, of course, foolish questions that cannot be answered with any degree of certitude. Yet in our society most judgments made regarding suitability for any role are based on judgments of normality. This is the case whether the criterion is stated explicitly or not; normality or variations thereof tend to be a crucial

[1] New York *Times*, Nov. 14, 1968.

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consideration in most selections. It would seem to follow then that there is something objectively identifiable as "normality" which stands as a model for behavior. Unfortunately, there is very little agreement among scientists about the concept. Indeed, although the events of recent years have given new impetus to assessments of psychological normality, both the general public and the medical profession are still far from certain of what they mean by "normal."

II

> The Committee, a satirical drama group in San Francisco, has a skit concerning the plight of a man who finds that the bar in which he is sitting is peopled entirely with homosexual men. Pursued aggressively by one such individual who insists on buying him a drink, our "innocent abroad" tries to appear nonchalant. In face of his own mounting terror, he blurts out, "How do you like being ah . . . ah . . . ah . . . homosexual?" His would-be drinking partner answers drily, "How do you like being ah . . . ah . . . ah . . . whatever it is *you* are?"

Most traditional definitions of normality differ only in the degree of emphasis given to the separate elements in the formulation, "nature + nurture = behavior." Only recently has there been some effort to factor out scientifically the elements that go together to make up normality. This new interest has been a reaction against the traditional descriptions which, in the main, derive from either (1) the symptom-free concept or (2) what has become known as the centrist construct, based on a statistical average of normally distributed characteristics.

Over the past twenty years, definitions of normality have tended to cluster around the idealist position, which provides for variation through the recognition of "complex cultural activity, symbolization, and altruism."[2] Behavior is considered "positive" or "integrative" to the extent that it reflects the unique attributes of the human animal; the positively valued traits specified by a variety of authors are: acceptance of self, others, and of nature; spontaneity; the quality of detachment; autonomy; democratic

[2] D. Friedes, "Toward the Elimination of the Concept of Normality," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 24 (1960), 128-33.

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character structure; creativeness; resistance to enculturation; freedom to focus energy on main purposes; ability to work and love with ease and to achieve happiness and efficiency somewhat in proportion to circumstances; self-control; personal responsibility; social responsibility; democratic social interests and ideals; emotional independence and self-reliance; balance between giving and getting; relative freedom from egotism, inferiority feelings, and excessive competitiveness; conscience; constructive aggressiveness; solid sense of reality; and flexibility and adaptability.

Feeling that a compendium of traits based upon the particular value system of the individual author illustrates the uselessness of the concept of normality, at least one psychologist, D. Friedes, opted out. This occasioned an interesting reply from Maurice Korman who agreed that there was much confusion about normality, but who felt that this should drive us toward a more operational definition which "would have the essential character of a theoretical construct."[3] It is important to note that Korman feels the idea of normality has therapeutic relevance as "a gross predictor of a person's future behavior."

This last matter is important, for there exists a fair body of opinion which holds that a concept of normality is central to clinical practice and that one way by which distinctions can be made between normal and pathological is to compare patient and non-patient groups. However, complications arise when one considers the range of problems for which various patients come into treatment as well as the complex set of factors that motivate both patients and therapists in treatment decisions. It is certainly easy to say that the element of suffering is to be found in all patients, but this thesis does not stand the test of experience when one considers children, those with perversions, those with character disorders, those who want draft deferments, and so on. Moreover, one large segment of child therapy is based upon the prevention of severe psychopathy by judicious intervention at the time of a reactive crisis. To call all who are helped by brief, situational aid pathological hardly serves to define the borders.

Even when we look at this problem from the other side of the

[3] Maurice Korman, "The Concept of Normality," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 25 (1961), pp. 267-69.

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table, there is scarcely more light. The best that can be said is that clinicians take patients into treatment when there is some consonance between them and their patients with regard to expectations. Perhaps the complexity of this last issue can be illuminated by Edward Glover's classic article in 1932 which defined normality from the psychoanalytic point of view. This was particularly necessary and timely then since psychoanalysis was moving from a concern with unconscious manifestations to a growing interest in ego psychology. A growing concern with the notion of normality seems to coincide with this shift; Freud had made few references to the ideal psychic state. Glover maintains that the use of such commonplace terms as "normality" or even "ego strength" requires an equal understanding of such terms as "abnormality" and "ego weakness," and states further that all psychoanalysts make use of working standards of normality that differ widely from their clinical colleagues! Glover's suggestions can be summarized as follows: (1) The advent of psychoanalysis made it impossible to exclude a capacity for personal happiness and peace of mind from the professional categories of normality; (2) "Children are not more ignorant or more stupid than adults, but differ in the *way* they think"; (3) The pleasure-pain principle is the most primitive measure of normal reaction for the infant, but it cannot become an adult measure until it has undergone that slow process of modification during childhood which converts it into the reality principle; (4) The present state of Western civilization provides no reason for assuming that normality and complete reality adaptation are identical; and (5) Normality may be a form of "madness" which goes unrecognized because it happens to be a good adaptation to reality. The whole matter is then summed up in Glover's well-known definition of normality: ability to love, ability to work, relative freedom from mental conflict, and freedom from physical symptoms.[4]

While Glover's efforts were viewed with interest by Freud, who saw normality as an "ideal fiction," other psychoanalytic precincts have made similar efforts with mixed results. Melanie Klein speaks out very clearly for the concept of integration, with

[4] Edward Glover, "Medico-psychological Aspects of Normality," *On the Early Development of Mind* (New York, 1956).

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love as the glue which unites the unknown with the known parts of the personality.[5] Erik H. Erikson postulates that the mastery of developmental tasks leads to a mature identity.[6] Lawrence Kubie speaks for personality flexibility; illness is thus "the freezing of behavior."[7] Frieda Fromm-Reichmann proposes freedom from fear, anxiety, and the entanglements of greed, envy, and jealousy.[8] Heinz Hartmann offers the intriguing concept of ego autonomy; the strength of the ego determines the degree of stability and adaptation.[9] Existential analysis is different. Apparently substituting the concept of authenticity for the concept of adjustment, it suggests that this norm is to be approached by lively participation in all human experience including values, activities, and all other aspects of life.

Erich Fromm has made a serious effort to bridge the gap between inside and out by an ingenious effort to psychoanalyze society itself, as it were. This extension, which starts out sounding like Glover, ends in a more contemporaneous fashion:

> Mental health is characterized by the ability to love and to create, by the emergence from incestuous ties to clay and soil, by a sense of identity based on one's experience of self as the subject and agent of one's powers, by the grasp of reality inside and outside of ourselves; that is, by the development of objectivity and reason[10]

Some critics maintain, however, that in the final analysis, Fromm's social definition is fatally weakened by its intrinsically intra-psychic and individually-oriented base.[11]

Perhaps some of the confusion described above can be clarified

[5] Melanie Klein, "On Mental Health," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 33 (1960), 237-41.

[6] Erik H. Erickson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 4 (1956), 56-121.

[7] Lawrence S. Kubie, "The Distortion of the Symbolic Process in Neurosis and Psychosis," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 1 (1954), 59-86.

[8] Frieda Fromm-Reichman, "Remarks on the Philosophy of Mental Disorder," *Psychiatry*, 19 ((1946), 293.

[9] Heinz Hartmann, "Towards a Concept of Mental Health," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 33 (1960), 243-48.

[10] Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955), 69.

[11] Daniel Offer and Melvin Sabshin, *Normality* (New York, 1966), 44.

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by an examination of what kind of adjustment is to be expected by psychotherapists from patients who have been successfully treated. Surely the clinician has some goals in mind as he assays the progress of his patient. In this regard, Herman Nunberg's view are interesting. He states simply that the experienced analyst is deeply committed to an alteration in ego reaction, a change in character structure which produces a cure of symptoms. Nunberg's emphasis is on the balance in economic factors in personality adjustment, and his description of cure, indicated by the patient's readiness to work and to love, bears close relationship to Glover's ideas.[12] Roger E. Money-Kyrle, writing a few years later, identifies self-knowledge as the ideal treatment goal, but concludes that all is relative since complete self-knowledge is never to be attained.[13]

Still, most therapists do deal in one manner or another with the problem of normality. Such attempts most frequently revolve around the general matter of optimal gain, but the basis for comparison often involves contrasting the patient with other patients as well as with the therapist's own self-evaluation. This last matter is of crucial import, for how can we assume that the therapist's judgment is reliable? The problem of psychotherapists defining standards of normality requires more than a passing glance. It presumes a detachment existing in this individual which would place him close to the summit of Olympus, while, in fact, present and past literature abounds in statements regarding the perils of counter-transference, the attachment of the analyst for his patient. Moreover, there is more than a small feeling that therapists as a group include some individuals whose normality may be subject to question, this in spite of something which approaches a fetishistic public overestimation of the therapists' character.

Even if we assume that psychotherapists as a group are normal individuals, it is certainly clear from what has been said that

[12] Herman Nunberg, "Evaluation of the Results of Psychoanalytic Treatment" in Morton Levitt (ed.), *Readings in Psychoanalytic Psychology* (New York, 1959), 311-20.

[13] Roger E. Money-Kyrle, "Psychoanalysis and Ethics" in Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, and Roger E. Money-Kyrle (eds.), *New Directions in Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1957).

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the range of normality is both elastic and variable and that it must perforce include a large group of idiosyncratic levels of adjustment. Stated simply, all human beings, including those within and without the therapeutic commonwealth, like people who share their set of values and who respond positively to their suggestions. This is certainly true within the more exhortative or active therapies which bear descriptive labels such as suggestion, persuasion, re-education, rational, and implosive therapies. Although this is less true in psychoanalysis where the analyst goes out of his way to avoid any semblance of persuasion or exhortation in his patient relations, all who work analytically must continually struggle to avoid their own biases in the selection of patients, within treatment options and termination goals. Even here in what we have come to regard as the most detached observational platform of all, a well defined value system obtains. Psychoanalysts require certain traits in their patients—the ability to be reflective, to internalize, to free-associate, to feel pain, and so on. Each of these requirements places a premium on one particular set of values instead of another. These are what we encourage patients to do; ergo, these are what we value.[14]

The problem of the therapists' biases is only part of the larger problem of the impact of a given culture as a whole on the concept of normality, as is illustrated by the reaction of a group of American scientists to Israeli childrearing practices. Children reared on kibbutzim are uniformly described as hard-working, responsible citizens, devoted to their settlements and their country and free from the noxious influences of drugs, homosexuality, and delinquency. These children are reared in clusters, far removed for most of the day from their parents, an arrangement that is in direct conflict with most theories currently held in this country. American behavioral scientists, moreover, are committed

[14] A word needs to be said of the work of Thomas Szasz who, although speaking from a psychiatric and psychoanalytic background, is usually to be found flailing away at stereotypes in both fields. Arguing that mental illness is a myth, Szasz has little more sympathy for its opposite. His particular hobbyhorse is the confusion between medical and legal values, and he finds that ethical values contaminate society's judgment of normality. See, Thomas Szasz, "The Uses of Naming and the Origin of the Myth of Mental Illness," *American Psychologist*, 16, 2 (1961), 59-65.

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to the idea that when changes in the parental role become necessary, those adults responsible for the surrogate care of young children be kept as permanent as possible. Yet here, too, Israeli practice differs, for the adults who rear them are often replaced and the youngsters must adapt to new faces and expectations. Bruno Bettelheim's view of the results of this experience is: "The Kibbutz example has shown that it is possible in a single generation to create a healthy personality that is entirely different from that of the parents."[15] But the American scientists who had been invited to observe the methods of the kibbutz quarreled with its results, indeed refused to accept the kibbutz as a way of life as natural as their own.

For the reasons this story suggests, it is of great importance to keep in mind that both therapists and the bulk of their patients come almost entirely from the middle and upper classes, which provide them with a set of values and which limit the range of their experience. Both of these factors may be at work in the definition of "normality" used in a report presented several years ago to the American Psychiatric Association. Derived from an interdisciplinary study, the data finds the normal man rather unremarkable. He is described as stable and well-adjusted, unhampered by serious marital discords, job dissatisfactions, or particularly high aspirations. Anticipating the inevitable questions the researchers ask the question, "Does 'normality' necessarily imply a lack of creativity, imagination, and spontaneity?" Their answer is forthright and in the affirmative.[16]

The work of R. D. Laing, a psychoanalytically-trained psychiatrist in England, deals directly with the issue of the relationship of the culture to concepts of normality. His position is best described in his own statement:

> A man who says that men are machines may be a great scientist. A man who says that he is a machine is 'depersonalized' in psychiatric jargon. . . . A little girl of seventeen in a mental hospital told me she

[15] Bruno Bettelheim, Review of *Children in Collective—Child-Rearing Aims and Practices in the Kibbutz*, (ed.) Peter D. Neubauer, *The New York Review of Books*, Oct. 6, 1966, pp. 12-15.

[16] "Psychiatrists Describe Normal Man," New York *Times*, Jan. 26, 1961, p. 28.

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> was terrified because the Atom Bomb was inside her. That is a delusion. The statesmen of the world who boast and threaten that they have Doomsday weapons are far more dangerous, and far more estranged from 'reality,' than many of the people on whom the label 'psychotic' is fixed.[17]

Laing maintains in the boldest terms that all of society is mad and that the difference between the sick and the well is that the former know that they are mad while the latter deceive themselves with thoughts of sanity.

Without doubt, some of the pressing issues of our time—student unrest, the Vietnam War, racial strife, the stultifying effects of poverty—call into question the traditional standards of normal behavior in our culture. Thus, while state legislators and the police cavil, most of us can relate to the exaggerated adolescent rebellion as it expresses itself in efforts to break away from academic models and standards. These movements reflect, after all, feelings which we have experienced, the difference being the way we have chosen to manage such impulses. Similarly, we can react sympathetically to resistance to the Vietnam conflict. Historians say that World War II was the only "popular" war, and almost everyone has struggled at one time or another with feelings about the uselessness and hopelessness of military resolutions.

The racial strife in this country has thrust the problem before us with greatest impact. What can we say about what constitutes normal behavior in ghetto children, in Negro middle class adults, in white home owners in threatened neighborhoods, in southern policemen, in small businessmen frightened by the consequences of neighborhood deterioration, or in any one of several million people whose lives, on the one hand, or whose treasured prejudices, on the other, have been threatened by the racial cataclysm which has become a part of our life in recent years. Some fascinating, and painfully obvious, questions can be raised regarding relatively fixed notions about normal adjustment.

The same conclusions inevitably result when we consider the poor. The unemployed, the unemployable, and the under-em-

[17] R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self*, quoted in the New York *Times Book Review*, Feb. 22, 1970, p. 44.

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ployed are often viewed by our society like the slag heaps which follow in the wake of bulldozers uncovering veins of coal in strip mining. The government is expected to care for such excess waste; welfare programs are attacked as socialist. The recipients of alms are held responsible for their own condition, A.D.C. mothers are accused of being promiscuous, unemployed men are described as shiftless and irresponsible, while the youth of welfare families are blamed for crime on the streets. In the monograph *Orthopsychiatry and the Law,* article after article documents the manner in which our society forces members of the "other America" into psychopathy and anti-social behavior. After judicial proceedings which usually have a pejorative cast, such individuals are often sentenced to prison and subsequent oblivion.[18]

Thus, we have identified three groups at least—adolescents in conflict, Negroes, and the poor of any color—whose plight removes them so completely out of the context of normal adjustment that some new way of perceiving their behavior seems necessary. These are unquestionably a different group from those who bare their souls to "paid friends" in darkened rooms in buildings on Park Avenue, Michigan Boulevard, or Roxbury Drive in Beverly Hills. We certainly do not mean to deride those single voices reciting a catalog of agonies. We do, however, suggest that standards of normality which neglect those who "turn on and tune out," who sit-in in the offices of university presidents, who riot, burn, and pillage in our cities, or who have not been employed for several years tend to overlook a sizeable portion of the populace.

III

Mario Procaccino, New York's Democratic nominee for mayor, received a letter a few weeks ago from Representative John R. Rarick (D., Louisiana), a devout Wallace man. 'I will be happy to appear in New York and cam-

[18] Morton Levitt and Ben Rubenstein (eds.), *Orthopsychiatry and the Law* (Detroit, Mich., 1968).

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> paign either for or against you, whichever you think will be more helpful.'
>
> A. Logan, "Around City Hall"
> *New Yorker*, Oct. 11, 1969, p. 164

There has always been a discrepancy between the stated and practiced values of any given society. Each culture through its institutions, consciously and unconsciously, makes known what standards are acceptable. The gap between stated and practiced values in our culture has widened incredibly, some say beyond any point of synthesis. Various segments of the population have made clear by their behavior that they cannot function in what they call our "sick" society. Other groups contend with equal intensity that life is better today than ever before. The philosopher Herbert Marcuse refuses to be bought off by optimism: " 'The fact that the vast majority accepts this [American] society does not render it less irrational and less reprehensible. Individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed on them and . . . are indoctrinated by the conditions under which they live and think and which they do not transcend.' "[19]

Perhaps the time has arrived to define those standards basic for mental health in modern society. Such standards and values are not absolutes but are intended to help a given culture survive in a healthy fashion. Because we believe that psychologists must accept the responsibility for defining those social values which are fundamental to emotional health, we offer, from a variety of sources, some related ideas which are highly generalized. Someone suggested that a healthy society is one which accepts and extends affection, concern, and love to all of its members; values people above objects; and refuses to accept a class and caste system of haves and have-nots. Another authority suggests such values as the rediscovery of a coherent view of life, the achievement of intellectual and effective communication between people and groups of people, and the encouragement of voluntary action both alongside and within public administration. Other views stress the reasonable consonance between the taught values of childhood and the actual values of adult life. The list can and should prob-

[19] Quoted in Marshall Edelson, "Schizophrenia," *Current Therapy* (1966), 621-26.

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ably go on and on for never has it been more necessary to find a philosophy suitable for conditions in our wildly changing world.

If the *bouillabaisse* offered above is confusing, it is no more than we expect. One last task, however, remains. We would like to speculate about what might constitute normative patterns of behavior in our country today. Along with most of life, mental health assessment should operate stereoscopically. One lens should focus upon the individual in a crudely diagnostic way with checkpoints involving such matters as temperament, intelligence, reaction to frustration, and so on. The other lens should focus upon the milieu and assay such analogous criteria as economic or educational opportunities, emotional climate, and opportunity for expression of feelings. Those who can effect some comfortable accommodation between the two forces, or who can work constructively to change the balance, can probably be considered to be in good health.

Where does this leave us with regard to candidates for political office? If normality is a quality which cannot be clearly defined by behavioral scientists, it may have limited utility in assessing a man's suitability for political office. Moreover, for some in the electorate (the young radicals, for example), normality may well represent an accomodation to a hateful and oppressive reality which cannot be allowed to survive. As but one example, it is interesting to speculate upon the personal characteristics of a political candidate who might try to win the support of student radical groups. Those who work within the system will likely not be acceptable to politically extremist groups. If the candidate shares Laing's views that what society calls "normal" is undesirable, he will lose the support of the middle of the electorate. With these thoughts in mind, who can guess how Robert Kennedy might finally have fared with the electorate? Newfield and Witcover describe him as having been a highly likeable if inconsistent man,[20] and few who watched the events of the spring of 1968 question his charisma. Still, his youth, virility, and appeal had not at the time of his death attracted the political base needed for a successful campaign, and there are many who believe that

[20] Jack Newfield, *Robert Kennedy: A Memoir* (New York, 1969); Jules Witcover, *85 Days—The Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy* (New York, 1969).

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the highly organized and mechanically programmed Nixon (once described as an "unlikeable man" by a close associate) would have won the 1968 election in any event.

So, then, a nagging conclusion begins to suggest itself; that is, that there is something in the combination of personality traits which the electorate desires to find in candidates for office that does not lend itself either to precise description or reasonable prognostication. If this is indeed true, then the concept of normality has little relevance to political life. In fact, some strong personalities seem to behave in a patently unusual fashion and still remain in public office. Adam Clayton Powell, Joseph McCarthy, and James Curley all violated commonly accepted codes of personal and official conduct and only McCarthy can be said to have paid a severe price. So perhaps the political obituaries already written for Edward Kennedy are premature. The public may in two years review the recent episode and choose not to consider it a reflection on Kennedy's emotional stability.

As the careers of numerous prominent figures indicate, the public is prepared to accord politicians a wide latitude of behavior if it can identify with their conflicts and their resolutions, normal or otherwise. The public thus behaves, in a way, like a therapist, abandoning moral judgments so long as it can in some personal way identify with the human predicament of men in high office.

Writing in 1963, Roy Grinker related mental health to individual flexibility, and suggested that it was necessary in the contemporary world to adapt to many different environments almost simultaneously.[21] Perhaps under present circumstances this kind of definition can serve to judge behavior in politicians. An editorial in the New York *Times* a week after President Johnson had visited Vietnam, the Pope, commanders in the Pacific, and troops in California and attended the funeral of the Australian prime minister suggests that it can:

> Thus he indicates to the American generals in South Vietnam that he rejects compromise and shares their conviction that military victory is possible. Then he flies to Rome to protest to the Pope that he is ready to lay aside military means and seek peace by negotiation—

[21] Roy S. Grinker, Sr., "A Dynamic Study of the Homoclite" in J. H. Masserman (ed.), *Science and Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1963), 6, p. 31.

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> which, by definition, implies compromise. Do the military urge increased bombing of North Vietnam, as they did last summer over the opposition of Secretary McNamara? Then there is verbal support for Mr. McNamara, but within weeks the bombers strike at many of the targets the Defense Secretary has opposed. Does the Pope urge a halt in bombing? Mr. Johnson is ready. All he asks is that Hanoi make a reciprocal gesture in advance, a condition that, however reasonable it may sound, is not likely to be fulfilled.[22]

Surely this is a picture of the man who could make ready changes, who could accommodate to differing expectation, and who could stay on top of complexities which stagger the mind of more contemplative types. So far as we know, he has not been in psychiatric treatment and he has overcome a physical handicap (a severe coronary) which has turned some heroes toward timidity. He was not confused by contradictions, scarcely heeding anything other than what he saw as the central issues of the time. In physical appearance, he sometimes has resembled a Wall Street banker, sometimes a river-boat gambler, sometimes a hardheaded politician determined to get his way. Despite the carping of some critics, whose defects he sarcastically exposed in broad strokes, his solemn reassurances were to be heard on all sides, and truly the medium here was the message. Although he protested the impossibility of his job, its hours, its terrible responsibilities, its lack of personal satisfaction, and its loneliness, the captain stood ready until very near the end to continue at the helm for another voyage, for his was the long view of the horizon. Undeflected by small riptides or large storms and obliged to be all things to all people, he almost succeeded and only the occasional news analyst, historian, or political rival professed to see uneasiness behind the mask. Although a credibility gap was known to exist and his personal popularity fell, strong men supported his political views and acts. His very deficiencies forced a grudging admiration upon many, and history may well record that Lyndon B. Johnson was the man for all seasons in the sixth decade of the twentieth century.

We frankly admit we have raised more questions than we have settled. An informal discussion of these ideas with a group of colleagues this fall brought from one an irritated query: "Are

[22] Dec. 27, 1967.

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you fellows kidding about Lyndon Johnson?" This brings to mind the joke in which one man asks another, "How's your wife?" and the second man promptly asks in return, "Compared to whom?" Do we really regard Lyndon Johnson as the man for all seasons? The answer is the same: "Compared to whom?" This is the real issue which must be resolved socially and politically. Normal, compared to whom?

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1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves*

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It seems evident now that a fundamental turn of sentiment against the Vietnam War occurred during 1968. The American commitment in Southeast Asia stalled, and both Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon wooed the electorate with newfound aptitudes for cooing. It was the Year of the Dove. Writers in Sunday supplements began to look around for precedents for this widespread anti-war sentiment, many of them drawing comparisons with the attitude toward the Mexican War of the 1840's. Those who scanned the more recent past, however, and rediscovered the anti-imperialist movement of 1898-1900 found more interesting and richer comparative materials. Although obviously not enough time has passed to provide the historian with the kind of perspective he prefers for analytical purposes, it does not seem premature to consider a tentative comparison of these two protest movements.

In comparing the doves with the anti-imperialists of seventy years ago, three distinct problems arise: those of definition, contemporaneity, and generalization.

To speak of definition first. How was an "anti-imperialist" defined in 1898 and how was a "dove" defined in 1968? Both terms

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cover a broad range of sentiments and proposals, but their general meaning is clear enough to preclude much confusion in using them. Theodore Roosevelt was not an anti-imperialist; Lyndon Johnson was not a dove. Carl Schurz was obviously no imperialist, and Senator Fulbright can hardly be mistaken for a hawk.

The term "anti-imperialist," as it was employed seventy years ago and as it will be used here, describes a person who opposed the acquisition of a colonial empire in the wake of the Spanish-American War. The all-out anti-imperialists dissented from the decision to go to war with Spain in the first place, denounced the annexation of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii, and opposed the imposition of a protectorate over Cuba. Other anti-imperialists were less adamant, but nearly all fought the acquisition of the Philippines. Though they did not always agree among themselves, they were in no sense difficult to distinguish from their expansionist opponents.

Doves, too, have adopted various positions on the war in Vietnam, but in this essay "dove" will be used to describe those critics who favor de-escalation over escalation, urge a compromise peace, and base their recommendations on the conviction that American intervention was ill-conceived and has been poorly executed. As this is written, such attitudes are held by perhaps a majority of the American people; the doves discussed here, however, are those who emerged early as critics of official policy, not the millions who subsequently came to accept their arguments or who merely tired of the war. Some hawks and doves have refused to wear the plumage assigned to them by the headline-writers. Before John P. Roche took on the job of defending White House policies against the attacks of other intellectuals, for instance, he had insisted that he was "neither a hawk nor a dove" but "a slightly frightened robin who wants to avoid a war with China. . . ."[1] Senator George McGovern, claiming that the anti-war dissenters have been more "tough-minded" than those "who have dreamed about exporting American freedom to the jungles in B-52's," proposed that the

[1] Bernard B. Fall, Richard N. Goodwin, George McGovern, and John P. Roche, "Containing China: A Round-Table Discussion," *Commentary*, XLI (1966), 27.

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inhabitants of the American aviary were not really hawks and doves after all, but ostriches and owls.[2] Here we shall confine ourselves to the conventional usage.

Comparing events already part of history with those still on the front page presents greater problems. The anti-imperialists can be studied with considerable detachment, but this is not true of the doves. The personal letters and journals of men living in 1898 are available—for example, Theodore Roosevelt's letter to Leonard Wood in which he called the anti-imperialists "simply unhung traitors, and . . . liars, slanderers and scandalmongers to boot,"[3] and the diary of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., in which he described McKinley as "a poor, weak, flabby [figure?]-of-wax, unctuous and canting. A well meaning, weak, Methodist 'statesman.' "[4] I have not seen former President Johnson's private correspondence nor any diary that John Kenneth Galbraith might have kept. To understand the doves, therefore, I have examined what is on the public record, read dozens of speeches and hundreds of magazine articles, absorbed the leading books on Vietnam, and even inspected relevant bumper stickers and graffiti. Some of my assertions, regrettably, will not be susceptible to documentation; they are based upon general impressions gathered from daily exposure to the extraordinary debate over this war.

An unavoidable hazard of writing contemporary history is that events occur more quickly than they can be recorded, and any day some astonishing change in fortune may cause a thesis to collapse and the whole purpose of a work to disappear. One can only hope to escape such a fate.

Finally, a word about the risks of generalization. Andrew Carnegie and Samuel Gompers were both anti-imperialists; George F. Kennan and Allen Ginsberg are both doves. I have attempted to keep the obvious problems in mind when making general statements about the anti-imperialists and the doves, but I

[2] George McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," Letter to the editor, *New Republic*, Sept. 23, 1967, p. 28.

[3] April 17, 1901, in Elting E. Morison *et al.* (eds.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-54), III, 60.

[4] "Memorabilia," May 20, 1899, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

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shall not burden the language of this paper with scores of qualifying and cautionary phrases.

With these qualifications in mind, let us compare these two protest movements, who the protesters were, what they did, and why they did it. The most obvious difference between the two movements is their contexts. The international situation in 1968 was radically dissimilar to that of 1898, when powers competed for Asian empire but no one worried about an international communist movement, when the United States had only begun to emerge as a world power, and—most importantly—when no one lost sleep over the possibility of a local war sliding uncontrollably into a world nuclear holocaust. The stakes in 1968 were as high as they could get, and the harrowing fears of the doves have been worse than any the anti-imperialists could imagine.[5]

The recent debate has been fundamentally more complex than the controversy of 1898-1900, which was innocent of the Byzantine arguments about the viability of a containment policy in Asia, counter-guerrilla military strategy, Vietnamese religious politics, and the relationship among the N.L.F., Hanoi, and Peking. To the anti-imperialists of 1898, however, the questions arising from the Spanish-American War seemed formidable enough. "Mr. Dooley," Chicago's favorite tavern-keeper, remarked that

> Wan iv the worst things about this here war is th' way it's makin' puzzles f'r our poor, tired heads. Whin I wint into it, I thought all I'd have to do was to set up here behind th' bar with a good tin-cint see-'gar in me teeth, an' toss dinnymite bombs into th' hated city iv Ha-'vana. But look at me now. Th' war is still goin' on; an' ivry night, whin I'm countin' up the cash, I'm askin' mesilf will I annex Cubia or lave it to the Cubians? Will I take Porther Ricky or put it by? An' what shud I do with the Ph'lippeens? Oh, what shud I do with thim? I can't annex thim because I don't know where they ar're. I can't let go iv them because some wan else'll take thim if I do. They are eight

[5] See "Statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Christian A. Herter Lectures—Lecture III. Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1966, 8:30 P.M." Release from Senator Fulbright's office, May 6, 1966, pp. 1, 4. This is the original "The Arrogance of Power" speech (hereafter cited as Fulbright, "Arrogance of Power"). Interview with Senator Fulbright, Feb. 16, 1968.

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> thousan' iv thim islands, with a popylation iv wan hundherd millyon naked savages; an' me bedroom's crowded now with me an' th' bed. How can I take thim in, an' how on earth am I goin' to cover th' nakedness iv thim savages with me wan shoot iv clothes? An' yet 'twud break me heart to think iv givin' people I niver see or heered tell iv back to other people I don't know. An', if I don't take thim, Schwartzmeister down th' street, that has half me thrade already, will grab thim sure.[6]

The doves of 1968 were protesting a war; in 1898, for the most part, it was the aftermath of a war and the formal annexation of new territories. Most commentators who have considered the 1898/1968 parallel insist that nothing remotely resembling the imperialism of 1898 has been involved in Vietnam. Some war critics, however, have not agreed with this confident assumption and maintain that something like old-fashioned imperialism *is* involved. Doctrinaire communists and certain representatives of the New Left harbor no doubts about the issue of imperialism, seeing evidence of it wherever the American flag flies abroad, including Vietnam. More provocative, however, is a contention like John McDermott's that America's well-intended aid and modernization programs, in those areas where they have "succeeded," have produced "a loss of national independence, erratic and imbalanced economic development and growing social chaos." He believes the United States has become imperialistic, by aspiring to be not the world's policeman, but the "world's social worker."[7] In more conventional terms Noam Chomsky, Christopher Lasch, William Pfaff, John K. Fairbank, Mary McCarthy, Walter Lippmann, and Senator J. William Fulbright have all described the United States presence in Vietnam as imperialistic. In language that strongly echoes that of the anti-imperialists of 1898, Fullbright has stated that the underlying cause for dissent today is

> a feeling that America has betrayed its own past and its own promise . . . most of all, the promise of the American Revolution, of free men building a society that would be an example for the world. Now the

[6] [Finley Peter Dunne], *Mr. Dooley in Peace and in War* (Boston, 1905), 44-45.

[7] John McDermott, "Welfare Imperialism in Vietnam," *The Nation*, July 25, 1966, pp. 76-77, 85, 87.

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world sees that heritage being betrayed; it sees a nation that seemed to represent something new and hopeful reverting to the vanity of past empires, each of which struggled for supremacy, each of which won and held it for a while, each of which finally faded or fell into historical oblivion.[8]

How many and what kind of people became anti-imperialists? Who are the doves? What does the membership of the two movements reveal about their characters and goals? It is impossible to say what percentage of the public was sympathetic to the anti-imperialists, but there is little evidence that they ever represented as great a proportion as the doves have or that nearly as many of them were as deeply involved—emotionally, intellectually, politically—in their protest as the doves have been. It is true that the Democratic Party was basically anti-imperialist in 1898 and 1900, but largely out of ritualistic partisanship. Few prominent leaders of the anti-imperialist movement were Democrats. This statement will not pass without objection from some other students of the period who insist that Democrats were very important to the movement and who base their argument on votes in Congress, especially on the Treaty of Paris in February of 1899, and on some of William Jennings Bryan's speeches in the 1900 presidential campaign. But the heart of the anti-imperialist movement did not usually reside within the halls of Congress, and Democrats played a distinctly limited role in the verbal and printed agitation on the issue as well as in the sustained organizational activity.

[8] J. William Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities at Home and Abroad," *Playboy*, July 1968, pp. 116, 152, 157; Noam Chomsky, "On Resistance," *New York Review of Books*, Dec. 7, 1967, p. 12; Christopher Lasch, "Same Old New Class," *ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1967, p. 12; William Pfaff, "No Victory in Vietnam," *Commonweal*, Apr. 23, 1965, p. 136; John K. Fairbank, "Perspective on Vietnam," *New Republic*, Jan. 20, 1968, p. 17; Mary McCarthy, "Report from Vietnam II: The Problems of Success," *New York Review of Books*, May 4, 1967, p. 8; Walter Lippmann, "The White Man's Burden," Washington *Post*, Apr. 28, 1966. See also John Malcolm Brinnin in Cecil Woolf and John Bagguley (eds.), *Authors Take Sides on Vietnam* (New York, 1967), 25 (this book hereafter cited as *Authors*); "Defective Vision," *New Republic*, Mar. 19, 1966, p. 7; J. W. Fulbright, "The Great Society Is a Sick Society," *New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 20, 1967, p. 96; and Fulbright in *The Vietnam Hearings, with an Introduction by J. William Fulbright* (New York, 1966), 283 (the book hereafter cited as *Vietnam Hearings*).

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Lists of the major anti-imperialists appear in Fred Harvey Harrington's pioneering article, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898–1900";[9] Maria C. Lanzar's series of articles on the Anti-Imperialist League published in the early 1930's;[10] an article by E. Berkeley Tompkins entitled "The Old Guard: A Study of the Anti-Imperialist Leadership";[11] and my own book *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900*.[12] These works concur essentially in their identification of the leading anti-imperialists. A sample roster would include Democratic politicians William Jennings Bryan (though his right to inclusion is debatable because of his peculiar behavior at the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Paris), Grover Cleveland, Bourke Cockran, Donelson Caffery, J. Sterling Morton, Champ Clark, and Ben Tillman; Republicans Benjamin Harrison, Thomas B. Reed, John Sherman, George F. Hoar, Justin Morrill, and George S. Boutwell; Mugwump-independents Carl Schurz, E. L. Godkin, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Moorfield Storey, and Erving Winslow; liberal reformers Jane Addams and Henry Demarest Lloyd; businessmen Andrew Carnegie, Edward Atkinson, and Henry Villard; writers Mark Twain, William D. Howells, Hamlin Garland, William Vaughn Moody, and Edward Arlington Robinson; academic figures Charles W. Eliot, David Starr Jordan, William James, Charles Eliot Norton, Thorstein Veblen, and Hermann E. von Holst; clergymen Edward Everett Hale, Charles H. Parkhurst, Henry Van Dyke, and Henry Codman Potter; abolitionist Thomas Wentworth Higginson and the sons of James Birney, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and William Lloyd Garrison.

A listing of the leadership of the movement—the chief officers of the anti-imperialist leagues, the senators who mounted the opposition to ratification of the Treaty of Paris, those persons who most frequently attacked American imperialism in speeches and articles—reveals a fairly clear pattern. Although their ranks included a few Democrats, most of the leaders were either dissident

[9] *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXII (1935), 211-30.

[10] "The Anti-Imperialist League," *Philippine Social Science Review*, III (1930), 7-41, 118-32; IV (1932), 189-98, 239-54, and V (1933), 222-30, 248-79.

[11] *The Historian*, XXX (1968), 360-88.

[12] (New York, 1968), see especially pp. x-xiii (hereafter cited as *Twelve Against Empire*).

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Republicans or "Mugwumps," the one-time Republicans who for fifteen or twenty years had played a rigorously independent role in politics. They were concentrated in the northeastern part of the United States, particularly in the Boston and New York areas. They were men of education and means. Though numbering a few remarkable immigrants among them (such as Schurz, Carnegie, and Godkin), most were of established British stock; in 1896, when several of them affixed their names to an anti-war petition, the New York *Herald* was prompted to remark, "They read like a roll call from Bunker Hill."[13] They were members of the old upper-middle and upper classes, conservative in social outlook and frequently aristocratic in demeanor. They took for granted that they could speak for the American conscience. Politicians of the old school, businessmen, editors, lawyers, and intellectuals, they were also elderly men with clear memories of gentler times and with little taste for the tone of modern America.

The leaders of the doves have not been such a homogeneous flock. *Ramparts* and the New York *Times* both have been "leaders" in the criticism of American policy in Vietnam. Norman Mailer and Hans Morgenthau, Cassius Clay and Dr. Spock all did their part. American policy has been attacked by some of the most impeccable representatives of the "establishment," side-by-side with some of the most scorned and rebellious elements in American society. Still, the doves were not a formless mass, and it is possible to make certain generalizations about them. While conservatives dominated the anti-imperialist movement, few such have been doves. Unlike the old men who guided the dissent against McKinley, the under-thirty set (non-existent, in a political sense, in 1898) were among the most vociferous, outspoken, and uncompromising critics of President Johnson. Negro leaders added their force to the doves; they did not count, except as objects of discrimination, in the days of Cuba Libré. Professional men and intellectuals have been prominent in both protest movements. In contrast to the anti-imperialists, however, doves have not been easily identifiable by class, region, or ethnic background. The "Stanford Poll" taken in February and March of 1966 found that religious

[13] Joseph E. Wisan, *The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898)* (New York, 1934), 102.

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beliefs had no bearing on attitudes toward the war, though a Boston survey of college professors concluded that Jews and the religiously uncommitted have been far more dovish than Protestants, who in turn have been more dovish than Catholics. Some polls of the general public seemed to indicate that working-class and poorly educated groups in America have been relatively hawkish, but the Stanford pollsters were of the not entirely convincing opinion that "variables of social status—occupation, income, or education—do not relate to policy preferences on the Vietnamese war."[14]

Doves are not only younger and much less conservative in their politics than the anti-imperialists were, but, as has been stated, they form a more heterogeneous group. This difference is interesting because it suggests that far more Americans today are politically alert and aggressive than in 1898. It also suggests that far more was at stake in 1968. Seventy years ago a relatively small group of people dominated by intellectuals and idealists were alarmed by imperialism because they believed it violated American principles. A much wider range of people have been alarmed by the Vietnam war, not only on principle, but also because the war has appeared to be a failure and has seemed to be actually contrary to the interests of the United States. The tensions caused by the current war have cut across class, regional, political, and generational lines as the acquisition of a tropical empire never did.

In what ways have the critics of these two eras made their protests? The anti-imperialists limited themselves almost exclusively to voting, speechmaking, and writing pamphlets and letters. Anti-imperialist members of Congress tried unsuccessfully to block ratification of the Treaty of Paris and to defeat Hawaiian annexation. Speaker Thomas Reed slowed House action on Hawaii and delayed passage of appropriation bills on the grounds that the money was "needed to pay for the Malays."[15] The dissenters' most remarkable

[14] Sidney Verba *et al.*, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *The American Political Science Review*, LXI (1967), 324-25, 331; David J. Armor *et al.*, "Professors' Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXXI (1967), 170.

[15] William A. Robinson, *Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian* (New York, 1930), 369-70, 378.

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organizational accomplishment was the creation of anti-imperialist leagues, which sprang up in Boston, New York, Washington, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and half a dozen other major cities. The parent Anti-Imperialist League, which in 1899 claimed 30,000 members and over 500,000 "contributors," mailed out hundreds of thousands of anti-imperialist pamphlets and other propaganda items.[16] The most generous subsidizer of this paper flood was Andrew Carnegie, who also offered to buy the independence of the Philippines with a personal check for twenty million dollars, a proposition predictably denounced as "wicked" by the New York *Times*.[17] The most energetic organizer in the movement was Edward Atkinson, a Boston businessman and indefatigible polemicist. Shortly after the Anti-Imperialist League was founded in his office on November 19, 1898, Atkinson furiously set about writing broadsides with such titles as "The Hell of War and Its Penalties" and an anti-imperialist periodical, all of which he distributed to those "influentials" he thought could most affect the government's imperialist policies—congressmen, clergymen, mayors, state government officials, and officers of commercial, agricultural, and labor organizations. Working from an ingeniously compiled mailing list of about 23,000 names, Atkinson spread the anti-imperialist message throughout the nation.[18] The government seized some of his pamphlets in 1899 when he attempted to mail them to American servicemen, officers, civilian officials, and newspapermen in the Philippines. Legal prosecution was rather idly threatened; Atkinson was made something of a martyr, and the circulation of his manifestoes jumped sharply.[19]

[16] Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," V (1933), 268; Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement," 223.

[17] Clipping enclosed in a letter of John Beatty to Andrew Carnegie, December 8, 1898, Carnegie Papers, Library of Congress; Carl Schurz to Andrew Carnegie, July 2, 1902, in Frederic Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz* (New York, 1913), VI, 292.

[18] Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," III (1930), 15-16; Edward Atkinson to Andrew Carnegie, November 28, 1898, Carnegie Papers; Edward Atkinson to Carl Schurz, February 2, 1899, Carl Schurz Papers, Library of Congress.

[19] Edward Atkinson to the Secretary of War, April 22, 1899, and to Andrew Carnegie, May 22, 1899, Edward Atkinson Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; *The Anti-Imperialist*, I, May 27, 1899, inside front cover; Erving Winslow to Andrew Carnegie, April 12, 1899, Carnegie Papers; Leon Wolff,

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The methods of protest employed by the more conventional and "respectable" doves have been essentially the same as those of 1898. Some of the doves' less inhibited allies, however, have added tactics to the arsenal of dissent that would never have been dreamed of (except in nightmares) by their predecessors of three-quarters of a century ago, including teach-ins, picketing, speech walk-outs, civil disobedience, military insubordination, draft resistance, marches on the Pentagon, medical aid to the enemy, "lie-ins" in front of troop trains, refusal to pay taxes, and even self-immolation.

The tone of both campaigns has often been impassioned and sometimes bitter, but the doves have produced more vulgarity. No anti-imperialist ever wrote an anthem like the Fugs' "Kill for Peace," which contains the line "Strafe them creeps in the rice paddy, daddy."[20] Neither Ambrose Bierce nor Thorstein Veblen (who as a child defaced neighborhood fences with obscenities in classical Greek) ever produced remarks like those made in 1965 by Norman Mailer:

> If the Lord of the Snopes [President Johnson] went to war in Vietnam because finally he didn't have the moral courage to try to solve an impossible mix of camp, red-neck, civil rights, street violence, playboy pornography and all the glut which bugs our works, if Lyndon Johnson finally decided in his fine brain that only a war was going to get America off the pot (we were that mercilessly screwed to the john by fifty years of smelling our national armpit every time the truth rose up to kiss us) well, what he didn't realize was that the war in Vietnam was not going to serve as a cloaca for our worst emotions but instead was going to up the ante and give us more camp, more red-neck, more violence in the streets, more teen-age junkies, more polite society gone ape, more of everything else Lyndon was trying to ship overseas.[21]

Rather more discreet, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., insisted in a 1966 "talk-in" that the President did not want a large Asian war and quoted him as saying, "I don't want to save my face, I just want

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Little Brown Brother: America's Forgotten Bid for Empire which Cost 250,000 Lives (London, 1961), 274-75; Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement," 224-25; and Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," III (1930), 31-32.

[20] "The Arts: Protest on All Sides," *Newsweek*, July 10, 1967, p. 84.

[21] Norman Mailer, "On Vietnam," *Partisan Review*, XXXII (1965), 645-46.

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to save my —," only to have Elizabeth Hardwick respond, "I can't, being a lady, use that word, but does he conceive of that portion of himself as extending all the way to Southeast Asia?"[22]

Anti-imperialists were less coarse in their language but, if anything, more accomplished masters of invective, which, in its developed form, is almost a lost art. William James called the McKinley administration's suppression of the Filipino rebellion "the most incredible, unbelievable, piece of sneak-thief turpitude that any nation ever practised."[23] E. L. Godkin charged the McKinley administration with substituting "keen effective slaughter for Spanish old-fashioned, clumsy slaughter."[24] To an expansionist friend, Carnegie wrote: "It is a matter of congratulation . . . that you have about finished your work of civilizing the Fillipinos [*sic*]. It is thought that about 8000 of them have been completely civilized and sent to Heaven. I hope you like it."[25] And in a little-known volume of malevolence called *The New Flag*, Henry Blake Fuller threw some doggerel at Mark Hanna:

> Grinning, coarsely fleshed and gross
> Following a mighty cross,
> Nailed upon whose either side
> Hangs a Malay crucified—
> Which some Christians, over-civil
> Carry to oblige the Devil.

and at McKinley:

> Hail! stalwart son and Canton Hero!
> Thou Xerxes up to date, or Nero! . . .
> Who for a coral bead or rattle
> 'Gainst unarmed babes doth march to battle![26]

Some of this rhetoric was aimed at influencing the outcome of the elections of 1900 and 1968. In both years critics were largely dissatisfied with the choice of candidates available to them, al-

[22] "A Talk-In On Vietnam," *New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 6, 1966, p. 78.
[23] William James to Carl Schurz, March 16, 1900, Schurz Papers.
[24] Quoted in William M. Armstrong, *E. L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy, 1865-1900* (New York, 1957), 194.
[25] Andrew Carnegie to Whitelaw Reid, December 1, 1899, Carnegie Papers.
[26] Quoted in Bernard R. Bowron, "Henry B. Fuller: A Critical Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1948), 378-79.

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though Bryan gladdened more dissenters than either Richard Nixon or Hubert Humphrey were able to do. In both years the intrusion of other issues—trusts, radicalism, urban problems, race, crime—made it impossible to produce a referendum on the issues of war and imperialism. McKinley's re-election did not prove that American imperialism had been endorsed by the public, only that it had not been repudiated.[27] The 1968 election campaign provided just as ambiguous a measure of the national mood on the Vietnam war. The manner in which doves searched for a way to express their views—pre-convention struggles for Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, Nelson Rockefeller, and George McGovern; fourth-party tactics; write-in votes—resembled the distracted maneuvers of the anti-imperialists in 1900. Some of the latter voted happily for Bryan, others for McKinley; some worked to nominate a third-party candidate—one possibility mentioned was Lew (*Ben Hur*) Wallace—while others preferred a quasi-independent candidate to serve as a stalking-horse for Bryan; some voted for Bryan but also for Republican congressmen who could prevent him from taking any maniacal action in domestic affairs; others voted for McKinley and Democratic Congressmen who could vote down funds for any more of his imperialist adventures. Others simply sulked in their tents on election day.[28]

One major difference in the two election years deserves notice. Early in 1968 the campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, Senator J. William Fulbright's continuing hearings, and the Communists' "Tet" offensive effectively unseated a president of the United States and left his heir with a desperately divided party. Neither the anti-imperialists nor the Filipinos ever accomplished as much in 1900.

Both anti-imperialists and doves opposed their government's policies for varying and often conflicting reasons. Though they sometimes overlapped and merged, these motives can be separated from one another for purposes of analysis. I should like to discuss

[27] See Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIV (1937), 43-52; *Twelve Against Empire*, 120-32; E. Berkeley Tompkins, "Scylla and Charybdis: The Anti-Imperialist Dilemma in the Election of 1900," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXXVI (1967), 143-61.

[28] *Twelve Against Empire*, 120-32.

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them, first with regard to the anti-imperialists and then with regard to the doves, beginning with the least and proceeding to the most significant motivation, a ranking which of necessity will be suggestive rather than definitive.

Personal grudges and narrowly conceived political partisanship had surprisingly little bearing on the actions of the most prominent spokesmen for the anti-imperialists. Had war with Spain begun during a Democratic administration, the anti-imperialists ranks might not have included either Bryan or Cleveland. Had such Republicans as Reed, John Sherman, and Benjamin Harrison had warmer personal feelings toward William McKinley, they too might have felt differently in 1898. But most anti-imperialist leaders (and, again, it should be mentioned that few Democrats are included in this group of "leaders") did not stand to gain politically by opposing the government. Senator George Hoar loved both the Republican Party and McKinley but made a glorious fight against their Philippine policy. Conservative independents who called Bryan a "communist" in 1896 voted for him in 1900.[29]

Economic considerations carried a little more weight with anti-imperialists than did hopes of political advantage. A few, including Thomas Reed, emphasized the need to complete the internal development of the United States before plunging into faraway enterprises.[30] A larger number of anti-imperialists believed that the United States, on the contrary, did need increased foreign markets but that colonialism was a poor and unnecessary way to get them. President David Starr Jordan of Stanford University, who held that more trade would enter the open door than follow the imperial flag, pointed to America's "peaceful conquest of Mexico" as "a legitimate form of expansion." The United States, he stated, "could fill all tropical countries with consular agents and commercial agents, men trained to stand for good order and to work for American interests, for less than it costs to subdue a single tropical island."[31] Most anti-imperialists, however, either ignored

[29] See *ibid.*, 126-38, 150, 152, 155, 158-59, 162-64, 188, 202, 205, 208, 255n.

[30] Thomas B. Reed, "The Safe Pathway of Experience," *North American Review*, CLXIII (1896), 389.

[31] David Starr Jordan, "The Control of the Tropics," *Gunton's Magazine*, XVIII (1900), 408-10.

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economic issues altogether or treated them as low-priority concerns.

Third in ascending importance was the there-are-problems-enough-at-home argument, implicit in the remark of Charles Francis Adams in 1898 that a "Roman-candle foreign policy" was inappropriate as long as "popular discontent" was widespread, cities were misgoverned, and Bryan and other malcontents were on the loose.[32] Whether concerned with race relations, civic corruption, the currency, or trusts, these anti-imperialists held that such problems disqualified the United States from initiating adventures overseas.

Constitutional questions were even more important. McKinley was frequently charged with sending troops to seize the Philippines without constitutional authority and ignoring an alleged constitutional ban on the acquisition of non-contiguous territory. Heard more often was the charge that the Constitution forbade acquisition of colonies not destined to be made states and the closely related contention—rejected by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases—that a colony could not be treated by Congress as though it were a separate and inferior part of the American constitutional system.[33] The anti-imperialists argued that the breaching of these rules would endanger all American principles.

Diplomatic issues were equally important to the anti-imperialists. They deplored the violence done by imperialism to the traditional isolationism and self-sufficiency of America. They condemned imperialism for breaking the nation's ocean belt of security and placing the flag in regions vulnerable to intimidation or attack by others. They held that expansion in the Far East was particularly ill-advised because, first of all, it would throw the United States into the thick of a dangerous contest for empire with European powers. Secondly, it would encourage fresh European encroachments in the Caribbean by undermining the Monroe Doc-

[32] Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "Memorabilia," April 4, 1898, Adams Papers; Geoffrey Blodgett, *The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 266.

[33] See for instance Benjamin Harrison's views in the Benjamin Harrison Papers, Library of Congress, Item #38244, Vol. 176, Ser. I, Mar. 3, 1900; Benjamin Harrison, *Views of an Ex-President: Being his Addresses and Writings on Subjects of Public Interest since the Close of his Administration as President of the United States* (Indianapolis, 1901), 185-221.

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trine pledge that the United States would stay out of the affairs of the Old World in return for European restraint in the New. And thirdly, it would involve the United States too closely with British interests, with the result that America would almost certainly get burned raking English chestnuts out of Asian fires.[34]

Next on the list were those considerations that might charitably be called cultural but, more accurately, should be called racial. Most anti-imperialist leaders believed that any mixing of "Anglo-Saxon" America with the unwashed coloreds of the tropics would lead to racial decadence and contamination. E. L. Godkin complained in *The Nation* that the annexation of Hawaii would admit "alien, inferior, and mongrel races to our nationality,"[35] and Carl Schurz proclaimed it impossible for the United States to absorb "Spanish-Americans, with all the mixture of Indian and Negro blood, and Malays and other unspeakable Asiatics, by the tens of millions!"[36] It was a rare anti-imperialist, like George Hoar or Moorfield Storey, who would bracket America's suppression of Filipino rebels with her everyday treatment of Negroes and condemn both.[37]

Nearly all anti-imperialists had moral objections to American imperialism. They believed it was simply *wrong* for one people to impose its will on another, especially when it was clear that

[34] See George F. Hoar to Beverly K. Moore, Dec. 29, 1898 (copy-draft), George Frisbie Hoar Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Bancroft, V, 480-87, 497-98 and VI, 76; U.S., *Congressional Record*, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1899, pp. 493-503; Andrew Carnegie, *Cuba Free!* (undated leaflet, but evidently written in early Dec. 1898); Andrew Carnegie to New York *Evening Post*, *ca.* Jan. 1899 (draft); and Andrew Carnegie to editor of New York *World*, Jan. 29, 1899, Carnegie Papers; *Twelve Against Empire*, 195, 218-19, 233-34.

[35] Jan. 13, 1898, p. 23.

[36] Bancroft, V, 503-06. See also *Twelve Against Empire*, 23-24, 65, 70-73, 192, 195, 202, 209, 219, 232-33, 235; Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Phillippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History*, XXIV (1958), 319-31.

[37] *The Anti-Imperialist*, I, May 27, 1899, p. 53; U.S., *Congressional Record*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, pp. 714, 4285; George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years* (New York, 1903), I, 259. For a similar stand, see Charles Francis Adams, *"Imperialism" and "The Tracks of our Forefathers," A Paper Read by Charles Francis Adams Before the Lexington, Massachusetts, Historical Society, Tuesday, December 20, 1898* (Boston, 1899), 10; "Memorabilia," Oct. 27, 1898 and May 15, 1900, Adams Papers.

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many Filipinos were prepared to resist American authority. As late as 1902 William James wrote, "God damn the U. S. for its vile conduct in the Philippine Isles!"[38] George Hoar was perhaps most eloquent of all in his moral outrage:

> We converted a war of glory to a war of shame. We vulgarized the American flag. We introduced perfidy into the practice of war. We inflicted torture on unarmed men to extort confession. We put children to death. We established reconcentrado camps. We devastated provinces. We baffled the aspirations of a people for liberty.[39]

The two most important anti-imperialist arguments, the political and what might be called the historical arguments, are very closely related, the first being the foundation and the second the inner core of the anti-imperialist protest. The foundation was built of solid political principles. The anti-imperialists, nurtured on American ideals and convinced of the truth and universal applicability of abstract political principles, asserted in 1898 that a republican government could not also be an imperial government, that the right of self-rule could not be abrogated in faraway territories, and that all men deserved to enjoy the blessings of freedom, whatever their capabilities or limitations.

The historical core of the anti-imperialist message was essentially that imperialism was a denial of the "American Mission," which was to establish a just and free nation whose people would be at peace with each other and the rest of the world. During the eighties and nineties this image was being tarnished in anti-imperialist eyes by new waves of immigration, growing urban problems, agrarian radicalism, severe depressions, and disputes between capital and labor. Then, in 1898, when the United States began to assume the appearance of a land-grabbing European state, the anti-imperialists lashed out in anger, taking the opportunity to attack all the ills of American life at the same time. With near unanimity, anti-imperialists despaired that America had lost her moorings entirely. In 1899 E. L. Godkin lamented:

[38] William James to F. C. S. Schiller, Aug. 6, 1902, William James Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

[39] Quoted in Frederick H. Gillett, *George Frisbie Hoar* (Boston, 1934), 265.

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> I have suffered from seeing the America of my youthful dreams vanish from my sight, and the commencement on this continent of the old story; and I must confess I think I have seen great decline in both morals and politics, within my forty years.[40]

And Carl Schurz wrote in 1902:

> Can you imagine the feelings of a man who all his life has struggled for human liberty and popular government, who for that reason had to flee from his native country, who believed he had found what he sought in this Republic, and thus came to love this Republic even more than the land of his birth, and who at last, at the close of his life, sees that beloved Republic in the clutches of sinister powers which seduce and betray it into an abandonment of its most sacred principles and traditions and push it into policies and practices even worse than those which once he had to flee from.[41]

William James, flabbergasted at how his country could "puke up its ancient soul . . . in five minutes," wrote Schurz: "What a rôle our country was born with, what a silver spoon in its mouth, and how it has chucked it away!"[42] His most disheartening discovery was that America was in no important way better than or different from any other country, that a nation which he had thought "better . . . morally than the rest . . . and without the old savage ambition," had proved by its conduct that "Human Nature is everywhere the same; and at the least temptation all the old military passions rise, and sweep everything before them."[43]

As might be expected, such a ranking of the motives and impulses of the doves reveals both similarities and differences. Economic considerations have been of even less significance today than they were at the turn of the century. Occasionally the more dovish business press (as well as the more hawkish for that matter) has worried about inflation and the distortions in the economy caused

[40] E. L. Godkin to W. R. Huntington, Nov. 13, 1899 in Rollo Ogden (ed.), *Life and Letters of Edwin Lawrence Godkin* (New York, 1907), II, 245.

[41] Carl Schurz to J. G. Schurman, May 8, 1902 in Bancroft, VI, 289-90.

[42] William James to Carl Schurz, Mar. 16, 1900, Schurz Papers; William James to François Pillon, June 15, 1898 in Henry James (ed.), *The Letters of William James* (Boston, 1920), II, 73-74; William James to Henry Lee Higginson, Sept. 18, 1900, James Papers.

[43] William James to François Pillon, June 15, 1898 in Henry James, II, 74.

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by the war[44], but almost no doves have echoed the anti-imperialists' interest in the issue of foreign trade and investments.

Nor have the doves echoed the racism of 1898, a sign of the twentieth-century transformation of elite views on race. The nearest thing today to the racism of the 1890's is a not uncommon disdain for Asian peoples, a feeling they are not worth the trouble Americans have given themselves on their account. Surely a touch of the old Godkinesque scorn for lesser breeds is evident in John Kenneth Galbraith's comment that were it not for American intervention in Southeast Asia, "all of that part of the world would be enjoying the obscurity that it richly deserves."[45]

Third on the list of motivations is partisanship, a bit stronger now than seventy years ago, though still not very significant. Dovishness was a potentially useful political tool to Robert Kennedy, George Romney, and Nelson Rockefeller. Most Republicans, however, were slow to criticize President Johnson's policy in Vietnam. When they did, they usually favored stiffening it—there have been few Republicans in the dovecote. And most Democratic politicians, originally at least, found it as painful to attack the President as it was for George Hoar to attack McKinley. This was clearly the case with Senator Fulbright, who remarked on the similarity of his dilemma to Hoar's.[46]

Despite years of exposure to the Hamiltonian-Rooseveltian view of the Constitution, the doves have charged President Johnson with usurping the power of Congress to declare war. Senator Fulbright used the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to reassert the constitutional prerogatives of the Senate in foreign affairs,[47] and George Kennan criticized Rusk's "commitments" in part on the

[44] For a discussion of American business and the Vietnam war, see Thomas V. DiBacco, "The Business Press and Vietnam: Ecstasy or Agony?" *The Journalism Quarterly*, XLV, 3 (1968), 426-35; I am indebted to my colleague for the opportunity to see this article in manuscript form. See also Marriner S. Eccles, "Vietnam: Its Effect on the Nation." Speech delivered at the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, Aug. 11, 1967, *Vital Speeches*, Sept. 15, 1967, p. 718.

[45] "The Importance of Obscurity," *Time*, Mar. 6, 1966, p. 27.

[46] Interview with Senator J. W. Fulbright, Feb. 16, 1968.

[47] J. William Fulbright, "The Higher Patriotism," Christian A. Herter Lectures I, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., Apr. 21, 1966. Reprint from the *Congressional Record*, 2.

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grounds that they were not sanctioned by appropriate "constitutional processes."[48] Constitutionalism is clearly not yet a dead issue.[49]

Far more important, however, has been the question of international legality, virtually absent from the anti-imperialist campaign. Opponents of the war have accused the United States of violating the United Nations Charter and other international treaties, the rulings of the Nuremberg Trials, and the general principles of international law. They have consistently maintained that the SEATO treaty does not provide justification for American intervention.[50] The Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam spoke for most doves in accusing the United States government of breaking the Geneva Accords of 1954,[51] and Quincy Wright, along with others, charged that the United States was violating the basic right of any society to undergo internal revolution.[52]

Next in ascending priority has been concern about the immediate consequences of the war upon American society and democracy. This has taken two different forms, charges that the war is producing serious neglect of pressing social problems and that the

[48] *Vietnam Hearings*, 113-14.

[49] See also Ernest Gruening, "The Reality of Vietnam," *The Progressive*, XXX (1966), 15-16; "The Illegality of the Undeclared War in Vietnam—The Answer of the Special Lawyers' Committee," *Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 2665.

[50] See Nat Hentoff, Walter Kauffmann, Mark Lane, Lewis Mumford, and Edgar Snow in *Authors*, 38, 44, 46, 54, 69; "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority," advertisement of RESIST, *New Republic*, Oct. 7, 1967, p. 34; *Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, with Henry Steele Commager, Amherst College, February 20, 1967* (Washington, D.C., 1967), 18 (hereafter cited as Commager); Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 156; Eugene J. McCarthy, "Why I'm Battling LBJ," *Look*, Feb. 6, 1968, p. 24; Senator Wayne Morse in *Congressional Record*, April 5, 1966, p. 7268; Wayne Morse in *Vietnam Hearings*, 14.

[51] "The Illegality of the Undeclared War in Vietnam," 2665.

[52] Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (eds.), *The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis* (New York, 1965), 8 (hereafter cited as *The Viet-Nam Reader*). See also Gruening, "The Reality of Vietnam," 16; Richard J. Barnet in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 46, 50; Richard A. Falk, "U.S. in Vietnam: Rationale & Law," *Dissent*, XIII (1966), 283.

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war itself is having a disintegrative impact on American society. The war critics have repudiated the "guns *and* butter" formulation of the Johnson administration and, like the anti-imperialists, have questioned how Americans could be expected to reorder a far-off society when they apparently can not reform their own.[53] They have charged that while billions of dollars have been spent in Vietnam, the issues of poverty, racial tensions, urban decay, crime, water and air pollution, and general physical ugliness are tragically short-changed in money and attention. According to Senator Fulbright, the war diverts America "from the sources of its strength, which are in its domestic life."[54]

The doves' catalog of the war's pernicious reverberations at home includes the suppression of dissent,[55] a growing disrespect for law caused by America's "lawless" conduct in Vietnam,[56] and even a corruption of language resulting from the administration's frequent resort to Orwellian double-talk in its efforts to represent its Vietnamese disasters as triumphs.[57] Moreover, they have argued that the war has shattered public unity,[58] alienated young people from society,[59] and poisoned the nation's spirit with cyni-

[53] Commager, 6; [Walter Lippmann], "A New Leader for the Orchestra," *New Republic*, Dec. 9, 1967, p. 2, conversation between Lippmann and college students on Public Broadcast Laboratory, Nov. 19, 1967.

[54] Fulbright, "Arrogance of Power," 11; Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 155-56; Eccles, "Vietnam: Its Effect on the Nation," 718; Fulbright, "The Great Society Is a Sick Society," 30; George F. Kennan, "Introducing Eugene McCarthy," remarks at a dinner for McCarthy in Newark, N.J., Feb. 29, 1968 in the *New York Review of Books*, Apr. 11, 1968; "Mansfield Ties Plight of Cities to War Drain," Washington *Post*, Jan. 23, 1968; *The Viet-Nam Reader*, xiv. Richard Rovere adds that the war causes the United States and other nations to neglect pressing international social problems (e.g., pollution) and is "monumentally irrelevant to what should be the priorities of policy in 1968," in *Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Personal Reflections on 1968* (Boston, 1968), 84.

[55] Fullbright, "The Higher Patriotism," 2; Hans J. Morgenthau, "When Consensus Breaks Down," *New Republic*, Jan. 22, 1966, p. 18; "Toward Caesarism," *Christian Century*, May 3, 1967, p. 579. See also Irving Howe *et al.*, "The Vietnam Protest," *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 25, 1965, p. 12.

[56] Fulbright, "The Great Society Is a Sick Society," 90 (one of the most remarkable expositions of this theme); *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 46.

[57] August Heckscher, "Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Vietnam," *The American Scholar*, XXXV (1966), 614, 617.

[58] Kennan, "Introducing Eugene McCarthy"; Rovere, 116.

[59] Kennan, "Introducing Eugene McCarthy."

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cism and hypocrisy.[60] "What I see," Walter Lippmann dolefully remarked, "is the disintegration of hope and belief and will—willpower and morale."[61]

Political and historical concepts have shaped the doves' views even more than anxieties about particular domestic problems. One of their most frequently repeated complaints has been that the United States has been acting in Vietnam like a frightened Old World power defending the status quo. "It is Metternich's war fought by the nation of Jefferson and Lincoln," in the words of Hans Morgenthau,[62] who thus echoed the beliefs of many anti-imperialists that America's error has lain in departing from her traditions and contradicting her own political nature. The United States, according to this dove view, has been throwing away the opportunity to influence the world by force of example rather than by force of arms and in succumbing to the "arrogance of power" (as was also said seventy years ago) has become indistinguishable in conduct from the sinful old nations of Europe.[63] The

[60] W. H. Ferry in David Nevin, "The Dissent: It Questions and Attacks U.S. Involvement in Vietnam," *Life*, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 62. See also William Henry Harris, "Morality, Moralism and Vietnam," *Christian Century*, Sept. 22, 1965, p. 1156.

[61] [Lippmann], "A New Leader for the Orchestra," 21.

[62] *Authors*, 76; Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power* (New York, 1967), 219; J. William Fulbright, "Revolution Abroad," Christian A. Herter Lectures II, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., April 27, 1966, reprint from the *Congressional Record*, 2; Hans J. Morgenthau, "What Ails America?" *New Republic*, Oct. 28, 1967, p. 19.

[63] See John Malcolm Brinnin, Robert Chrichton, Denise Levertov, Lewis Mumford, David Riesman, Susan Sontag, Richard Wilbur in *Authors*, 24-25, 30-31, 46-47, 54-55, 64, 69-70, 76; Robert Bly, "Murder as a Prudent Policy," acceptance speech on winning the National Book Award for Poetry, in *Commonweal*, Mar. 22, 1968, p. 17; Chomsky, "On Resistance," 12; "Defective Vision," 7; Fulbright, "The Higher Patriotism," 1-2; Fulbright, "The Great Society Is a Sick Society," 30, 96; Fulbright, "Arrogance of Power," 11-12; Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 156–57; Interview with Senator Fulbright, Feb. 16, 1968; Sidney Lens, "Vietnam: A Policy of Deceit," *The Progressive*, XXX (1966), 17; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Vietnam: Shadow and Substance," *New York Review of Books*, Sept. 16, 1965, pp. 4-5; Hans J. Morgenthau, "U.S. Misadventure in Vietnam," *Current History* (Jan. 1968), 33-34; Morgenthau, "What Ails America?" 18-19; Joseph Kraft in *The Vietnam Reader*, 316; Harris, "Morality, Moralism and Vietnam," 1155-57; William Pfaff, "The Parochial American," *Commonweal*, Aug. 20, 1965, pp. 581-82.

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war, John Fairbank asserted, "shatters our self-image of America the great and good . . . assaults our self-esteem as world leader . . . and calls our ultimate values into question."[64]

Some critics have insisted that the war in Vietnam came as no accident, no biological sport, but as a natural outgrowth of American society. The young critics of the New Left express this idea in politico-economic terms in their charge that the Vietnam war was created by a society that lives on the manipulation and exploitation of poor people at home and abroad.[65] Other dissenters seem to be saying that American policy in Vietnam is the inevitable product of a sick culture; Mary McCarthy on her return from a trip to South Vietnam in 1967 reported that near "any large American base . . . the countryside resembles nothing more than a dump or the leper's pigyard, with backed-up cesspool . . . the fecal matter of our civilization we have left in the country."[66]

The anti-imperialists and today's dissenters have viewed both wars as morality plays with the United States in the unlikely role of villain. The moral protest against the Vietnam conflict ranks second in importance among the doves' motivations. In addition to a general condemnation in moral terms,[67] they have advanced

[64] Fairbank, "Perspective on Vietnam," 16.

[65] Carl Oglesby, "Bankruptcy of the Liberals," *Commonweal*, Jan. 7, 1966, p. 397; Todd Gitlin, "Power and the Myth of Progress," *New Republic*, Dec. 27, 1965, pp. 19-21; Paul Goodman, "Reflections on Racism, Spite, Guilt, and Violence," *New York Review of Books*, May 23, 1968, p. 22; Andrew Kopkind, "Radicals on the March," *New Republic*, Dec. 11, 1965, pp. 15-16.

[66] Mary McCarthy, "Report from Vietnam II," 8. See also James Purdy and Susan Sontag in *Authors*, 62, 69.

[67] See for instance, S. N. Behrman, Kay Boyle, John Malcolm Brinnin, Paddy Chayefsky, Richard Ellmann, Allen Ginsberg, Joseph Heller, James Jones, Walter Kauffmann, Mark Lane, Denise Levertov, Herbert Marcuse, Lewis Mumford, Frederic Raphael, David Riesman, Harold Rosenberg, Susan Sontag, Terry Southern, and George Steiner in *Authors*, 20, 24, 29, 33, 36, 38, 43-44, 46-47, 50, 54-55, 63-65, 69-71; Kenneth E. Boulding, "Postscript: A Moderately Great Society," *New Republic*, Dec. 18, 1965, pp. 15-16; "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority," 34; McGovern in Fall, Goodwin, McGovern, and Roche, 40; "The Debate," *Time*, July 2, 1965, p. 14; Eccles, "Vietnam: Its Effect on the Nation," 718; Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 30; Kennan, "Introducing Eugene McCarthy"; Eugene J. McCarthy, "Why I'm Battling LBJ," 24; Mary McCarthy, "Vietnam: Solutions," *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 9, 1967, p. 5; Senator Morse, *Congressional Record*, April 5, 1966, p. 7268; Henry Rubin, William A. Williams, Mark O. Hatfield, Robert Cohen,

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two distinctive arguments. The first, exemplified by poet Robert Bly at the time he turned over his 1968 National Book Award check to a draft-resistance organization, is that the United States has been "murdering a culture in Vietnam at least as fine as our own . . .,"[68] which recalls William James's accusation about American impact on the Philippines.[69] The second and more frequently heard refinement of the moral argument is the contention that the war is causing a "psychic numbing" and brutalization of the American people. Robert Lifton claimed that this tendency has been very subtly corrupting the sensibilities of Americans in Vietnam, where military men, diplomats, and journalists all have blandly talked of how a Vietnam "stint" would help their careers, public information officers have pooh-poohed reports of civilian casualties, and social scientists have spoken of their "rewarding" and "exciting" studies in "a fascinating place."[70] One phase of this morally desensitizing process, as William James maintained at the time of the Philippine insurrection, is the substitution of abstract for concrete thinking, the growing inability to sense the humanity of the enemy or the inhumanity of some of one's own actions.[71] Senator Fulbright believes this attitude has reappeared; in mentally transforming the Viet Cong into "an abstraction—a 'communist son of a bitch' "—Americans, he feels, have become effectively dehumanized. And it is not only the military about whom doves have worried; in Senator Vance Hartke's words: "Day by day millions of our own people are growing thicker calluses on their hearts as they grow impervious to the old

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Edwin B. Horowitz, and W. H. Ferry in Nevin, "The Dissent," 62; D. Gareth Porter, "People as Enemy: The Scorched Earth of Vietnam," *New Republic*, Feb. 10, 1968, p. 19; I. F. Stone in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 309; Rovere, 116; Susan Sontag quoted in *Publisher's Weekly*, Mar. 28, 1966, p. 36; Kennan in *Vietnam Hearings*, 110, 112; Harris, "Morality, Moralism and Vietnam," 1155-57; Interview with Senator Fulbright, Feb. 16, 1968.

[68] Bly, "Murder as a Prudent Policy," 17.

[69] William James to Charles F. Adams, Dec. 29, 1898, Adams Papers; William James to Henry Rutgers Marshall, Feb. 8, 1899 in Henry James, II, 88; and William James to G. Stanley Hall, May 14, 1900, James Papers.

[70] Robert Jay Lifton, "America in Vietnam—The Circle of Deception," *Trans-Action*, V (1968), 13.

[71] Boston *Evening Transcript*, Mar. 4, 1899 and Apr. 15, 1899.

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story of napalm, search-and-destroy, bomb-them-harder, escalate more, and bring them to their knees."[72]

From the words of the doves it is possible to conclude that moral arguments have been paramount in their minds, but among the most articulate and influential critics the most impressive dissent has come in the form of a diplomatic and intellectual critique. Some of this reliance upon a "realistic" diplomatic critique probably stems from the reluctance of men who wish to appear "tough-minded" to express their deeply-held moral objections to the war. In sharp contrast to seventy years ago, when diplomatic grounds for dissent—according to this crude and tentative scale—were six notches down the list in importance, the doves have directed their most forceful arguments at alleged errors in the intellectual formulation and practical execution of American policy. It appears, ironically, that the *Realpolitik* teachings of George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau, familiar to all students of American diplomacy for the last twenty years, has at last borne fruit, so that an administration which boasted the services of such self-styled *Realpolitikers* as Walt W. Rostow and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski came to be accused daily by the "old" realists of living in a world of diplomatic fantasy.

The impact of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Fullbright, and their colleagues cannot be properly appreciated without rehearsing in some detail the amazing range of their criticisms. They began by attacking the entire intellectual foundation of American policy in Southeast Asia, especially condemning the administration for pursuing a policy of globalism for which American resources are inadequate[73] and rejecting a spheres-of-influence pol-

[72] Vance Hartke, "Where are the Peacemakers?" *The Progressive*, XXX (1966), 14. See also John Malcolm Brinnin and Lewis Mumford in *Authors*, 25, 54-55; Fulbright, "The Great Society Is a Sick Society," 30; Morgenthau, "Vietnam: Shadow and Substance," 4-5; and David B. Barron in Nevin, "The Dissent," 62.

[73] Commager, 5; "Alternatives in Vietnam," *Christian Century*, Mar. 10, 1965, p. 291; Lewis Mumford, Susan Sontag in *Authors*, 55, 69; Chomsky, "On Resistance," 12; Falk, "U.S. in Vietnam," 284; Fulbright, "Arrogance of Power," 1, 4, 11; Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 156; Lippmann in Irving Kristol, "Teaching In, Speaking Out: The Controversy over Viet Nam," *Encounter*, XXV (Aug. 1965), 66; Walter Lippmann, "The Vietnamese War

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icy which would accept the idea of Chinese predominance on the Asian mainland.[74] They have repeatedly accused Secretary of State Rusk of trafficking in mythical Wilsonian assumptions,[75] failing to distinguish Chinese talk from Chinese action,[76] giving way to obsessive anti-communism, and persisting in the notion of a monolithic communist movement.[77] They have, by turns and contrarily, denounced the administration for aligning the United States on the side of the status quo in a revolutionary world and for foolishly attempting to play the revolutionary from a conservative base.[78] They accused President Johnson of misunderstanding the meaning, importance, and means of protecting American prestige,[79] of breaking the American taboo against fighting wars on the mainland of Asia,[80] of neglecting opportunities to work with rather than against Asian nationalism,[81] and of staking everything on an ally that, in George Kennan's words, was "too weak, too timid, too selfish, too uninspiring, to form a

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Today," *Newsweek*, Sept. 13, 1965, p. 17; Walter Lippmann, "The Frustration of Globalism," Washington *Post*, Mar. 10, 1966; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Globalism: Johnson's Moral Crusade," *New Republic*, July 3, 1965, p. 19; Raskin, Fall, Kennan, Barnet, Gary Porter in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, xiv-xv, 3, 15-16, 49, 326; Rovere, 73; Fulbright and Kennan in *Vietnam Hearings*, 34, 118.

[74] Lippmann in Kristol, "Teaching In, Speaking Out," 66; Lippmann, "The Frustration of Globalism"; Morgenthau, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 39.

[75] Lippmann, "The Frustration of Globalism." Similarly, see Porter in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 326.

[76] J. W. Fulbright, "America in an Age of Revolution," *The Progressive*, XXX (Feb. 1966), 19; George McT. Kahin, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 289; Rovere, p. 73.

[77] Harvey Swados, *Authors*, 72; Commager, 7; Fulbright, "America in an Age of Revolution," 19; Fulbright, "Revolution Abroad," 2; Morgenthau in "The Prospect for Southeast Asia: A Symposium on United Foreign Policy," *Saturday Review*, Oct. 30, 1965, p. 100; Kahin, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 289.

[78] Commager, 11-12; Draper, 219; Fulbright, "America in an Age of Revolution," 20; Fulbright, "Revolution Abroad," 1-2; Raskin and Fall in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, xiii.

[79] Fulbright in *Vietnam Hearings*, 287; Morgenthau, "Vietnam: Shadow and Substance," 3.

[80] [Lippmann], "A New Leader for the Orchestra," 19; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28.

[81] Kahin, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 289.

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suitable or promising object of our support."[82] They have condemned the war in Vietnam because it threatens general world peace,[83] because the United States was initially under no obligation to become involved there,[84] because it was inexpedient to intervene unilaterally in what was essentially a civil war,[85] and because no concrete interests that the United States might have had in Vietnam could justify such massive intervention. As Kennan testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966: "It is difficult to believe that any decisive developments of the world situation would be determined in normal circumstances by what happens on that territory."[86]

In reply the Johnson administration at times employed metaphors and historical analogies. These were promptly rejected by the doves, who declared that the precedents of European containment are inapplicable to Asia, that the nations of Southeast Asia are not stacked dominoes, that Ho Chi Minh was not Hitler, and that a compromise peace would not be another "Munich."[87]

[82] Kennan, "Introducing Eugene McCarthy." See also McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28; Kahin, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 292; Lifton, "America in Vietnam," 11.

[83] Paddy Chayefsky, *Authors*, 29; Fulbright, "Arrogance of Power," 1, 4; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28; Fulbright in *Vietnam Hearings*, 206; Interview with Senator Fulbright, Feb. 16, 1968.

[84] Morgenthau, "Vietnam: Shadow and Substance," 3; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28; Don R. and Arthur Larson, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 106; Morse, Kennan in *Vietnam Hearings*, 14, 113-14, 149.

[85] Falk, "U.S. in Vietnam," 284; McDermott, "Welfare Imperialism in Vietnam," 87; Senator Frank Church in Nevin, "The Dissent," 59; Charlton Ogburn, Jr., "Mr. Katzenbach's Puzzle," *New Republic*, Nov. 4, 1967, p. 14; Kennan in *Vietnam Hearings*, 113-14; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28.

[86] *Vietnam Hearings*, 108. See also Fulbright in *ibid.*, 287; Paddy Chayefsky, Barbara Tuchman in *Authors*, 29, 72; Eric Sevareid, "Why Our Foreign Policy is Failing: An Exclusive Interview with Senator Fulbright," *Look*, May 3, 1966, p. 24; John K. Galbraith in "The Importance of Obscurity," 27; Gruening, "The Reality of Vietnam," 15; Kennan, "Introducing Eugene McCarthy"; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Johnson's Dilemma; The Alternatives Now in Vietnam," *New Republic*, May 28, 1966, p. 14; Selig S. Harrison, "Reischauer's Asia," review of Edwin O. Reischauer's *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia*, in *New Republic*, Nov. 25, 1967, p. 23; Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 116, quoting Reischauer.

[87] Walter Lippmann, "Confrontation with China," Washington *Post*, Feb. 15, 1966; Walter Kauffmann, *Authors*, 44; Fulbright, "The Higher Patriotism," 2;

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Finally, these scholarly doves blasted the Vietnam war on the grounds that it had injured American foreign policy in other important areas without accomplishing its own supposed objectives. They charged that the war has been detrimental to American interests in its effect of slowing down the Sino-Soviet conflict—although George Kennan, on the other hand, has argued that the conflict continued undiminished but had been converted into a contest to see whether Russia or China could best support anti-American wars of liberation.[88] In addition, the doves have asserted that American policy in Vietnam has arrested the progress of the U.S.-Soviet *détente*,[89] encouraged other nations like Israel to use force in diplomatic disputes,[90] entangled the United States in an area of secondary importance, thereby leaving it vulnerable elsewhere,[91] stalled the effort to build bridges to eastern Europe, accelerated the unraveling of the Western alliance, crippled many of the urgently needed foreign aid programs, stimulated the arms race again, and left the United States more isolated diplomatically than it had been for thirty years.[92]

On the other side, Dean Rusk pleaded the necessity of checking a belligerent China; the doves answered that the war might make that nation more belligerent than ever and pointed to "the absurdity of the idea that we [were] 'containing China' by destroy-

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Gruening, "The Reality of Vietnam," 15; Church and Morgenthau in Nevin, "The Dissent," 59; Morgenthau in "The Prospect for Southeast Asia," 32; Morgenthau in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 38; Richard L. Renfield, "A Policy for Vietnam," *The Yale Review*, LVI (June 1967), 483-84; Church in *Vietnam Hearings*, 136.

[88] Peter DeVries, *Authors*, 32; Lippmann in Kristol, "Teaching In, Speaking Out," 66; Kennan, *Vietnam Hearings*, 125.

[89] George Steiner, *Authors*, 71; Eccles, "Vietnam: Its Effect on the Nation," 719; Fulbright, "America in an Age of Revolution," 18-19; Walter Lippmann, "The Rusk-McNamara Containment Policy," Washington *Post*, Mar. 8, 1966.

[90] Richard J. Barnet, *The Viet-Nam Reader*, 50.

[91] Eccles, "Vietnam: Its Effect on the Nation," 718; General James M. Gavin in *Vietnam Hearings*, 70.

[92] Fulbright, "America in an Age of Revolution," 18; Senator Mike Mansfield *et al.*, "The Vietnam Conflict; The Substance and the Shadow," *"Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 963; Raskin, Fall in *The Viet-Nam Reader*, xiii-xiv; Gavin and Kennan in *Vietnam Hearings*, 65, 110-11.

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ing popular and independent forces on its borders."[93] Rusk then would speak of demonstrating the futility and costliness of wars of liberation; the doves claimed that the war, in fact, has proved the difficulty of stopping one and that the outcome in Vietnam would not settle the issue definitively in any case.[94] President Johnson said the United States had to demonstrate the reliability of all its world commitments; his critics countered that America's overcommitment in Vietnam has raised doubts about her ability to meet her other obligations and that her excessively destructive methods of warfare have caused other small nations to question seriously the desirability of American "commitments" to them in the future.[95] The administration returned to the domino theory; the doves rejected it again but added that it was more likely to be true now than in the past because the United States, by unnecessarily transforming a local struggle into *the* diplomatic crisis of the 1960's, had seen to it that any American defeat would have a far wider international impact than would have been the case otherwise.[96] Finally, the administration fell back on what many considered to be its most sophisticated and compelling argument, that the United States was merely trying to protect South Vietnam from its enemies long enough for that budding nation to develop its own capabilities for carrying on alone; tirelessly, the doves replied that the war had actually intensified the South's deterioration, reduced its independence, self-reliance, and sense of nationhood, and rendered its social transformation virtually impossible.[97]

This assault on the principles and practice of American policy has been the most comprehensive, meticuously detailed, merciless,

[93] Steiner, *Authors*, 71; Chomsky, "On Resistance," 8; J. W. Fulbright, "Vietnam: A Holding Action," *Vital Speeches*, XXXI, July 1, 1965, p. 546; Renfield, "A Policy for Vietnam," 482.

[94] Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 112, 116; Morgenthau in "The Prospect for Southeast Asia," 32.

[95] Walter Lippmann, "Robert Kennedy's Point," Washington *Post*, Feb. 22, 1966; Fulbright, "For a New Order of Priorities," 116; Mansfield *et al.*, "The Vietnam Conflict," 963; McGovern, "Vietnam and the Birds," 28; Fulbright, *Vietnam Hearings*, 287; Morgenthau, "Vietnam: Shadow and Substance," 3.

[96] Rovere, 100-01.

[97] Lifton, "America in Vietnam," 11-12, 17.

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and unremitting ever to be directed at a government of the United States in its conduct of foreign affairs.

Because the circumstances of 1898 and 1968 differed so markedly—in 1898, for instance, Americans were mopping up after a clearly victorious war while recently they have been trying to extricate themselves from what no one could call a victory—there is little point in comparing the detailed proposals of each group of dissenters for settling the issues in question. Suffice it to say that the anti-imperialists suggested many programs, few of which were persuasive. Their primary accomplishment was to lodge a moral protest, reassert traditional ideals, and, as I have written elsewhere, "warn a nation of optimists that America could not escape the consequences of its own conduct."[98] The doves have played a similar role. Their enclave strategy suffered as great a setback from the Tet offensive of 1968 as did the administration's policies, and many of their proposals for negotiation were frustrated by a lack of amiability from Hanoi as often as by a lack of receptiveness in Washington. But despite these discouragements, the doves have served the American people as a conscience and, more than any critics of the past, as a voice of diplomatic reason. And their effect—witness the events of 1968 and 1969—has been historic.

[98] *Twelve Against Empire*, 239.

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Britain and America: Some Requisites of Executive Leadership Compared*

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The 1968 election contest between Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey illustrated a serious institutional limitation of the American presidency. Faced with some of the gravest challenges in history, the two major candidates never publicly debated one another in their quest for national leadership. Ultimately, Mr. Nixon was elected without the ordeal of a hostile cross-examination. Once in office not only is he generally free to determine the timing and nature of his public communications; he is virtually insured against the risks of any further personal, public, face-to-face encounters with political opponents. The American procedure, by which candidates and incumbents of the presidency can not be compelled to defend and justify their actions publicly, is the very antithesis of the British system, and the difference has serious implications for the formulation of public policy and the maintenance of democratic values.

The importance of these differences is occasionally dramatized by momentous events such as the current conflict in Vietnam. The war in Vietnam probably has produced more division, confusion,

* The writer wishes to express appreciation to his colleague Professor Charles M. Hardin for several suggestions embodied here from his "The American Presidency: The Problem of Confrontation" (unpublished paper, March 1966).

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and despair in the body politic than any American conflict save the Civil War. Yet, no president of the United States, constitutionally the chief formulator and executor of the nation's foreign policy, has ever publicly debated the reasons for American involvement there. To be sure, presidents have made speeches and declarations, but none has appeared in any public forum to defend his views or to reconcile them with the criticisms and objections raised by others. For example, President Johnson's oft-repeated statement that the United States "ought to help a brave people defend itself"[1] clashed with so many American news reports on the deportment of South Vietnamese troops and officials as to undermine seriously public confidence in those allegedly brave, free allies anxious to defend themselves against Communist aggression. Yet the President never attempted publicly to reconcile his view of the American role with what many others regard to be the actualities of the war. When a pastor once mildly chastised Mr. Johnson to his face for his failure to adequately explain the American effort in Vietnam, that event itself became something of a national sensation.

Under the British political-constitutional system, this tremendous gap in communication between the chief decision maker and his public is, in fact, impossible. Under the American system, the executive is virtually *prevented* from engaging in public debate on policy by the institutional setting of his office; under the British system he is expected and, in fact, *compelled* to engage continually in it. To be sure, dialogue, in any form, does not guarantee successful policy, and compelling "answers" does not necessarily ensure getting "good" answers, but forcing the executive to publicly explain, defend, and justify his policy serves important democratic values. It strengthens the concept of responsibility to the voters by forcing him to expose his policies to their scrutiny.

The dialogue is possible under the British political system because the British prime minister is, by the nature of his office, a parliamentary leader. Whether he happens to be the chief of a coalition government or of a government based upon a single majority party, he must be a member of Parliament and his tenure

[1] Last enunciated in a White House speech of March 21, 1968.

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of office, from a constitutional point of view, is at the pleasure of the House of Commons on a virtually continuous, twenty-four-hour basis. Although it is unlikely to happen, he could be turned out of office by the Commons at any time. By virtue of usage established at the beginning of this century, the prime minister must himself be a member of the House; his physical attendance upon the Commons, his personal availability to answer queries and to give guidance, is equally well established and highly prized by the members. Thursday afternoons, with punctual regularity, the prime minister answers questions, some hostile, many relatively neutral, that is, concerned with eliciting factual information or clarification not intended to damage the government's reputation. Although he has prior written notice of most questions so that he may be briefed by his civil service chiefs and other aides, there are always some inevitable "supplementaries." Any one of these could be exploited by the government's opponents then and there, as well as subsequently, if the prime minister should falter in his responses. In addition, on many other occasions he is expected to rebut and confront his opponents face-to-face and occasionally to volunteer pronouncements of policy during debates conducted by others on virtually every conceivable topic within the purview of the government's interest or responsibility.

Moreover, the government itself, that is the Cabinet of which the prime minister is member and leader, is a committee of Parliament, both in a *de facto* sense and in a legal-constitutional sense. All its members must be simultaneously members of either the House of Commons or the House of Lords. They are all continuously co-responsible with the prime minister to the House of Commons so that, in the event of a formal vote of censure, a vote against one would be simultaneously a vote against all. The policy of the prime minister is understood to be synonymous with the policy of the entire Cabinet, and those members who differ with their leader's announced decisions can publicly voice those differences only by resignation from it.[2] The constitutional co-responsibility of British Cabinet members provides them with

[2] Ramsay MacDonald's 1931 Coalition National Government with its famed "agreement to differ" is the single exception.

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a right to argue matters of policy among themselves and with the prime minister. Blame cannot be avoided on grounds of constitutional impotence. Not all the members of the Cabinet are equally senior and significant figures either in Parliament or in their parties but, in accordance with Britain's unwritten constitution, the Cabinet invariably includes at least several of the principal party leaders and senior members from the prime minister's own party. Thus, what may be regarded as the constitutional right and even incentive to argue one's case within the Cabinet is generally buttressed by considerable political influence and prestige at least in the case of several of the members.

Because of these requisites of leadership, the typical British prime minister in the twentieth century, and to a large extent even in the nineteenth, has been a member of long experience in the House of Commons, who is thus well equipped by training and exposure to engage in the two major dialogues demanded by his position—the dialogue in the Commons and the dialogue within the Cabinet itself.

Unlike appearances before party gatherings or the television cameras, these dialogues take place frequently and regularly; nor are they speeches or formal presentations by two or more persons of different or opposing views. The dialogues in the House of Commons and in the Cabinet consist of exchanges of questions and answers, and can be quite painful for the participants. They have little in common with the kind of speech which politicians in Britain, and elsewhere, deliver "on the hustings," from the platform of a large auditorium, or in front of the television cameras. There are no prepared texts to rely upon. Only a politician who has learned how to think on his feet can cope with such a system and survive in it. Even if he need not be a genius in order to succeed, he must have experience, wide-ranging knowledge of public affairs, and considerable agility. He cannot shield himself with assistants and advisers; he must be able to think and speak for himself at all times and must combine a high degree of alacrity with no lesser measure of prudence and caution.

The House of Commons fosters, indeed requires, a mode of expression which is at once sober, deferential to the audience, and unspectacularly straight-forward. As Sir Ivor Jennings describes it:

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> The speeches which succeed are quietly spoken. . . . The extravagances of the political platform fall flat; even the methods of the law courts, strangely quiet and unemotional though they are when contrasted with those adopted in many other countries, are not sufficiently conversational. The House is a small and compact body. Its members are experienced in demagogy, and are impatient of it in their own proceedings. The speaker who 'catches the ear' of the House must speak intelligently. Pathos is apt to turn to bathos and emotion to apathy. . . .[3]

The members of the House are noted for constituting a demanding audience:

> The House of Commons is not an easy audience to address, and Members soon realize that the conditions are very different from those of the public platform or the lecture theatre. . . . The Commons is an experienced and critical audience. . . .[4]

No less important is the technique involved in the daily question period. Here the debating skills of the executive are apt to be frequently and sometimes severely tested. A recent study on the subject concluded that:

> A Minister who is not by training a politician may find it difficult on occasions to deal with the House but the majority of supplementaries present little if any terror for the experienced politician. There are some who would have lasted longer as Ministers or risen higher in Government circles had they been able to answer questions better. But it is likely that their inability to handle questions was but a reflection of their general inadequacy as Parliamentarians.[5]

Without exception, the incumbents in this century have pos-

[3] *Parliament* (Cambridge, 1957), 17.

[4] Peter G. Richards, *Honourable Members* (London, 1959), 87. Cf. Byrum E. Carter, *The Office of Prime Minister* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 269 and Viscount Samuel, *Memoirs* (London, 1945): "A Parliamentary audience is naturally more discriminating and critical than a popular meeting. It likes a convincing argument; it resents errors of fact—and while Lloyd George was always anxious to be accurate, temperament sometimes defeated him; and it is inclined to scoff at flights into the picturesque" (pp. 88-89). Cf. L. M. Weir, *The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald* (London, n.d.), chaps. 8 and 9, for an account of how MacDonald nearly ruined his career with "the speech that pleased no one" on August 3, 1914.

[5] D. N. Chester and N. Bowring, *Questions in Parliament* (Oxford, 1962), 286.

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sessed qualifications which testify to their thorough professionalism and talent for dialogue. Not since Lord Salisbury in 1895 has the premiership devolved upon a peer. In 1963 Lord Home was named prime minister only after the renunciation of peerage had been legalized and in the clear expectation that he would return to the House of Commons where he had served an apprenticeship of twenty years, from 1931 until 1951. Of the fourteen men who have served as prime minister during the twentieth century (excluding Lord Salisbury before 1902), only three have had less than twenty years experience in the House of Commons before assuming the top post. MacDonald and Baldwin served fourteen and fifteen years respectively, and Harold Wilson nineteen years. Winston Churchill, Campbell Bannerman, Macmillan, and Eden all served more than thirty years.[6]

Hans Daalder has shown that in the period from 1868 to 1958, of the 279 persons who first entered the Cabinet at all levels, only 29 had had no previous parliamentary experience. There were altogether 39 appointments from the House of Lords (compared with 211 from the Commons) and of these 39, all but 15 appointees had served in the House of Commons before succeeding to the peerage.[7]

Moreover, the prime minister generally has been a veteran of the Cabinet; that is, he has been trained within the highest national policy-making body and usually he has also had executive experience as head of one of the major departments of national government. Only James Ramsay MacDonald among the fourteen prime ministers of the twentieth century did not have previous Cabinet experience.

Recently, it has been suggested that the ability to persuade the Cabinet and the Commons has become less important as the preeminence of the prime minister has grown, that his power has become so great that he can fairly well depend on the automatic support of the members of his party. Thus, Parliament is viewed as having become an electoral college and elections of M. P.'s as

[6] See Lewis Broad, *The Path of Power* (London, 1965), 217-22; Carter, 62-64; Cf. Philip W. Buck, *Amateurs and Professionals in British Politics, 1918-1959* (Chicago, 1963), 118, Table 28.

[7] *Cabinet Reform in Britain, 1914-1963* (Stanford, Calif., 1963), 8, Table II.

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merely a means of installing a prime minister. Bound by party discipline, these M.P.'s would never dare to oust their own party's leader. In addition, it has been said that the increased attention given by voters to the choice of a prime minister has weakened the ability of lesser ministers to oppose him within the Cabinet.

These arguments are not only exaggerations but in certain respects indicate mistakes in their basic assumptions.[8] The power of the House of Commons to control and oversee does not, in fact, depend upon its ability to register a formal vote of no confidence in the prime minister and thereby compel his resignation. It consists rather in the ability to compel him and his Cabinet colleagues to continuously justify their conduct before a large, politically sophisticated and critical audience, with potentially the entire world watching and listening. It is not the loss of a vote of confidence which the British executive must dread but the loss of face. It is not "confidence" in the narrow and technical sense of the word which the British executive must maintain but "confidence" in its more usual, ample sense; an administration could not long stay in power if it lost the respect of the House, if it "came apart," either by incompetence or malfeasance. The support of an overwhelming party majority would not be enough to save it. What is said and done in the House cannot be hushed up, no matter what the vote. In an all-important sense, the daily confrontations have their psychological effects upon the participants, as well as outside the House.

American, and to some extent even British, views of the Commons have been heavily influenced by the "myth of the no-confidence vote," an alleged be-all and end-all of parliamentary control of the executive. Louis W. Koenig, for instance, wrote recently:

> What was constitutional fact in [Britain] in the nineteenth century . . . has become constitutional fiction in the twentieth. The House of Commons in bygone days did control the government and could, when it chose, dismiss it. Nowadays, however, public opinion rather than the House determines Cabinet tenure.

[8] On ministerial appointments, see D. J. Heasman, "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet" in W. J. Stankiewicz (ed.), *Crisis in British Government* (New York, 1967), 161-78.

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> The House of Commons has been reduced to a passivity which even the most resolute critic of Congress would not wish upon it. In its tightly restricted capacity, the House resembles the American electoral college, registering the popular will in choosing a government and then automatically ratifying its program and voting the funds it asks for. The House lacks means of initiating policy; unlike Congress, it has no standing committees to investigate and recommend, deprivations which preclude any legislative capacity to take an independent line and exercise meaningful control.[9]

An assessment of this sort overlooks (1) the role which the Commons plays in influencing public opinion outside by what transpires within its walls and (2) the necessity for the executive to maintain prestige and authority in the Commons quite apart from the passage of any formal censure motions.[10]

The most recent and the classic illustration of the power of the House to bring down a Cabinet ostensibly backed by a heavy party majority without passing a censure motion continues to be the case of Neville Chamberlain on May 8, 1940. In the summary of his successor:

> The Government had had a majority of eighty-one but over thirty Conservatives voted with the Labour and Liberal Opposition and many more abstained. There was no doubt that in effect, though not in form, both the debate and the division were a violent manifestation of want of confidence in Mr. Chamberlain and his Administration.
>
> After the debate was over, he asked me to go to his room, and I saw at once that he took the most serious view of the sentiment of the House towards himself. He felt he could not go on.[11]

[9] *The Chief Executive* (New York, 1964), 397-98. See "A Debate on the Parliamentary and Presidential Systems" by Don K. Price and Harold Laski reprinted from the *Public Administration Review*, Vols. III and IV, in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), *Comparative Politics* (rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill., 1964) 399-413.

[10] In fact, according to Sir Ivor Jennings, "Not since 1866 has there been any real 'control' of the Government by the House of Commons. A majority Government can be defeated only by reason of a party split." In 1895 when the Cabinet last resigned upon an adverse vote in the House, it had apparently decided to do so because of internal dissensions even before the vote, *Cabinet Government of 1951* (2d ed.; Cambridge, 1951), 445-46.

[11] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War;* Vol. I: *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948), 660-61.

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Churchill's account of Chamberlain's resignation presents one side of the problem. Granted that under some circumstances the disposition of the House could induce a technically undefeated government to resign; what then about its power to affect the policy of the government while it is still in office? And beyond this, is the 1940 precedent still applicable to the post-World War executive-legislative relations?

With respect to the first question, there is evidence that parliamentary opinion indeed did influence the character of British policy during the Chamberlain premiership. To be sure, causal relationships are notoriously difficult to establish. Chamberlain and his Cabinet operated in response to many sources of pressure of which Parliament was one. But it is fair to say that Chamberlain did not pursue the appeasement of Hitler in defiance of Parliament but rather in agreement with it. Chamberlain's policy may well have been disastrous but it was widely supported in Parliament and in the country until Hitler's troops occupied Prague in March 1939. And the Prime Minister publicly defended his policies with considerable zeal and ability. As Sir Samuel Hoare recalled after the war:

> In the House of Commons [Chamberlain's leadership] . . . was further strengthened by his talent for debate. A party expects fighting qualities in its leader. Chamberlain delighted his followers not only with his gifts of clear statement and keen argument, but still more, with the evident pleasure that he showed in routing his enemies. Every offensive that the opposition launched against him he repelled with a devastating counterattack. Even Churchill's stirring eloquence he was able to meet with close-knit arguments and ready retorts that justified the Government policy and encouraged his followers. Whenever he met the Conservative members of the House of Commons in the Party meeting known as the 1922 Committee, and explained to them his line of policy, he invariably received an overwhelming vote of confidence.[12]

In February 1938, Chamberlain was forced by Eden's impending resignation to explain and justify confidentially his views on foreign policy to all his Cabinet colleagues. Eden's action offered the Chamberlain Cabinet an opportunity to examine and pass upon

[12] *Nine Troubled Years* (London, 1954), 376.

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Britain's foreign policy and to interpose a veto if it so chose. In fact, the Cabinet reflected what was still the prevalent mood of the country. The differences between Eden and the Prime Minister were aired in a three-hour Cabinet meeting on February 19, 1938. Both Eden and Chamberlain set out their views at length, and apparently all of the other members of the Cabinet also participated in the discussion. As Eden recalled in 1962: "It was evident that the majority of the Cabinet, particularly among the older members, agreed with the Prime Minister."[13] Even though the differences between them were regarded by each as fundamental, "a small subcommittee of the Cabinet was formed to try to reconcile the Prime Minister's opinions and mine."[14] In Eden's view, the formula worked out by the subcommittee gave too much away, and he insisted on his resignation, apparently to the scarcely concealed satisfaction of the Prime Minister.

The charge of "dictatorship" leveled at Chamberlain in particular, and at various prime ministers in general before and hence, confuses a basic issue. The absence of opposition does not *per se* indicate either that there is no opportunity for opposition to manifest itself or, worse yet, that opposition is being suppressed. The implicit charge of those who criticize the support given Chamberlain by his Cabinet and parliamentary colleagues before 1939—or, for that matter, to Eden in 1956—is that of hypocrisy. Presumably ministers and M P.'s did not believe in the policies being followed but did not dare oppose them. This kind of argument is particularly appealing and plausible after the policy has been subsequently widely adjudged a failure.

It presumes too much on human motives to believe that ministers and M.P.'s are always concerned only with the merits of a policy and totally insensitive to other questions. The latter might include gaining preferment in office, keeping a seat in the House, enhancing a reputation with constituents and party leaders, and so on *ad infinitum*. If we allow for subconscious as well as conscious motives, it is hard to separate any human decisions into such neat "policy" and "personal" categories. Under the Cabinet system, the prime minister's formal powers to appoint and dismiss

[13] *Facing the Dictators* (Boston, 1962), 670.
[14] *Ibid.*, 675.

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his colleagues and to obtain the dissolution of the House as well as his usually great influence in his party obviously discourage any of his colleagues from lightly challenging him. To oppose the prime minister may not be easy, or painless, or without some risks, under any circumstances.

It is true that at present Cabinet meetings do not decide all the policy or administrative issues facing the government; very likely they never did completely. Some of these issues, occasionally at least, may be disposed of by the prime minister alone.[15] It is also true, as noted earlier, that in all Cabinets there is a hierarchy of members, ranked by their importance and influence both within their party and with the prime minister, though never to the exclusion of the principal leaders of the party in power. When in 1964 Labour returned to office, each of the contenders for the leadership of the party in the Commons—Wilson, Brown, and Callaghan—entered the Cabinet. To exclude all the luminaries in the prime minister's party from Cabinet office would be tantamount to political suicide. And just as in the formation of the Cabinet the British prime minister cannot choose simply those he likes or those who might be good heads of departments, so in the running of it he must take care to respect the party balance of power.

He cannot indefinitely postpone the discussion of controversial issues by the whole Cabinet, although he can delay it. Generally, he "will not make any important decisions without consulting the five or six leading men in his government . . . the 'inner' Cabinet in whom he places special confidence."[16] The prime minister can conceivably, and occasionally does, "ride roughshod" over one or some of his ministers, even influential ones, like Anthony Eden in the Chamberlain government or George Brown in the Wilson government; indeed he could almost always fire one or even several ministers. But in the last analysis it would be impossible for him to "ride roughshod" over all his colleagues all of the time.[17]

[15] See Andre Mathiot, *The British Political System* (Stanford, Calif., 1958), 157.

[16] *Ibid.*, 163.

[17] Among recent proponents of the prime minister as "Cabinet incarnate" or the British equivalent of the American president, see John P. MacKintosh, *The British Cabinet* (London, 1962). Cf. Douglas V. Verney, *British Govern-*

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What went on during the Suez crisis of 1956 does not in any way refute this view of the power of the Commons or of the Cabinet to expose, restrain, chastise, and ultimately punish the prime minister. The initiation of British intervention involved, to be sure, high level secrecy among British, French, and Israeli negotiators. The Cabinet knew much more in advance than did the House, and the prime minister even more than most of the Cabinet. Even so, the limits of a prime minister's power were not nearly so great as some make them appear.[18] Leon D. Epstein's *British Politics in the Suez Crisis* not only fails to establish the case for any significant constitutional change since 1940, but, in fact, contains useful summaries of evidence indicating how Suez differed from Munich in the eyes of the British people and parliamentarians. Behind the picture of well-disciplined party confrontations in the House, Epstein shows the divisions outside. If the Commons was not universally outraged at Prime Minister Eden's policy and did not force his immediate resignation, it was largely because the Conservative M. P.'s and their constituents were not nearly as distraught as they were in the aftermath of Munich. On the contrary, as Epstein says and convincingly demonstrates:

> The Conservative voters' support [for Eden was] really immense. Whatever doubts many of them had had earlier about military action appear to have been dissipated or put to one side, once their leaders took the action. . . . What Eden did seemed right to Conservatives either simply because he did it in collaboration with his Conservative cabinet, or because his arguments for action became persuasive.[19]

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ment and Politics (New York, 1966), 52-65. An earlier view of "monolithic power" resting with the Cabinet and primarily the prime minister is presented in Ramsay Muir's *How Britain is Governed* (London, 1940). The conception of the Cabinet as still a substantially collegial institution, in which men still argue, is supported by Daalder, 248, among others. A. B. Keith, *The Cabinet System* (London, 1952); Sir Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (3d ed.; Cambridge, 1959); and Lord Morrison's *Government and Parliament* (3d. ed.; Oxford, 1964). Cf. G. W. Jones, "The Prime Minister's Power," *Parliamentary Affairs*, XVIII, 2 (1965), 167-85, for a thorough and balanced account.

[18] Cf. Hugh Thomas, *Suez* (New York, 1967): "Suez . . . showed the almost limitless power of a Prime Minister in present circumstances, particularly when supported by a powerful group of ministers" (p. 163).

[19] *British Politics in the Suez Crisis* (Urbana, Ill., 1964), 146-47. See chap. 7, Tables 1-4.

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Among other things, Epstein cites one poll taken in September 1957, many months after the Suez operation, which shows that, in spite of military and diplomatic failure, 79 per cent of Conservative voters thought Eden had been right about taking military action against Egypt and only 10 per cent thought that he had been wrong. A poll taken in November 1956 shows 89 per cent of Conservative voters backing Eden. Among Liberals, opinion was almost evenly divided with 40 per cent approving, 41 per cent disapproving, and 19 per cent in the "don't know" column. Even among Labour supporters only 51 per cent openly disapproved of the Eden action in retrospect; 30 per cent approved of it and 19 per cent refused to take a position.[20]

While admittedly there are no public opinion surveys of the 1938-40 period upon which to base equivalent comparisons, it is all but certain that Conservative and other support of Chamberlain after Munich fell far below the levels of Eden's support in 1956 and 1957. On March 16, 1939, in the aftermath of Nazi occupation of Prague, Neville Chamberlain found himself deserted and attacked by a majority of the Conservative newspapers, including the *Times:*

> The overwhelming sentiment of the press on March 16-17 was obviously that appeasement was totally discredited and must, therefore, be abandoned at once. Most of those newspapers which, at the time of Munich, had been inclined to give the policy a 'fair trial' now recognized its utter futility. . . . The forcefulness of this judgment, coming as it did in a time of sudden crisis, could not help but weigh heavily on a Prime Minister who was himself disillusioned and vexed.[21]

Epstein reports that throughout 1956 a majority of British newspapers was "pro-Suez" but notes:

> Without any exceptions, all the major newspapers with established party preferences adopted positions on Suez that conformed to those party preferences. Conservative papers were pro-Suez, and Labour and Liberal papers were anti-Suez.[22]

[20] See *Ibid.*, 142, Table 1.

[21] See W. R. Rock, *Appeasement on Trial: British Foreign Policy and Its Critics, 1938-1939* (New York, 1966), 209.

[22] Epstein, 156, Table 8.

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If in 1956 the House of Commons did not rebel against Eden as it once did against Chamberlain, it was because the degree of the public's moral indignation and alarm on the two occasions was vastly unequal. Epstein's own conclusion is that as a result of Suez:

> Parliamentary government in Britain now meant, if it had not before, that a Prime Minister and his cabinet could count on a party majority to support, almost unanimously, their policy both when many parliamentary party members had grave doubts and when that policy subsequently failed.[23]

This opinion is essentially a projection of his own values and indignation upon the British political system. "Doubt" varies in degree. "Failure" may be combined with redeeming moral, legal, and political considerations in the eyes of beholders. Both William Pitt and Winston Churchill were upheld by the House of Commons on occasions suffused by "doubt" and "failure."

Exaggeration of public disapproval of Eden's policy is at the root of Epstein's misjudgment of the British potential for parliamentary control over the executive. In addition to this, however, Epstein has also minimized those checks and controls which Parliament apparently did impose upon the executive in the Suez crisis. A few examples may suffice. Epstein notes that "the debate was nerve-racking," in part

> because the parliamentary harassment of Eden was so prolonged and nearly continuous. . . . But even if thus, through ordeal by debate, Labour contributed to the illness which in January caused Eden's resignation, it was hardly much of a parliamentary accomplishment. Its effect depended on the Prime Minister being ill to start with, and in any case produced no immediate resignation and even subsequently its result was only the substitution of another Prime Minister (Macmillan) openly avowing support for Eden's actions.[24]

As for the claim that opposition criticism forced an early cease-fire upon the Eden Cabinet, Epstein merely notes that: "In the absence of a *consistent* Labour claim and, more important, of an *official* government *admission* of the evident change in policy,

[23] *Ibid.*, 84.
[24] *Ibid.*, 84-85.

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there can be no certainty about the effectiveness of the parliamentary opposition."[25] In a final attempt to picture Eden's leadership in 1956 as rank autocracy, the author avails himself of a logical as well as political *non sequitur* in his assertion that "Eden shared his decision making only with a few key congenial ministers, and since these ministers were distinctly of his own choosing, he was really the decision-maker." Notwithstanding all such frequently acrobatic discounts of parliamentary influence, even Epstein concedes that "... it is possible that the intense partisan criticism would have been consequential if the government had continued its brief military campaign for several months instead of having to stop for essentially international reasons."[26]

To a significant degree, the British prime minister must still confirm his victory margin on every vote in the faces of the men who cast the ballots. In the light of its traditions and rules and the continual ordeal of exposure, nothing less than the talents of a highly seasoned and capable professional could prove equal to the task. To be sure, the prime minister is not forced to "tell all" and to respond to every prompting and stimulus in his political environment. It seems that both in Britain and the United States, as well as in all technologically complex democracies, there has been a common tendency for the legislature to lose ground to the executive in various ways. Executive leaders in both political systems can and do make many decisions without much prior public consultation and justification. Decisions on issues not yet matters of general public knowledge or involving secret information, whether military, political, or economic, fall into this category. The principal difference between the British and American systems, however, reveals itself in the formulation of policy in areas—foreign or domestic—in which the issues have been publicly identified already and on which substantial public controversy has developed. The prime minister

[25] *Ibid.*, 86 [emphasis mine].

[26] *Ibid.*, 202, 204. It is interesting to compare this discussion with Epstein's conclusion on the significance of parliamentary criticism in R. C. Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (2d ed; Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962): "There is not much doubt that British politicians place great store by performance in debate, and no minister is likely to survive if his own supporters find him a poor spokesman for the government and the party" (p. 37).

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must engage in debate on such issues, while the president, if he chooses, may make himself entirely unavailable. Where the president may remain personally aloof, the prime minister has no alternative but to pursue a public dialogue with an institutionalized opposition across the Treasury Bench of the House of Commons and, very likely, a semiprivate one within the Cabinet itself.

Moreover, to the extent that the president does choose to speak out on some issues, he may confine himself to campaign-like oratory, obscuring his real motives, intentions, and calculations behind a facile smokescreen of platitudes and generalized formulas. The president of the United States always speaks from a pedestal; he has no equals, or even presumed near-equals, who could address him on issues and at times of their own choosing. He faces no one who can publicly talk back to him.

The closest American parallel to the roles of Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, the Shadow Cabinet, and, in fact, sundry M. P.'s of the opposition is found, oddly enough, in the institution of the presidential press conference, which provides a confrontation of sorts, but the parallel is still very wide indeed. Press conferences are called by the president, not by newsmen; the participants are generally anxious to secure information, not to cross swords with the president in order to show the inadequacy or harmfulness of his policies. In fact, other things being equal, White House correspondents are tempted to exert themselves to stay in the president's good graces. His displeasure could conceivably hamper their news gathering opportunities within the administration; his good will could be a significant asset. Newsmen have no vested interest in "showing up" the chief executive, in order to succeed either to his job or to other jobs within the gift of his office. This vested interest, of course, characterizes a prime minister's Opposition in Britain. The prime minister must always face men who are permanently dedicated to his overthrow by constitutional means, always probing his armor, always on the trail of his exposure. In fact, they cannot succeed unless he fails.

In the British system the appeal to the voters, while essential, is not enough. If the British leader cannot function in the House

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of Commons and if he cannot manage the Cabinet, he cannot survive. The voters can directly and indirectly help him into office, but the leader must ultimately face his opposition personally and singlehandedly. He can be helped onto the stage but once there he must perform alone.

The separation of powers keeps the president personally aloof from the legislature. He may, if he wishes, deal with congressional opponents almost entirely through Cabinet and other executive intermediaries or through private conferences, while, of course, retaining in his own hands full power of executive initiative and keeping his own counsel about it. Critics like Fulbright or McCarthy cannot directly confront the president under the American political system and force him to explain or defend his positions. If such encounters were not only possible but actually institutionalized, they would have enormous significance for informing and educating national public opinion. Whether Fulbright and McCarthy or anyone else could or could not secure a motion of "no confidence" in the president on the model of procedure in the British House of Commons is a matter of secondary importance.

The practical consequences of this lack of confrontation at the top in the American system are likely to vary from case to case. The citizenry may be asked to endure and support a policy whose merits have been discussed by everyone except the man ultimately responsible for it, with the result that the public may be at a loss for leadership. It may be forced to choose from an array of journalistic, private, and official, but secondhand, sources the reasons why the United States is pursuing policy *X* and not policy *Y*, *Z*, or *Q*. It may even be left to guess what course is being pursued.

During the Eisenhower administration contradictory statements on farm policy from Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson and Vice-President Nixon often went unresolved by the occupant of the White House. At the height of Senator Joseph McCarthy's campaign against alleged subsersives in the United States Army, President Eisenhower resorted to studious silence and allowed various subordinates, notably Army Secretary Robert A. Stevens, to respond to McCarthy's attack. According to Professor Edward S. Corwin, Eisenhower

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> on several occasions . . . appears to have accomplished what President Truman and many commentators have said was impossible, 'passing the buck' to the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, the Attorney General. Each of these gentlemen, according to the President, is an independent office-holder with his own views of appropriate policy, with which the President has no warrant to interfere.[27]

The president is not only prevented from confronting Congress by the separation of powers; he is also spared any genuine confrontation within the executive branch. The president's Cabinet is not an institution which gives opportunity for a cross-examination of the decision maker.[28] The American Cabinet as a whole is not, after all, the repository of executive power; the president is. The members of the Cabinet are the president's appointees who enable him to run the several executive departments and tender him advice when he asks for it. They are not his colleagues and equals, either constitutionally or in fact. The president has never been bound either to consult with or accept the advice of his Cabinet officers. Presidents such as Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt have frequently treated their Cabinets with great indifference, preferring to consult with and confide in various unofficial advisers and friends. Jackson apparently treated his Cabinet as a group of "clerks or staff officers"; Lincoln was openly contemptuous on occasion; and Wilson and F.D.R. were indifferent and, implicitly at least, condescending.[29]

The American chief executive does not need to exert himself to make a case to anyone if he wishes either to change his policy or his principal advisers in the execution of that policy; much less is he under such an obligation because of the intended resignation of a department head. President Truman's decision to fire Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was fraught with foreign policy overtones. Typically, however, the action did not have to be explained or argued about either with the Congress or the Cabinet. If

[27] *The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957* (4th ed.; New York, 1957), 302.

[28] Cf. Richard F. Fenno, *The President's Cabinet* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); H. B. Learned, *The President's Cabinet* (New Haven, 1912); and M. Hinsdale, *A History of the President's Cabinet* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1911).

[29] Corwin, 302, 490-93.

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Wallace chose to make speeches after being fired, well and good. The President did not owe any explanations to anyone.

The essential difference, implied and reinforced by institutions, is that the American president, once in office, is under no general obligation to debate the merits of his policy with anyone; the prime minister is. When there is clamor the president can shield himself from it. The prime minister must meet it head on; if he cannot, politically, physically, or emotionally, he must resign.

Thus, it is not surprising that American presidents and major party presidential nominees have often been men with minimal training in the dialogue of national politics: their "assets" are their appeal to a mass electorate not skill in political debate. The recruitment patterns have reflected, and generally reinforced, the institutional requisites of the office. In contrast,

> the institutional patterns of British politics make impossible the choice of persons merely because they can command the support of doubtful areas or the choice of obscure men because they are less likely to have a large number of enemies in important places. *The British leader cannot be obscure; he must have made his reputation in the midst of political controversy.*[30]

Having made the above comparison, Byrum E. Carter, along with many other authors, concluded that the differences in the British and American institutions are not really related to the lesser abilities among American officeholders. "Ability," however, is a broad term, one which includes many facets of executive performance; skill in debate and wide-ranging knowledge of government business are, however, applicable criteria. Looking at the period since the turn of the century in the United States, one is impressed by the relative dearth of prior experience in elective office among Americian chief executives.[31] Thus, among the eleven incumbents since 1901, three had no prior experience of elective office whatever (Taft, Hoover, Eisenhower). Two presidents had had very brief experience (Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson). Of the remaining six, only Lyndon Johnson had more than ten years of service in elective office at the national level. Three of the rel-

[30] Carter, 76 [emphasis mine].

[31] Judicial office is excluded from this compilation.

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atively most-experienced officeholders who became presidents—Coolidge, Truman, and Johnson—were initially chosen for the vice-presidency. Since 1900 the losing major party candidates with relatively brief or no experience of elective office have included Adlai Stevenson, Thomas Dewey in 1944, Wendell Wilkie, John W. Davis, Charles Evans Hughes, William Jennings Bryan, and Alton B. Parker.

The test of "availability" applied to candidates in American presidential party conventions places a different value on the ability to communicate than does selection through service in the House of Commons. On occasion, and particularly before the advent of television, presidential nominees, like Coolidge and Hoover, have been at best indifferent public speakers. In the majority of instances, however, the candidates have possessed at least some assets as orators, usually assets that project well to a mass audience. Not expertise or a debater's logic but the capacity to convey an "impression"—of sincerity, ardor, trust, sobriety, vigor, personal magnetism and warmth—has been at a premium. Thus, McKinley was "a fluent public speaker who could talk generalities more impressively than any man then in public life," but enjoyed the private reputation of being a "weak, kindly mediocrity."[32] Harding is described by one chronicler as "the perfect picture of the dignified statesman . . . perhaps the most distinguished looking man in public life"; and at the same, "inexperienced in administration, unintellectual and indolent in nature, he found that the Presidential harness chafed and burned. There was too little time for golf, poker parties, and the other diversions of a good fellow."[33] And during the campaign of 1940, Willkie's "inexperience in politics cropped out sometimes in indiscreet statements that had to be qualified or explained away. But his unfailing good humor, his abundant vitality and his vigorous style of speech were increasingly effective in arousing enthusiasm. . . ."[34]

Conceivably, Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas Dewey, Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and perhaps some others

[32] Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections* (New York, 1959), 313, 321.
[33] *Ibid.*, 403, 404.
[34] *Ibid.*, 470.

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would not have been at a loss in the daily confrontations of a House of Commons. But many presidents and presidential aspirants probably would have been. Granted the frequent amateurism and parochialism of American incumbents and contenders for national leadership,[35] does substantial service in the Congress really provide the opportunity for politicians to master the arts of dialogue and of public business? The hallmark of the Congress is specialization among its members: the tendency to cultivate certain subjects related to their committee assignments and the interests of their constituencies. British M.P.'s are exposed continually to the discussion of those in charge of all the business which government handles. The lack of the executive presence in the legislature makes such exposure practically impossible for a member of Congress; he is most likely to come into contact with the representatives of the executive through their occasional testimony before special committees.

The debate which takes place on the floor of the House or Senate does not have the coherence of a debate on policy between those having the responsibility for carrying it out and those interested in displaying its deficiencies. Congress may debate a bill by member *X* one day, a bill by member *Y* the next, and a bill by member *Z* the following day. Under the congressional system such measures need not be connected by the common thread of anybody's policy, and yesterday's debate may have virtually no relevance to today's.

Moreover, the ability to produce legislation and to defend the interests of his constituents are probably more important in winning the esteem of a congressman's colleagues and re-election in his district than are oratorical triumphs. Under the separation of

[35] On the potential consequences of amateurism, see Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York, 1960), chap. 4. Cf. Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress* (3d rev. ed.; New York, 1962): "President Eisenhower's promotion of his program was hampered, at first by his ineptitude as a political amateur and later by lack of continuous interest in his program" (p. 354). Cf. Joseph E. Kallenbach, *The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship* (New York, 1966); he concludes about the presidential nominating conventions: "As a standard bearer they prefer one to whose support there will be a minimum of difficulty in rallying the party faithful along with a goodly share of 'independents' " (p. 155).

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powers scheme there is no ready path to ministerial office for good speakers. In fact, the "introverted specialist" is the man most likely to command the maximum respect of his peers. Charles L. Clapp cites typical congressmen's estimates of the effective House member:

> 'Basically I think the House type is an in-fighter, an operator. He is not a speaker; he may speak, but he does not speak frequently . . . .'
>
> 'Even if a man is exceptionally able there is resentment if he seeks to be an expert on a matter not related to his district or his committee work . . . .'
>
> 'The yappers just don't get to be leaders . . . .'
>
> 'You can't stand on the floor and inform people; they don't want to listen . . . .'
>
> 'The most effective people are those who confine their activity to bills that come from their own committees.'[36]

The ability of Congress to oppose, change, or even block a president's legislative program is unquestioned. There is clearly no doubt that the "feudal barons" of the American Congress can exert greater influence on the shape of appropriation and revenue bills, in fact, on virtually all items of legislation, than rank-and-file British M.P.'s. Some American and British scholars and critics deplore the lack of analogous powers on the part of the House of Commons. Because of this difference, they see the House as a largely passive rubber stamp. But in the conduct of debate on national policy, the British House effects an exposure of the executive through direct confrontation which is wholly lacking in the American system and whose importance ultimately may be far greater for the democratic conduct of public affairs than the power of individual, sometimes obscure legislative committees to exercise a parochially-oriented, haphazard, and frequently capricious initiative with respect to sundry items of legislation.

In conclusion we should address ourselves to the fallacy which fails to distinguish between democratic (or other) values and effectiveness of government. Professor Koenig has charged: "Eng-

[36] *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), 26. Cf. Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (New York, 1960), 95, 96, 23, 24, 27.

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land's own decline in power and place in the family of nations, although a product of many factors, strongly suggests that the Parliamentary method smacks excessively of the past and has not adjusted sufficiently to modern change."[37] Without defending some possibly obsolete British political institutions, it is still necessary to note the false burden of this argument. The rise of Prussia in the eighteenth century is no more a testimonial to the superior virtue of autocracy than the decline of Britain today is indicative of the faults of democracy. Demographic, economic, technological, and cultural changes are all apt to affect the prosperity, influence, and prestige of nations. Even if British parliamentarism is not always associated with prosperity and world leadership, its merits, nevertheless, may continue to be appreciated, as John Stuart Mill enunciated them in his essay *On Representative Government* a century ago, for its contribution to the moral and intellectual uplift of the individual.

[37] P. 397.

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The French Revolution in Comparative Perspective

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It is a commonplace to view other revolutions in the perspective of the French Revolution. For example, both later scholars and the participants of 1917 have seen a causal connection and a similarity of development between the French and the Russian Revolutions. Thus, the scholar Isaac Deutscher, exploring the "analogies" between the two movements, asks rhetorically: "Is it really true that history does not repeat itself? Or that in the repetition the original drama becomes a farce? Is it not rather that in its Russian repetition the French tragedy appears magnified and intensified, projected as it is from the European to the global scale and from an epoch preceding the steam engine to the age of atomic energy?"[1] Elsewhere Deutscher claims that among the Russian revolutionaries,

> It had always been admitted that history might repeat itself; and that a Directory or a single usurper might once again climb to power on the back of the revolution. It was taken for granted that the Russian usurper would, like his French prototype, be a personality possessed

[1] "The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution: Some Suggestive Analogies," *World Politics*, IV, 3 (April 1952). For a further comparison between the French and the Russian Revolutions, see R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton, 1959), I, 10-11.

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> of brilliance and legendary fame won in battle. The mask of Bonaparte seemed to fit Trotsky only too well. Indeed, it might have fitted any personality with the exception of Stalin. In this lay part of his strength.[2]

Trotsky, in his turn, pressed home the general point. In July 1927, five months before his expulsion from the party, he is said to have delivered a speech on the fall of Robespierre and the destruction of the Jacobins which caused consternation among the old Bolsheviks on the Central Control Commission.[3] Bukharin, too, trembled at the thought of Thermidor, and in his "Letter of an Old Bolshevik" told how "among the last testaments left by Lenin there is none to which our 'party leadership' had clung more tenaciously than his imperative advice not to repeat the mistake of the Jacobins—to eschew the road of mutual extermination."[4] This repeated harping on the "lessons" of 1789 drew much of its inspiration from Marx and Engels; the latter, for example, had declared that "Russia was the France of the new age," from which he expected "another 1789," that is, a bourgeois and anti-feudal rather than socialist revolution.[5]

It was not only the Russian Revolution, however, that looked to the French Revolution as a model, and progenitor. As Hannah Arendt points out, "Tocqueville's main concern [in *Democracy in America*] was to study in America the consequences of that long and inevitable revolution of which the events of 1789 were only the first stage."[6] Indeed, it seems to have been the 1830 revolutions in Europe, harking back to the ideals of 1789, that turned Tocqueville toward his travels in America. And, of course, the revolutionists of 1848 were in this same tradition. As George Lichtheim sums it up: "Revolutions give rise to myths, and these myths then help to shape the course of later revolutions. In the 19th century, revolutionaries everywhere saw analogies to what had been happening in France between 1789 and 1799 (or, if they

[2] *Stalin: A Political Biography* (New York, 1960), 273.

[3] See George Lichtheim, "Reflections on Trotsky," *Commentary*, 37, 1 (Jan. 1964), 54.

[4] Nikolai Bukharin, "Letter of an Old Bolshevik" in *The Stalin Revolution*, (ed.) Robert V. Daniels (Boston, 1965), 73.

[5] Isaac Deutscher, *Russia in Transition* (New York, 1957), 166.

[6] *On Revolution* (New York, 1963), 55.

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were Bonapartist, between 1789 and 1814). Every upheaval, however insignificant, was interpreted in terms of recent French history, usually misunderstood."[7]

There is no doubt, then, that the French Revolution has served as myth and model for the interpretation of other revolutions. The reverse approach, however, appears to have been almost totally neglected. The French revolutionists modeled themselves, in part, on the Romans, and this inspiration has been studied.[8] There was also a segment of the French nobility who wanted to take the English parliamentary settlement of 1688 as a model for their own aims in 1789.[9] But these examples do not have anything like the force or extent of the French Revolution itself as a mirror in which to see other revolutions (even the American, which came before).

The question, therefore, remains: what if one were to consider the French Revolution in the perspective of other revolutions? What, especially, if one were to do so in the light of two new factors: one, the perspective shed on the nature of revolution in general by the Chinese Revolution, dating this from 1911, and two, the hypotheses advanced by the various theoretical and typological treatments of revolution produced recently by sociologists and political scientists, as well as by historians?[10] I believe the effort worth undertaking, even if it is filled with pitfalls and hope for two results from it: 1) a better understanding of the French Revolution itself and 2) a better understanding of its place in general history, as well as in comparative revolution studies.[11]

[7] Lichtheim, 52.

[8] Harold Parker, *The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries* (Chicago, 1937).

[9] For example, see Georges Lefebvre, *Etudes sur la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1954), 248.

[10] For example, Crane Brinton's classic work, *The Anatomy of a Revolution* (rev. ed.; New York, 1965) does not include the Chinese Revolution. Among the new theoretical works of special interest are Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System*, Hoover Institution Studies, No. 3 (Stanford, Calif., 1964) later expanded as *Revolutionary Change* (Boston, 1966); Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," *History and Theory*, IV, 2 (1965), 133-63; *Internal War, Problems and Approaches*, (ed.) Harry Eckstein (New York, 1964); and Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics*, XVIII, 2 (Jan. 1966), 159-76.

[11] In a study such as this, of necessity, I will use mainly secondary materials on the French Revolution and refer directly only on a few occasions to the

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One last preliminary consideration. I assume that it is unnecessary to justify here the value of comparative history. I share Marc Bloch's opinion so eloquently maintained as long ago as 1928, that "the comparative method will accomplish great things, and I consider its perfection and general use one of the most pressing needs of present-day historical science."[12] In his own work, Bloch distinguished two types of comparative history—the first when "the units of comparison are far removed from one another in time or space"; the second when "the units of comparison are societies that are geographical neighbors and historical contemporaries, constantly influenced by one another."[13] The comparative study of revolutions really falls between these two definitions and partakes of both. For our purposes, Bloch's classification can be altered so as to posit two kinds of comparative study of revolutions, a horizontal and a vertical. An example of an horizontal study is R. R. Palmer's *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*. As he describes it,

> . . . the present work attempts to deal with Western Civilization as a whole, at a critical moment in its history, or with what has sometimes recently been called the Atlantic Civilization. . . . It is argued that this whole civilization was swept in the last four decades of the eighteenth century by a single revolutionary movement, which manifested itself in different ways and with varying success in different countries, yet in all of them showed similar objectives and principles.[14]

From this viewpoint, Palmer and others study the revolutionary movement of the eighteenth century as starting in 1763 rather than 1789. Similarly, a comparison of the Communist attempts at revolution in Europe in the 1917 and post-World War I years is another example of the horizontal genre.

Chinese Revolution, but will use its features as a general, unspecified background to the consideration of the French Revolution.

[12] "Toward a Comparative History of European Societies" in *Enterprise and Secular Change*, (eds.) Frederick C. Lane and J. C. Riemersma (Homewood, Ill., 1953), 494-95.

[13] *Ibid.*, 498.

[14] Palmer, 4. Cf. J. Godechot, *La Grande Nation: L'expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799* (2 vols; Paris, 1956). Peter Amann, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution: French or Western?* (Boston, 1963) is a useful collection.

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The vertical study, a very small part of which this paper pursues, would range from the first modern "great" revolution—the Puritan—up through the latest entries in the twentieth century.[15] This effort presumes to differ from such comparative studies as Brinton's *Anatomy of a Revolution* by 1) focusing on the French Revolution in comparative perspective rather than anatomizing four Great Revolutions equally; 2) doing so, as already said, keeping in mind the Chinese Revolution experience as well as much more scholarly work that has been produced recently on the Russian Revolution; and 3) seeking the dynamic rather than the static and structural elements that make the French Revolution historically different from, yet similar to, other revolutions. The methodological convictions that inform this paper are in sympathy with those of a scholar in another area, Robert Daniels, who sought to view "The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective." He declares,

> No one can deny that the events of recent Chinese history constitute a revolution on the grand scale, comparable to the English, French, and Russian revolutions. . . . Nevertheless, there has been little effort either to interpret Chinese developments in terms of the comparative sociology of revolution, or to revise general conceptions of the revolutionary process in the light of the Chinese experience. . . . The comparative study of revolutions has suffered from the tendency of historians either to force differing events into the same mold, or to label them unique and abandon attempts at comparison. Naturally, no two revolutions are exactly alike; to expect this would be absurd, but it is equally absurd to hold that they can have nothing in common. The situations of political breakdown and social chaos characteristic of the great revolutions clearly belong to a distinctive category in historical study. Patterns can be discerned in the study of revolutions which either explain events or call attention to deviant events which require special explanation. China no less than any other country can be approached from this standpoint.[16]

For our purposes, of course, substitute the word "France" in place of the word "China."

[15] Needless to say, this paper will not offer details here of any of these revolutions; rather, informed by their general characteristics, it will examine a few aspects of the French Revolution in their light.

[16] Robert V. Daniels, "The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective," *World Politics*, XIII, 2 (Jan. 1961), 210-11.

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I

From among the numerous elements of the French Revolution that might profitably be looked at in a comparative manner, this paper will center attention on two—war and the military, and the *sans-culottes* and "crowd" behavior.[17] A glance at the literature of any of the twentieth-century revolutions shows the central role of either war or the military. The Russian Revolution started in the midst of a world war, was only possible in 1917 Petrograd because the troops would not fire on the uprisers (many of them women), and could proceed to its Bolshevik conclusion only because, as Lenin said, the war had accelerated developments by thirty years or more. In China, the revolution that started in 1911 with Sun Yat-sen moved into high gear only with Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (nationalist) army; on the other side, the Communists resorted to guerrilla warfare, and it was this "people's war" that led to Mao's victory and the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution. In the process, it is also clear that the Red Army has been a vehicle for drastically transforming the people and social structure of China.[18] The crucial role of guerrilla warfare in causing the revolution in Cuba is obvious, and in the Egyptian revolution, the initiating action of the colonels led by Nasser was equally glaring.

What happens to the French Revolution if looked at in this perspective? First, it is clear that a general war did not exist as a causal background for 1789. The French involvement in the American War of Independence had weakened her financially and thus had prepared the way for calling the Estates-General and all that followed, but this sort of "war" background is of a different order from, say, the Russian. The conclusion must be that the French Revolution did not emerge from a war, but brought about one (which then helped foster the "left" turn of the revolution)—hardly a novel conclusion. Next, it is also obvious that guerrilla warfare was not practiced by the French revolutionaries, but by

[17] Others that could be looked at with great profit are the role of women, elites and leaders, the absence of a nationality problem, the absence or presence of a conscious desire for "modernization," the function of cities in the Revolution, and so forth. Topics such as these, however, must await another time and place.

[18] See especially Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York, 1938), *passim*.

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their opponents, for example, the Vendeéans and the Spaniards. Lastly, the "colonels" à la Nasser (substitute Napoleon and his marshals) took over only long after the outbreak of revolution and then in a very different way from modern examples.

Surely it must be, in part, for these negative reasons that the role of the army in the outbreak and development of the French Revolution has been so steadily overlooked or played down in general histories of the Revolution, a fact that one senses sharply on returning to 1789 from more recent revolutions. Extraordinary as it seems, the best account of the role of the army in the events of 1789 may well be that of Henry Rollin, writing on *La Révolution Russe*.[19] That account shows clearly that without the defections of the royal troops there probably would have been no revolution. For example, this was certainly the lesson that Lenin claimed to have learned from 1789.[20] Calling the army the "key to the country," Lenin declared that the first task of every revolution is to bring the army over to its side. In this, he was merely restating what Rivarol had said of the French Revolution: "La défection des troupes n'est point une des causes de la révolution; elle est la révolution elle-même."[21]

Only at the Bastille did the royal troops remain "loyal." More typical were the refusal of the eleven guardsmen to fire on the people at Versailles on the night of 22-23 June and the opening of the gates at the Hotel des Invalides on the 14th of July by the insurrectionary troops, refusing to obey the Governor, the Marquis de Sombreuil. Such examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely.

What is the explanation for this "key to the country" being handed over to the revolution? Rollin suggests, "C'est uniquement la propaganda qui a provoqué la déroute de l'armée royale sans autre combat que celui de la Bastille. . . . A ce point de vue les journées de juillet 1789 sont un example saissant de l'influence des forces

[19] (2 vols.; Paris, 1931). Vol. II is best, though the entire book is to be recommended. A disappointing book is Alexandre Zevaès, *La Révolution Russe* (Paris, 1917).

[20] See Andrew C. Janos, "The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution" in *Communism and Revolution*, (ed.) Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (Princeton, N.J., 1964), especially p. 34.

[21] Rivarol's statement is quoted in Rollin, 57.

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morales à la guerre et de la propaganda dans les conflits sociaux."[22] Surely, this is too simple. While it is an important part of the explanation, it needs to be supplemented by anterior causes as well. For example, one simple fact is that the French central government was weak, the Court lamentably incompetent. In D. W. Brogan's words, "In a world of growing violence, the King had not the habit of mind for the exercise of the last argument of governments, ordered violence."[23] Louis' vacillations in ordering troops to crush the revolution and then his giving way on the matter is too well known to require repeating here. What needs more investigation, however, would seem to be the relationship of the foreign Swiss and German troops, for example, and the native French troops. The provocative effect of the foreign troops is notoriously present in Desmoulin's cry on July 12: "Ce soir tous les bataillons suisses et allemands sortiront du Champ de Mars pour nous égorger. Il ne nous reste qu'une resource, c'est de courir aux armes!"[24] Now, in large part, the civilian recourse to arms was successful because the Gardes Françaises, long stationed in Paris with marital and other ties to the city's population, refused to fire on the revolutionists. This fact shows the need for a study of the actual composition of these troops, like the studies by Soboul, Rudé, and others which provide close-ups of the crowd that stood in front of them, armed and unarmed.[25]

What of the officers? Had they already, in an important sense, "joined" the revolution in the "révolte nobiliare" of 1787? Was their loyalty so shaken by 1789 that they merely stood by, if they did not actively encourage, their troops in their defection? Something is known of the problem involved in the division between the court nobility—those officers absorbed in life at Versailles—and the officers actually in command of the troops (not to mention the troops themselves), especially in an army which was, in

[22] Rollin, 52

[23] D. W. Brogan, *The Price of Revolution* (London, 1951), 6, n. 1.

[24] Rollin, 43.

[25] George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1959); Albert Soboul, *Les Sans-Culottes parisiens en l'an II* (Paris, 1958); and Richard Cobb, *Les armées révolutionnaires* (2 vols.; Paris & la Haye, 1961-63) and "Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire (Avril, 1793-thermidor an II)," *Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, VI (1959), 81-120.

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any case, top-heavy; there were 35,000 officers in the French army—more than that of all the other European states combined —of whom only 9,500 served effectively in the regiments.[26] We also know of the effect on morale of the edict of 22 May 1781 restricting the appointment of officers above the rank of captain to those who could prove "four-quarters" nobility, and of the consequence of the 1787 reforms of the Conseil de la Guerre, spurred on by Guibert, which, to quote Hartmann, "désorganisa l'armée et, sans en avoir le moindre soupçon, prépara la Révolution."[27] Also, the freemason lodges in the French army provided a source of liberal ideas for both commanding and inferior officers and served as an important vehicle of communication among the regiments in France.[28] Finally, there were definite hints of what was to come in the unwillingness of the military to carry out the orders of the court, demonstrated at Rennes, Grenoble, and Lille during the months preceding the Revolution.

Nevertheless, very little is known. As Reinhard puts it so well,

[26] Louis Hartmann, "Les officiers de l'armée royale à la veille de la révolution," *Revue Historique*, C (1909), 241-68, and CI (1909), 37-79. The figures cited are given on p. 244. This article, though dated, is still the most useful on the subject and has yet to be superseded. A beginning list of published work on the problem of the military in 1789 would include the following selected items (and for help in compiling such a list, as well as for work on other aspects of this particular topic, I am much indebted to my former research assistant, Mrs. Elizabeth Altman): Henri Carré, *La Noblesse de France et l'Opinion publique au XVIII^e Siècle* (Paris, 1920); P. Chalmin, "La désintégration de l'armée royale en France à la fin de XVIII^e siècle," *Revue Historique de l'Armée*, 20, 1 (1964), 75-90, which, though a recent study, adds little to the earlier ones; Albert Duruy, *L'Armée royale en 1789* (Paris, 1888); Emile G. Leonard, *L'Armée et ses Problèmes au XVIII^e Siècle* (Paris, 1958); Léon Mention, *L'Armée de L'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1900), which is one of the best studies and contains some wonderful illustrations; Marcel Reinhard, "Observations sur le rôle révolutionnaire de l'armée dans la révolution française," *Annales Historique de la Révolution Française*, 34 (1962), 169-79, which asks the right questions, in the right spirit, even though it does not provide the answers, and is also oriented to comparative studies; Louis Tuetay, *Les Officiers sous L'Ancien Régime; Nobles et Roturiers* (Paris, 1908); and Spencer Wilkinson, *The French Army Before Napoleon* (Oxford, 1915).

[27] Hartmann, 47.

[28] See Rollin, 45. Later, the freemason lodges served as a model for the Carbonari and other insurrectionary brotherhoods which in Spain and Russia, though not in France, indulged in pronunciamentos and Decembrist conspiracies.

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"Ce grand sujet mériterait de trouver son historien.[29] Thus, the questions remain, what, in a comparative perspective, *and in detail*, was the behavior of French officers in 1789 and, whatever their reasons, in what way was their behavior the foreshadowing of what was to come. In any case, whatever the answers to these questions, once the royal army had defected, the task of the revolution was to create a new army. This new army was a *national* army, not an army of foreigners or of French subjects serving for pay. It was part of the citizenry and the citizens part of it; thus, it had a new identity, which, indeed, had already begun to emerge as part of the royalist troops' defection to the people and which was thus forged in the experience of the Revolution itself.[30] On the other hand, it is necessary not to exaggerate and mistake the ideal for the reality; as is well known, very quickly in 1789 the bourgeoisie moved to secure all arms under its control for use as much against the lower class disturbances as against the threat of revived monarchical and aristocratic ambitions. It was the invasion of foreign armies that forced the bourgeoisie to call upon the lower class again as an armed force.

The end of the story is equally well known. By 1795, the army had become the dominant force, now willing to fire on the *sans-culottes*. Moreover, when Babeuf and his followers in 1796, seeking to carry out the lesson of 1789 that the army must first be incited to insurrection, tried to win over the barracks at Grenelle (in Paris), their plans became known to Carnot in advance, and Babeuf and his accomplices were immediately arrested. The mili-

[29] Reinhard, 169. Reinhard concludes that "Pourtant l'historiographie a négligé l'étude du rôle révolutionnaire de l'armée." Needless to say, a fine study such as Richard Cobb, *Les armées révolutionnaires*, does not affect the situation under consideration here. [Since writing this paper, I have become aware of the following work in progress, which presumably would go a long way toward answering Reinhard's and my plea: Samuel F. Scott, "The Line Army in the French Revolution," based on a 1967 Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Wisconsin, and an analysis with the aid of a computer of French army officers in the period 1750-1800 undertaken by David Bien in association with François Foret.]

[30] In 1785, the *Encyclopédie methodique* had already insisted that "Les guerriers . . . sont hommes, sont citoyens," but this was mere assertion. See Reinhold, 191 and for a further treatment of this problem, Mention, 307.

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tary coup d'état of Napoleon was not long in following. Yet these developments should not distract us from the crucial role of the army's defection in 1789 and of its reorganization, ideally, as a national army which, like the Red Army of the Chinese Revolution, had an educational and transforming function—the creation of French citizens, albeit armed. To ignore or to mistake the role of the army as a causative and continuing factor in the French Revolution may be consoling to a bourgeois interpretation, but it is not helpful to an understanding of 1789, seen as the beginning of an increasingly revolutionary—and violent and militaristic—age of modernity.

II

If the role and composition of the army has been neglected in French Revolution studies (in comparison to work on this subject in reference to other revolutions), that of the *sans-culottes*, or crowd, has recently been researched extensively. In fact, viewed in comparative perspective, the crowd (or its absence) has been overlooked, for example, in both the Puritan and the Russian Revolutions, where one might have expected attention to it. Hence, the problem in relation to the French Revolution is not to ask for further study of the crowd, or "laboring poor," though of course this is desirable, but to try to assess the dynamic significance of the *sans-culottes* and thus their place in history.[31]

All the commentators agree that the *sans-culottes* were a recognizable social *group*, but not a social *class*. Soboul lists the following traits as defining them: 1) recognizable by dress, i.e., wearing trousers instead of breeches (and in this matter the *sans-culottes* triumphed, eventually putting all males of whatever social condition into trousers); 2) possessed of a certain social comportment, in this case, a "rough and ready" manner (as judged by

[31] The important works here, of course, are those by Rudé, Soboul, and Cobb already cited (see n. 25). Both Rudé and Soboul, part of whose book has been given a poor English translation (Oxford, 1964), have excellent footnotes, which direct the reader to the further literature on the subject. Generally related to the whole subject under consideration here is the interesting collection edited by Jeffry Kaplow, *New Perspectives on the French Revolution* (New York, 1965), which also has a bibliography.

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the aristocrats) which proclaimed a belief in social equality; and 3) antagonistic to "aristocrats," a term eventually broadened to include the rich and non-productive bourgeoisie.[32] In addition the *sans-culottes* are defined less by their position as workers—and their laboring functions differed profoundly, ranging from small shopkeepers and workshop masters to journeymen and city poor —than by their self-definition as consumers. As one set of writers put it, "the *sans-culottes* did not achieve an exact understanding of their social function of work, reasoning like consumers rather than producers."[33]

One result was the widespread resort to the food riot as the typical weapon of protest rather than to the labor strike, which emerges as a significant tactic only after 1848. Time and again, the spark for the emergence of crowd action was the food riot, at the heart of which lay the question of the price of bread. As writer after writer has shown, the *sans-culottes'* mentality was preoccupied with the thought of cheaper and more plentiful bread rather than with higher wages and better working conditions. According to Rudé, "This basic identity of interests was to prove one of the most solid of the links that bound together the social groups forming the *sans-culottes* of the Revolution."[34]

As consumers, the *sans-culottes* were opposed to the physiocrats' free trade conviction, especially on the subject of bread. As workers, they were opposed to the bourgeois desire for large-scale production oriented to capitalist profit: "Direct producers themselves, they believed that personal labor alone could justify ownership. They dreamed of a society of small property-owners, each possessing his field, his workshops, his shop. In order to maintain a relative equality, the State should intervene."[35] In short, the *sans-culottes* were opposed to the new capitalist order that was gradually emerging under the control and for the benefit of the bourgeoisie.

[32] Soboul, see the chapter, "Masses populaires et militants sans–culottes: mentalité et composition sociales."

[33] F. Furet, C. Mazauric, and L. Bergeron, "The Sans-Culottes and the French Revolution" in *New Perspectives on the French Revolution*, 223.

[34] Rudé, 22.

[35] Albert Soboul, "Problems of Work in Year II" in *New Perspectives on the French Revolution*, 223.

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A number of consequences, some paradoxical, flow from this fact. To one who has read E. J. Hobsbawm's fascinating little book, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, the *sans-culottes* take their place as a transitional social group, midway between his "primitive rebels" (Lazzaretti, Andalusian Anarchists, Sicilian Fasci) and the modern working class. Speaking of those social groups, who must adapt to a modern capitalist economy or disappear, Hobsbawm says,

> . . . they come into it [the world of capitalism] as first-generation immigrants, or what is even more catastrophic, it comes to them from outside, insidiously by the operation of economic forces which they do not understand and over which they have no control, or brazenly by conquest, revolutions and fundamental changes of law whose consequences they do not understand, even when they have helped to bring them about.[36]

They resort to primitive social movements such as social banditry or millenarianism, and it is the latter which most preoccupies Hobsbawm. He is concerned with the way in which these relatively unstructured, semi-religious movements become secularized and thus part of modern revolutionary movements. While he does not treat the *sans-culottes*, they obviously fall into this class of phenomena, although at an advanced stage. Lefebvre perceived this when he remarked in passing that "the optimistic picture that the revolutionary class forms of itself excludes all difficulties. It will suffice if the dominant class disappears. In this respect the collective revolutionary mentality obviously is akin to the millenarianism of certain religious groups: the revolution is also a 'gospel'."[37]

The paradoxical element in this situation is that the *sans-culottes* emerged only briefly, as a revolutionary political force brought into being by the bourgeoisie. It was the latter, primarily, who

[36] (New York, 1965), 3.

[37] Georges Lefebvre, "Foules révolutionnaires" in *Etudes sur la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1954), 5. On the popular cult aspect of the French Revolution, see Albert Soboul, "Sentiment religieux et cultes populaires pendant la Révolution: Saintes patriotes et martyrs de la liberté," *Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française* (1957), 195-213.

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"politicized" the *sans-culottes*, not by political parties, which did not yet exist, but by the new, though transient, political device of the clubs. "C'est par les societés fraternelles," Mathiez reminds us, "que s'est faite l'education politique des masses. Ces societés furent le berceau et l'asile de la sans-culotterie."[38] New political techniques, a political program (even though confused), and the new organizational devices of section or club, all of these the bourgeois linked, admittedly for its own purposes, to the *sans-culottes'* concern for bread. The immediate result was to turn a vague social group into a powerful political movement that for a short span of time dominated history both in France and then in Western Europe.

Politicization of the masses is one fundamental trait of the process called today "modernization." In modern society, the bulk of the population must "participate," in the sense of being mobilized by communication media, educational facilities, and so forth, to support actively the policies and programs of the state. This means that the huge masses of people, hitherto faceless and unknown to the historian, emerge into the light. Once emerged, there is no return to darkness.[39] The irony is that in the case of the *sans-culottes* it meant their disappearance as a social group, as a result of merging into the new, and increasingly politicized, working class, which then took over from the *sans-culottes* and became a major actor in modern history.[40]

The *sans-culottes*, in this perspective, were merely the mechanism by which the politicization of the masses was begun. The *sans-culottes* themselves did not believe in "moderization"—there is no "revolution of rising expectations" here—and they did not initially look toward "politicization" as a virtue. Moreover, the *sans-culottes* were powerless without the alliance of the bourgeoisie, as became overwhelmingly evident in 1795, when

[38] Albert Mathiez, *Le Club des Cordeliers pendant la crise de Varennes* et *le massacre du Champ de Mars* (Paris, 1910), 66.

[39] For "political modernization" as a phenomenon, see, for example, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1958). For the emergence of the "masses" into history, see Arendt, 64 and Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?* (New York, 1962), 178.

[40] Daniel Guérin, *La lutte de classes sous la première République* (2 vols.; Paris, 1946), is wrong in seeing the *sans-culottes* as already the proletariat.

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deserted by the bourgeoisie, without leaders of its own, a settled plan of action, or a clear political program, the *sans-culottes* went down before the rising new force of the army. Thus, the *sans-culottes*, as such, were "crushed and swept," as Soboul puts it, "from the stage of history."[41] One fundamental reason for their destruction as a group was lack of class consciousness. Held together only by their common role as consumer and by a desire for social equality, they lacked the cohesive force of what we would now term "ideology."

The other "class"—in this case really an estate—which perished at this time as a significant collective actor in history was the one at the opposite pole, the aristocracy. The most "class" conscious of all social groups, the aristocracy could hardly be expected to foster the notion of a "class struggle" in the eighteenth century. Only after its defeat in 1789 could it develop "class consciousness" (which is subtly different from "class" consciousness) and become sufficiently self-aware to produce an ideology of conservatism.[42] By then, it was too late. Along with its enemy, the *sans-culottes*, the aristocracy too disappeared as a modern social force. In their places stepped the bourgeoisie and the workers, the major characters in modern industrial society.

Nevertheless, two further points must be made about the *sans-culottes*. The first is that they provided the initial instance of a mass movement in secular, and incipiently ideological, form, which led Hegel, who in his philosophy duplicated the shift from religious categories to secular ones, to declare that "this was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking beings shared

[41] Soboul, *Les Sans-Culottes parisiens*, 1031. For details, see Rudé, chap. X. A comparison with the need of the Chinese peasants for an alliance with the literati in order to mount a successful revolution is in order here. See, for example, C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Revolution in China* (London, 1953), chap. 1.

[42] "Class" consciousness means to draw the line against individuals outside of one's group and to look down upon (or up to) them. "Class consciousness" means to have a sense of one's corporate identity and interests as against other "classes" and to recognize one's mission in the struggle against such other "classes." The Comte de Boulainvilliers, possibly, among the aristocrats had a sense of this latter definition. The classic work on conservative ideology as a conscious position (a necessary part of ideology) is, of course, Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought" in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, (trans) Paul Kecskemeti (New York, 1953).

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in the jubilation of this epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred men's minds at that time; a spiritual enthusiasm thrilled through the world, *as if the reconciliation between the Divine and the Secular was now first accomplished.*"[43] In less ethereal terms, and extending it to the American Revolution as well, Hobsbawm emphasises that "the American and French Revolutions of the 18th century are probably the first mass political movements in the history of the world which expressed their ideology and aspirations in terms of secular rationalism and not of traditional religion. The fact marks a revolution in the life and thought of the common people so profound that its nature is difficult even to appreciate. . . ."[44]

The second point is that a by-product of the *sans-culottes* movement was the development of "crowd psychology." It was specifically introduced into the study of the French Revolution by Gustave Le Bon in 1895, but it was already present in the work of Taine and others before that and even earlier as a fear in the minds of the European middle and upper classes. Even so penetrating an observer as Sigmund Freud, as a young man in Paris toward the end of the century, allowed his imagination to carry him away: "The town and the people are uncanny," he wrote, "they seem to be of another species from us. I believe they are all possessed of a thousand demons. . . . I hear them screaming 'A la lanterne' or 'A bas dieser and jener.' They are the people of psychical epidemics, of historical mass convulsions."[45] In short, the events of 1789 saw the *canaille* give way to the mass (as well as to the mob of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), at least in the European imagination. To put it more strongly, the actual *sans-culottes* took on mythical shape in the "crowd." It is only recent scholarship that has removed this mask.

[43] G. F. W. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, (trans.) J. Sibree (New York, 1900), 447 [emphasis mine]. Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, (trans.) Louis Wirtz (London, 1936), who suggests that the sixteenth-century Anabaptists were an anticipation of this development.

[44] Hobsbawm, 126.

[45] Ernest Jones, *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud* (New York, 1953-57), I, 184. Le Bon's *La psychologie des foules* was published in 1895; it is from a critique of Le Bon that Lefebvre starts in his excellent article, "Foules révolutionnaires."

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III

Seen in comparative perspective, the French Revolution appears a poor instance on which to model plans for future revolutions. Its major protagonists, the *sans-culottes* and the aristocracy, no longer existed in any significant sense after 1795, and it was unrealistic to base an understanding of their successors, the working class and the bourgeoisie, on a mistaken analysis of their putative prototypes. Nor was it useful to think in terms of a "crowd," spontaneously arising and making the revolution. After 1789 this was, of course, the fear of the conservatives and the hope of the communists. In fact, the only revolution in which the crowd, that is, the *sans-culottes*, dominated the political scene for any length of time was the French Revolution, where mass interventions were a feature of Parisian life almost continuously for six years (and for nearly two years before that).

Eighteen forty-eight showed the illusionary nature of successful "crowd" revolutions; and Marx, if not others, finally learned this lesson. When the Russian Revolution ultimately came, it did start with a "spontaneous" crowd demonstration,[46] but this was quickly taken in hand, and we hear very little of the crowd after 1917. One reason for this is that Lenin and his cohorts did learn at least one lesson from the French Revolution—not to permit the crowd to pull away from its allegiance to the small group of leaders. The Jacobins had allowed this to happen. As Rudé puts it,

> . . . the disaster lay in the failure of the Jacobins to regain the allegiance of the *sans-culottes* in the summer of 1794, when the gap between them and the Revolutionary Government proved unbridgeable and hastened the fall of Robespierre and his associates in Thermidor. This only goes to show once more that the elements composing revolutionary crowds, though permeated by the political ideas of the Jacobins and advanced democrats, had social claims of their own which they persisted in advancing even against the advice and, on occasion, the interests of the revolutionary leaders themselves.[47]

[46] See, however, the debate on this subject between William H. Chamberlain and Leon Trotsky, as presented in *The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory*, (ed.) Arthur Adams (Boston, 1960).

[47] Rudé, 228; see further 128 ff. As Alec Nove comments, in *New Society*, Sept. 22, 1966, p. 458, "In Lenin's notebook of the period there is the phrase

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In retrospect, it seems clear that one reason for the failure of Robespierre and his associates to bridle the crowd was the lack of an ideology effectively justifying such action. Lenin and his followers had no such deficiency, and they prevented the opening of a gap, or at least its manifestations, between the mass of the Russian people and the Bolsheviks by resorting to force and terror, justified by an ideology of elitism. The result was totalitarian rule, where the "social claims" of the revolutionary crowds were not allowed to override the "advice" of the revolutionary leaders themselves.

It is curious, therefore, that Lenin in fact took to heart the conservatives' fear of the crowd. He also took up their polar view, that the French Revolution was a result of a conspiracy, or conspiracies, and stood it on its head. That is, whereas in fact 1789 was not a result of a conspiratorial uprising, October 1917 definitely was. Thus, the myth of a conspiratorial revolution was turned into reality at the same time that the 1789 reality of *sans-culottes* (read "crowd" here) activity, in turn, was honored mainly as a myth during the Russian Revolution.

We see now that it has not been the descendant of the *sans-culottes*, the working class, that has made revolutions since 1789. They have been made by a conspiratorial party that has taken in hand either the army or a broad mass of unorganized and decentralized peasants and politicized them for its own purposes. (Or else, a group of officers within the army itself has attempted the task.) On any count, the French Revolution can then be said to be a misleading model (in the sense of something to be copied) for future revolutionists and historians.

In this perspective, 1789 emerges as having been as much, or more, the cataclysmic end of the old as the herald of the new; and perhaps now we can perceive this truism in a new sense. Wordsworth may have exclaimed, "Oh, what bliss to be alive," Goethe may have declared of the French victory at Valmy in

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'1794 versus 1921.' He carried out a necessary retreat in 1921; but to avoid the fate of Robespierre and the Jacobins it was necessary for the party to keep its undivided and firm grip on the levers of power, to resume in due course the long haul to socialism."

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1792, "A new epoch in world history begins at this place today," and Hegel may have hailed the Revolution as a "glorious mental dawn," but for the *sans-culottes* and the aristocrats, it was the coming of the night. For most, a certain callousness will prevail, and few tears will be available for the demise of the aristocracy. What, however, of the *sans-culottes* and their dream of static equalitarianism? Must we be so wedded to the idea of progress that we cannot spare a lament for this transitional social group, on the edge of modernity, who, in Hobsbawm's words, fell victim to "forces which they do not understand and over which they have no control . . . and [to] fundamental changes of law whose consequences they may not understand, even when they have helped to bring them about."[48] Even if we cannot empathize with them, might we not pause to reflect that unless we come to a better understanding of the revolutionary forces that are today sweeping our own lives—and the development of a comparative perspective appears to be one of the best ways of doing this—we may share the *sans-culottes'* fate in a world that we create but do not control. This, surely, is one of the main "lessons" of the French Revolution.

[48] Hobsbawm, 3.

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Machiavelli and Madison: Perspectives on Political Stability

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One of the central concerns in the history of Western political thought—from Plato's early attempt to institute a state which because it would embody absolute truth would be impervious to all change to modern efforts to discover factors which tend to produce social stability—has been the founding of a stable and enduring political system. Despite this common goal there are obvious differences between Plato and, for example, Talcott Parsons. Plato's effort was avowedly normative—his state would permit, indeed assure, that men lead the good life in pursuit of truth and justice. Modern social theorists attempt to isolate those factors conducive to stability and to develop theoretical models of stable polities. Thus they posit certain functions that all societies, irrespective of their ideological goals, must perform in order to continue merely to exist. Such a position does not preclude the possibility that some cultural goal or "good life" can be achieved, but does suggest that the attainment of some degree of societal stability is a prerequisite to this achievement. If this is a fair representation of the general purpose of modern theorists, the two thinkers under discussion here can be viewed as quite "modern." Both Niccoló Machiavelli and James Madison were preoccupied with stability, and both attempted to develop theoretical models

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of stable polities, although they are not often viewed in this context.

Machiavelli, although long recognized as one of the early practitioners of modern political analysis, is seldom seen as a builder of theory. Indeed, one of Machiavelli's major failings is commonly held to be his inability to abstract from the particular. As Joseph S. Murphy has commented: "Machiavelli fails because he does not offer us the principles and procedures for analyzing political institutions, but merely a handbook of recipes the object of which is merely the baking of a political pie."[1] Despite the tendency in recent commentary to treat his theoretical endeavors more seriously, James Madison, is normally viewed as a political practitioner—perhaps the most academically oriented of the "Founding Fathers," but hardly a great theoretician. Thus Daniel J. Boorstin describes Madison's work in *The Federalist:* "The organization of *The Federalist* papers is practical rather than systematic: they proceed from the actual dangers which confronted Americans to the weaknesses of the existing confederation and the specific advantages of the various provisions of the new constitution."[2] Boorstin maintains that "they had a simple practical purpose: to persuade the people of New York to ratify the recently drawn federal Constitution."[3] Undoubtedly, both were engaged in eminently practical tasks—Machiavelli's to find some basis for a stable government in his beloved Italy, Madison's to secure ratification for a specific form of constitutional government. But it does not follow that because they were engaged in practical endeavors, their writings lack theoretical content. Indeed, it seems that their eminently practical concerns forced them to base their generalizations on the hard facts of the real world. Such a stance affords them a perspective similar to that of the modern political scientist.

It has often been noted that Machiavelli's prime claim to the honorific title of "political scientist" is the lack of a philosophical system from which his political maxims were deduced.[4] He pro-

[1] Joseph S. Murphy, *Political Theory: A Conceptual Analysis* (Homewood, Ill., 1968), 16.

[2] Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953), 97.

[3] *Ibid.*, 96.

[4] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in*

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duced, in Sheldon Wolin's words, "the first great experiment in a 'pure' political theory."[5] Similarly, Martin Diamond writes, "*The Federalist* does not discuss systematically, as would a theoretical treatise, the question of the ends or purposes of government. That is, it does not deal systematically with philosophical issues."[6] Their practical tasks unite them in the search for the relevant factors of political life in an effort to build stable and enduring institutions. Other dimensions of human experience would perhaps have to be examined in an attempt at a comprehensive philosophy, but they are not directly relevant to the task of government. Both Machiavelli and Madison are primarily concerned with building institutions which will provide for stable political relationships. In pursuit of this goal they arrive at similar conclusions about the variables of political life which must be considered in nation-building. Further, they advocate the development of political systems which, despite the vast difference in their personal experiences and time of life, are similar. Finally, their insights are by no means confined to the historical periods of their generation—they are relevant considerations in present studies of stable societies.

Machiavelli's writings are dominated by a concern for establishing stable and enduring political institutions.[7] The power-seeking prince is justified because given the prevailing conditions, only such a person is capable of building a stable state. The lack of moral concern which characterizes the prince's behavior and which leads some commentators to call Machiavelli a teacher of

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Western Political Theory (Boston, 1960), 203-09; Leonardo Olschki, "Machiavelli The Scientist" in DeLamar Jensen (ed.), *Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot, or Political Scientist* (Boston, 1960), 68-71.

[5] Wolin, 198.

[6] "Democracy and *The Federalist*: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (1959), 61. This does not mean that these men did not have views on the relevant philosophical issues of the day. For a development of the philosophical views of James Madison, see Adrienne Koch, *Madison's "Advice to My Country"* (Princeton, 1966); Ralph L. Ketcham, "James Madison and the Nature of Man," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 19 (1958), 62-76.

[7] See David E. Ingersoll, "The Constant Prince: Private Interests and Public Goals in Machiavelli," *Western Political Quarterly*, 21 (1968), 588-96; Lee C. McDonald, *Western Political Theory: From its Origins to the Present* (New York, 1968), 196-97; Wolin, 222-24.

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evil, surely attests to his preoccupation (one could almost say obsession) with stable polities. Commentators who emphasize the prince's quest for personal power often fail to see that he is but a means to the achievement of a stable society.[8] The famous appeal of Chapter 26 of *The Prince* to a leader who would unite Italy is quite consistent with this preoccupation with order.[9] But he is not merely concerned with the particularities of Italian political conditions; dozens of examples from other times and circumstances are advanced, all pointing to the basic notion that stability is the prerequisite of any other political action.[10]

Madison's concern with stability while less overt, is nevertheless quite real. His central problem in *The Federalist* is to show how a republic, traditionally the most volatile of political forms, can be rendered stable and enduring. While his focus is much narrower than Machiavelli's in that he presupposes the desirability of the republican form, the problem faced is nevertheless the same—how to ensure a stable republic. In his discussion of the virtues and failings of historical confederative forms of government in *The Federalist*, Numbers Eighteen, Nineteen, and Twenty, his overall purpose is to show how a properly constructed confederation can produce stability.[11] While it is undoubtedly true that Madison is most interested in assuring popular sovereignty and liberty, he is preoccupied with the institutional stabilizing factors which will permit these values to be maximized.[12] If the political institutions are properly constructed, liberty will be present

[8] See, for example, Herbert Butterfield, *The Statecraft of Machiavelli* (New York, 1962).

[9] Niccoló Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Luigi Ricci (New York, 1952), chap. 26. All subsequent citations to *The Prince* refer to this edition.

[10] *The Prince*, 6, pp. 48-50; 14, pp. 81-83; 7, p. 52; 19, p. 97; 24, p. 118. Niccoló Machiavelli, *The Prince and Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius*, trans. Christian Detmold (New York, 1950), Book I, chap. 2, p. 115; I, 6, p. 128; I, 10, pp. 142-43; I, 19, p. 174. All subsequent citations to the *Discourses* refer to this edition.

[11] *The Federalist*, (ed.) Jacob E. Cooke (Cleveland, Ohio, 1961), 110-29. All of the subsequent citations to *The Federalist* refer to the Cooke edition.

[12] See Ketcham, 62-76 for an interesting exposition of a Madisonian value scale. Also relevant are Koch; Maynard Smith, "Reason, Passion and Political Freedom in *The Federalist*," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 525-44; James P. Scanlan, "The Federalist and Human Nature," *Review of Politics*, 21 (1959), 657-77.

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and stability will be attained. Given these values, the science of politics must explore the means for achieving them: "*The Federalist's* political goals can all be subsumed under the headings of safety and liberty, the former the object of any government, the latter the special goal of popular government."[13] If, then, Madison's study of popular governments throughout history shows him that liberty was seldom obtained, his task becomes obvious —devise institutions which will ensure stability without sacrificing liberty, for other values can be pursued only when stability has been achieved.

I

In order to maximize their initial goal of a stable regime, both Machiavelli and Madison turn to an analysis of the important variables for political organization; initially both note the centrality of environmental change. One of Machiavelli's major breaks with the then grand tradition of political philosophy was his emphasis on a political universe in constant flux. In contrast to the fixed Aristotelian categories which occupied medieval political thought, Machiavelli saw a world where change was rampant: "But as all human things are kept in a perpetual movement, and can never remain stable, states naturally either rise or decline, and necessity compels them to many acts to which reason will not influence them. . . ."[14] Through observation and his reading of history, Machiavelli concluded that the "natural" tendency of all human institutions was to decline—or, to be more precise, to become unstable because of their inability to cope with changing events in the environment.[15] This led him to a view of history (that has been described as "cyclical") which made past historical events of great value for the constructor of a new political science.[16] If history tends to recur in discernible patterns, knowledge of the experience of past political systems becomes inval-

[13] Smith, 527.
[14] *Discourses*, I, 6, p. 129.
[15] *Ibid.*, III, 9, pp. 442-43.
[16] For a somewhat extreme interpretation of Machiavelli's reliance on history, particularly the history of Rome, see Butterfield, 23-33.

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uable in attempting to construct new ones. A study of history indicates those states most successful in coping with their environment and thus provides the theoretical building blocks for new political institutions. However, it is not possible simply to copy institutions of states which endured for a long period of time.[17] History "repeats itself" in broad patterns, not in particulars, and constantly in operation are the effects of what Machiavelli calls "capricious *fortuna*,"[18] which is both a woman to be wooed and won through bold action and a river rampaging out of control. Fortune can provide opportunities for "heroic acts" or it can destroy the best laid plans of men.[19] Although Machiavelli's conception is ambiguous, fortune seems best described as the chance ever-present in natural and human affairs. It renders events in the environment less predictable, while providing great opportunities for men of bold vision. In sum, Machiavelli's environment contains constant change, which is somewhat predictable through a knowledge of history, yet is subject to the vicissitudes of an almost unfathomable fortune.

James Madison, like Machiavelli, lived during a period of great chaos. He, too, was deeply impressed with the impermanence of human institutions and with the necessity for making them capable of supporting change. For Madison the major source of change is, of course, the tendency of human beings to maximize their own self-interest at the expense of other men. This leads to a constant shifting of forces within the state and is the prime cause of the downfall of republics: "The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished. . . ."[20] The essence of the Madisonian "solution" to the problems of popular government is commonly seen in his attempt to harness this self-

[17] Cf., *Ibid.*

[18] *The Prince*, 24, 25, pp. 118-123; *Discourses*, II, 29, pp. 380-83.

[19] "I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, casts down trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other . . . and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can make provisions against it by dykes and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal, or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous"; *The Prince*, 25, p. 120.

[20] *The Federalist*, 10, pp. 56-7.

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interested motivation of man by means of a governmental system which will control its evil effects.[21] While this is largely accurate, from a more theoretical perspective it is evident that the Madisonian system succeeds because it has institutionalized change; it provides means for regularized change and prohibits, if successful, the massive changes which would make the system unstable: "A system of Government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them."[22] Change, then, is one of the central variables of the science of goverment for both Madison and Machiavelli; another more important one is the nature of the "political matter," namely man.

II

Initially, it must be reemphasized that both men observe their environments from the perspective of builders of stable governments. As such, they are attempting to determine which facets of human experience are relevant in the creation of viable political systems. Thus Machiavelli has little to say of the moral or religious dimensions of human experience; Madison, in *The Federalist*, exhibits a similar lack of concern.[23] Further, they share the belief that it is possible to make meaningful statements about "habitual patterns" in human behavior. Madison, under the influence of David Hume and the Scottish school of science and politics, thought it possible to construct "scientific" generalizations concerning human action, as Douglass Adair indicates:

> . . . the aim of studying man's behavior in its comparative-historical manifestations was for the purpose of prediction—philosophy would aid the legislator in making correct decisions. Comparative-historical studies of man in society would allow the discovery of the constant and universal principle of human nature, which, in turn, would allow at least some safe predictions about the effects of legislation 'almost

[21] By far the best short exposition and critique of the "Madisonian solution" is to be found in Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), 4-33. Also see Neal Riemer, *The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory* (New York, 1967), I, pp. 122-51; Paul Eidelberg, *The Philosophy of the American Constitution* (New York, 1968), 3-31, 137-65.

[22] *The Federalist*, 41, pp. 276-77.

[23] Diamond, 64.

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> as general and certain . . . as any which the mathematical sciences will afford us.' 'Politics' (and again the words are Hume's) to some degree 'may be reduced to a science.'[24]

Machiavelli constantly asserted that the politician, be he prince or law-giver, could assume that men would normally act in certain ways: "All those who have written upon civil institutions demonstrate (and history is full of examples to support them) that whoever desires to found a state and give it laws, must start with assuming that all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature, wherever they may find occasion for it."[25] Madison's assumptions concerning how men could be expected to act are no less "realistic":

> The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man. . . . So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts.[26]

Furthermore, *homo politicus* is a power-seeking animal whose "personal motives" and "ambition" must be balanced by the ambition of others to prevent tyranny.[27] While men are capable of "calm passion" and "enlightened self-interest," the builder of a stable polity must assume that these qualities are rare.[28]

Thus, Machiavelli and Madison are united in the belief that it is possible to make at least crude predictive statements about human behavior, and they share the basic observation that men

[24] Douglass Adair, " 'That Politics May be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth *Federalist*," *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, XX (1957), 346. Adair conclusively demonstrates the influence of Hume in the formulation of Madison's "extended republic."

[25] *Discourses*, I, 3, p. 117.

[26] *The Federalist*, 10, pp. 58-9.

[27] *Ibid.*, 51, pp. 349-53; Diamond, 65-6. For a somewhat different interpretation see Smith, 525-44.

[28] "As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust: So there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence"; *The Federalist*, 55, p. 378. "But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of beings wished for by Plato"; *ibid.*, 49, p. 340. Machiavelli has similar views: see Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Machiavelli and the Problem of Political Development," *Review of Politics*, 30 (1968), 320-21; *Dis-*

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are naturally power-seeking and are ever capable of tyrannizing over their fellow men. Despite this pessimistic (or realistic, depending upon one's perspective) view of human motivation, both of these men seem to believe that in the proper institutional setting the "best" elements in man's nature will emerge. Man is, to some extent malleable and the creative actions of a "prince" or a "founding father" can provide stability by designing appropriate institutions and attempting to encourage the ascendency of the more benign characteristics of men.

III

Despite their common tendency to place their major emphasis on man-made political institutions to control the "evil" tendencies of mankind, both thinkers realize the profound limitations that existing patterns of social interaction place upon the constitution-maker. To prescribe remedies for men without considering the existing social structure and the immediate past experience of the subjects is to resort to the utopianism that both thinkers despised.[29] In comparing their observations on this subject, the more limited nature of Madison's enterprise is immediately evident. While Machiavelli deals with both "principalities" and "republics," speaks of the effects on people of previous experience with good or bad leaders, and generally examines the effects of many political and social patterns on individuals, Madison limits his discussion to the establishment of a republican form in a particular country. Despite this difference in scope, Madison's preoccupation with republicanism would have been applauded by Machiavelli because of the character of Madison's endeavor. They would have agreed that, given the nature of the people and their past experience, a republic was the only possible political form

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courses, I, 58, pp. 264-65, finds "the people" better sustainers of institutions than princes.

[29] *The Federalist*, 49, p. 340. "... [I]t appears to me more proper to go to the real truth of the matter than to its imagination ... for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation"; *The Prince*, 15, p. 84.

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for America. Whether or not Machiavelli was a champion of republicanism need not concern us here; there is no doubt that he viewed a republic as the only viable form of government where there was great equality among the people: "Let republics, then, be established where equality exists, and, on the contrary, principalities where great inequality prevails; otherwise, the governments will lack proper proportions and have but little durability."[30] From Machiavelli's point of view, Madison would have had no choice but to consider republican institutions; the people and their past experience with political freedom and equality made a republic the only possible choice of the wise statesmen in America. Thus, Madison's presupposition of the desirability of "popular government" seems quite consistent with Machiavelli's prescriptions for stable government. Madison could see the necessity for other forms of government when the "people" had little experience with liberty, but for America the republican form was the only viable alternative:

> It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determination, which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.[31]

IV

For Machiavelli and for Madison the significant political variables are individuals dominated by their personal interests; constant change, often predictable but never capable of being completely controlled; and the effects of the prior environmental conditioning of individuals. It is important to note that both thinkers are fully aware of the interdependance of these variables—alteration in one factor produces change in the others. All factors interact with varying intensity to produce a quite complex pciture of the raw materials with which the theorist must deal. If the prime political goals for these two men are stability and endurance, they must attempt to devise institutions (through human "art") which will give man some measure of control over his existence.

[30] *Discourses*, II, 55, p. 257.
[31] *The Federalist*, 39, p. 250.

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Machiavelli's "solution" to these problems is many-faceted. Various remedies are prescribed depending upon the mix of variables at a particular point in time. The amoral power-seeking leader of *The Prince* is the only solution to extreme chaos—he will impose order on a corrupt people.[32] But this is not a permanent solution to chaos, for the prince, being mortal, will eventually die and the scramble for personal gain will reoccur.[33] A prince who, following Machiavelli's "advice," has succeeded in gaining control in a country does, however, have an opportunity to restructure the environment in such a way that a stable polity will endure after his death. Indeed, it is in the construction of enduring institutions that the prince achieves the acme of his personal power; he "lives" forever in the minds of grateful citizens.[34] How does a ruler ensure the continued existence of a momentarily stable government? What factors must he take into account in the construction of an enduring polity? He cannot control fortune or change, so he must construct a system capable of supporting it. He cannot fundamentally alter the egoistic nature of human beings, so he must attempt to control its "evil" (that is, disequilibriating) effects. Human art is capable of restructuring the institutional environment in such a way that the entire social structure will achieve the desired stability. Machiavelli's solution here is twofold. Initially, political institutions must be formed in such a way so as to make the private egoistic wills of individuals serve a public good—the combined egos can be used to produce a stable social system. Secondly, while the fundamentally egoistic nature of man can never be radically changed, he may be "socialized" in such a way that the more benign aspects of his nature are in the ascendency. Machiavelli must thus consider both the establishment of appropriate political institutions (governmental forms) and varying processes of political socialization.

[32] Ingersoll, 592; *Discourses*, I, 17, pp. 164-67.

[33] "For a people in such condition can never become settled unless a new prince be created, who by his good qualities and valor can maintain their liberty; but even then it will last only during the lifetime of the new prince"; *ibid.*, I, 17, p. 165.

[34] Ingersoll, 596. "The welfare, then, of a republic or a kingdom does not consist in having a prince who governs it wisely during his lifetime, but in having one who will give it such laws that it will maintain itself even after his death"; *Discourses*, I, 11, p. 148.

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Looking to history for examples of political systems which had been successful in coping with environmental change for long periods of time, Machiavelli is struck by the example of Rome, a government which seemed to embody both of his criteria of stability and longevity. The unique political structure of Rome made it possible for her to grow from a small city-state to a large empire with a minimum of instability. Rome showed herself capable of accommodating alterations in the environment which resulted both from changes in the composition of her citizenry and from external changes caused by the expansion of her territory. The prime reason for this was that Roman institutions, particularly after the establishment of the tribunes, were designed to give all major groups within the society adequate represention in the decision-making process. Rome was the prime historical example of the "mixed state" where the various forces within the society shared power:

> The government, composed of Consuls and a Senate, had but two of the three elements of which we have spoken, the monarchical and the aristocratic; the popular power was wanting. . . . The nobility, to save a portion of their power, were forced to yield a share of it to the people. . . . It was then that the Tribunes of the people were created, which strengthened and confirmed the republic, being now composed of the three elements of which we have spoken above.[35]

From this example, Machiavelli develops the maxim of pluralism and balance of power: "In fact, when there is combined under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the power of the people, then these three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check."[36] In this context Machiavelli made some of the most explicit statements of an interest theory of politics to be found in all of his work. If the political system is constructed so as to deprive individuals of a voice, the inevitable result will be an attempt to overthrow the existing regime or an appeal to outside force:

> . . . whenever the aid of foreign powers is called in by any party in a state, it is to be ascribed to defects in its constitution, and more es-

[35] *Discourses*, I, 2, p. 116.
[36] *Ibid.*, I, 2, p. 115.

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> pecially to the want of means for enabling the people to exhaust the malign humors that spring up among men, without having recourse to extraordinary measures. . . .[37]

The recognition of the legitimacy of all interests in the state provides for plural centers of power, which in turn balance one another to achieve a dynamic equilibrium.

While the concept of the mixed state provides for representation of all classes within the society, the Machiavelli of the *Discourses* has an obvious preference for the "masses" as the major stabilizing element within the state. A prince may be necessary to impose order in a chaotic situation and may promulgate the laws of the state, but "the people are superior in maintaining those institutions, laws, and ordinances. . . ."[38] Thus, Machiavelli advocates a mixed state wherein representation is granted to all of the major groups in the society, but one also appropriately called "republican," for the "people" are the major force sustaining the state.[39]

Machiavelli is not so naive, however, as to believe that the appropriate governmental framework will, of itself, provide stability. He is well aware of the limitations placed upon "law-givers" by the condition of the people of the state. The very chapter titles of the *Discourses* give some indication of the complexity of the problem:

> A people that has been accustomed to live under a prince preserves its liberties with difficulty, if by accident it has become free.[40]

> If cities which from their very beginning have enjoyed liberty, like Rome, have found difficulties in devising laws that would preserve their liberties, those that have had their origin in servitude find it impossible to succeed in making such laws.[41]

[37] *Ibid.*, I, 7, p. 133.

[38] *Ibid.*, I, 58, pp. 264-65. ". . . [W]e shall see that the people are guilty of fewer excesses than the prince, and that the errors of the people are of less importance, and therefore are more easily remedied"; *ibid.*, I, 58, p. 265.

[39] See the discussion of this matter in Wolin, 222-23.

[40] *Discourses*, 160.

[41] *Ibid.*, 238.

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> A republic that desires to maintain her liberties needs daily fresh precautions; it was by such merits that Fabius obtained the surname of Maximus.[42]

The formal political system is to be supplemented by other institutions which will foster the primacy of the more "benign" personal characteristics. Religion will be a most important device:

> And therefore everything that tends to favor religion (even though it were believed to be false) should be received and availed of to strengthen it. . . . Such was, in fact, the practice observed by sagacious men; which has given rise to the belief in the miracles that are celebrated in religions, however false they may be. For the sagacious rulers have given these miracles increased importance, no matter whence or how they originated; and their authority afterwards gave them credence with the people.[43]

Similarly, a system of honors is to be established to reward citizens' good behavior: "A well regulated republic, therefore, should open the way to public honors to those who seek reputation by means that are conducive to the public good. . . ."[44] In the same vein Machiavelli repeatedly expresses his belief that citizen armies are superior to any others. Granted, this is primarily because such armies are more effective in battle, but a citizen army also serves to instill discipline and a love of country,[45] and the development of patriotism is an extremely valuable part of the socialization process. Finally, Machiavelli emphasizes the centrality of the proper education in developing well-socialized citizens, at one point going so far as to declare that entire countries can have their characters molded through education: "It is true that men are more or less virtuous in one country or another, according to the nature of the education by which their manners and habits of life have been formed."[46]

[42] *Ibid.*, 538.

[43] *Ibid.*, I, 12, p. 150. Note also Wolin's discussion of Machiavelli's civil religion; Wolin, 236-37. For an interesting discussion of "our religion" and "pagan religion" see *Discourses*, II, 2, pp. 284-85.

[44] *Discourses*, III, 28, pp. 493-94.

[45] *Ibid.*, I, 21, pp. 175-76; III, 31, pp. 503-04.

[46] *Ibid.*, III, 43, p. 530.

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This then is the Machiavellian solution to the problems of stability and endurance; the field of ego-oriented forces which is politics is to be controlled by giving all major groups within the society a voice and stake in the political system.[47] Various other processes of control will attempt to produce well-socialized citizens, particularly among the masses, who are the main pillar of support in enduring republics. In the end, the prince, following Machiavelli's analysis of the relevant forces of politics, becomes the "founding father" of a republic by establishing a system of rules.

As previously noted, James Madison was commited to the idea of a government based upon popular sovereignty. The reasons for this commitment were no doubt many, but it is certain that he believed with Machiavelli that republicanism is the only viable form of government where there is great equality among the people. The two problems with which he was faced were the traditional instability of republican governments and the "conventional wisdom" that republics are inevitably confined to small states.[48] Building on the insights of Hume and Montesquieu, Madison attempts to solve both of these difficulties through his idea of the "extended republic." Turning the classical argument against large republics around, he notes that one of the major causes of instability in small republics is that their limited size made them extremely vulnerable to majority factions whose purpose is to tyrannize over other individuals in the society.[49] If the size of the political space could be expanded, it would be extremely difficult for one faction to gain a majority, since the sheer size of the population would give rise to a multiplicity of factions which would tend to balance each other and produce equilibrium. This is a key element in the Madisonian "republican solution to the evils of republican government"—a reliance on the geographical and numerical extent of the nation to prevent one group from

[47] It is important to note that these are not merely "classes"; all sorts of cleavages exist within the traditional classes. On this point see Wolin, 232-33.

[48] See Reimer, 122-48 for an excellent discussion of Madison's handling of these problems.

[49] The terminology is Dahl's; *tyranny* being defined as the "severe deprivation of natural rights"; Dahl, 32-33.

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dominating the affairs of state and tyrannizing over their fellow men.[50]

While the effect of the environment on the formation of majority factions is extremely important, it, by itself, will not be sufficient to ensure the desired "non-tyrannical republic."[51] Properly constructed constitutional forms provide additional safeguards against faction. Separation of powers, federalism, staggered elections, checks and balances, and all the other "mechanical" checks of the United States Constitution are designed to prevent all power from accumulating in a few hands, while assuring representation to all groups within the state.[52] Representation will provide leaders ". . . whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations."[53]

Even from such a brief summary of the familiar features of the American constitutional structure, it is obvious that Madison paid far greater attention to formal constitutional elements than did Machiavelli. The major reason for this is, of course, that Madison in *The Federalist* was trying to convince people to adopt a specific constitutional structure. Despite this discrepancy in detail, their analysis of the type of governmental form necessary is quite similar. Both declare that the prime danger in a republic is the tendency of one group of citizens to attempt to dominate another. Madison's analysis of the bad tendencies of faction is well known, but Machiavelli spoke in the same vein: "If the government of the city is a republic, then there is no surer way of corrupting the citizens, and to divide the city against itself, than to foment the spirit of faction that may prevail there; for each party will strive by every means of corruption to secure friends and supporters. . . ."[54] The inevitable result of such a situation is political instability, and Machiavelli cautions the wise law-giver to

[50] The best short exposition of the Madisonian solution is, of course, found in *Federalist* No. 10, but there are other references, notably in No. 51; *The Federalist*, 10, pp. 56-65; 51, pp. 347-53.

[51] Again, the terms are Dahl's; see his discussion in Dahl, 10-11.

[52] *The Federalist*, 47, 48, 49, pp. 323-43.

[53] *Ibid.*, 10, p. 62.

[54] *Discourses*, III, 27, p. 492.

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mitigate against the evil tendencies of faction. While Madison's conception of the republican form of government does not exactly conform to the Machiavellian notion of the mixed state there are definite similarities. The method of election of the executive and senate seem designed to provide representation for the "upper classes" while the House of Representatives is the organ of the "people." Essentially, Madison's constitutional republic is intended to perform precisely the same functions as Machiavelli's mixed state. Both place the ultimate burden of sustaining the state on "the people"; both construct systems designed to give representation to the prominent classes and groups within the society; both rely on a pluralism resulting from diverse human interests to produce equilibrium in the society; both are concerned, above all, with establishing a stable polity which, largely because of its ability to support change, will endure.

Some commentators have noted that one of the major failings of Madison's analysis is his tendency to neglect the effect of habit patterns and social conditioning on the people. Robert Dahl, for example, states: "The Madisonian argument exaggerates the importance, in preventing tyranny, of specific checks to governmental officials by other specific governmental officials; it underestimates the importance of the inherent social checks and balances existing in every pluralistic society."[55] Madison, as Dahl contends, does seem to ignore the effects of these forces on men and in this sense, apparently suffers in contrast to Machiavelli's detailed investigations of these forces. We know that Madison depreciated the effect of "moral and religious motives" in controlling faction.[56] Yet it can be argued that Madison rather than ignoring these elements, presupposed their existence and effect, deemed them insufficient to prevent tyranny, and supplemented these social conditioners with the elaborate structure of mechanical checks of the American Constitution. Further, the entire no-

[55] Dahl, 22. However, see Diamond, "The Founding Fathers are often criticized for excessive attention to, and reliance upon, mechanical institutional arrangements and for an insufficient attention to 'sociological' factors. While a moderate version of this criticism may finally be just, it is nonetheless clear that *The Federalist* pays considerable and shrewd attention to such factors"; p. 64.

[56] *The Federalist*, 10, p. 61.

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tion of the expansion of the political space and the resultant multiplicity of factions is a "sociological" argument. Where Machiavelli relies on the socializing effects of religion, the army, and education, Madison emphasizes individual self-interest. Through diversity, self-interest becomes the check of excessive self-interest. Madison in other writings asserts that a properly constructed educational system would yield positive benefits in societal stability and freedom,[57] and surely no follower of David Hume could be ignorant of the effect of habit on human behavior. Whatever the case, it is a question of which control devices are effective in producing stability, not whether control devices are necessary.

V

The final element in political development implied in what has preceded must now be made explicit—the role of political leadership in nation-building. I have argued elsewhere that Machiavelli's prince is assigned at least three separate roles in the process of building a stable state; he is the power-seeking prince who establishes order from chaos by force and cunning, the person who provides for legitimation of the regime so as to retain his personal power, and finally the founding father of a new republican form of government which will live on after his death.[58] Given the enormity of the tasks which Machiavelli assigns him, there can be little doubt of the crucial role that the political leader plays in the Machiavellian conception of politics. Without him a stable existence is impossible. Further, the prince must attempt to analyze the terribly complex interaction of factors which make up politics and to decide what type of action is appropriate under varying circumstances. Machiavelli is quite clear about it; in the early stages of developing a state, the dictatorial rule of one man is necessary to have any type of order, and that order is a prerequisite for all other action. In establishing such a state the prince

[57] Saul K. Padover (ed.), *The Complete Madison* (New York, 1953), 313-17; James Madison, *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison* (Philadelphia, 1865), III, 276-81.

[58] Ingersoll, 588-96.

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must be prepared to ignore conventional morality and to submit his acts for judgment only to history; if he is successful in establishing an enduring regime his actions must be adjudged to have been correct.[59]

However important political leadership is in the establishment of states it is equally important in assuring that they endure. The prince must promulgate a set of political rules and institutions which will permit the state to accommodate the tremendous change that will result from his death. If he is successful in this enterprise, future princes need not exist.[60] The "man on horseback" may be Machiavelli's initial means of producing stability, but the best way to preserve that stability is through impersonal republican institutions: ". . . although one man alone should organize a government, yet it will not endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of many, for thus it will be sustained by the many."[61]

Madison, as a "founding father" takes a similar position. Martin Diamond has argued that *The Federalist* distinguishes between the qualities necessary for "founders" and those necessary for their successors: "Founders need a knowledge of the newly improved 'science of politics' and a knowledge of the great political alternatives in order to construct a durable regime; while the men who come after need be only legislators who are but interested 'advocates and parties to the causes they determine'." If the lawgiver is successful in establishing a regime which harnesses the forces of change and human passion he, much as the prince, obviates the need for future men of his kind.[62] Although the act of establishment is, once again, the product of the few, the state is sustained by the many. Indeed, one might argue that an appropriate system of political rules once in effect should preclude the possibility of another group of "founders," for their presence in the future would indicate that the constitution-making enterprise had failed.

[59] Machiavelli's treatment of the Romulus legend is a familiar, but excellent example; *Discourses*, I, 9, p. 139.

[60] Wolin, 228-35.

[61] *Discourses*, I, 9, p. 139.

[62] Diamond, 67, 68.

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As is the case with Machiavelli, personal political leadership is crucial to Madison, but only if that personal leadership generates an impersonal set of rules and institutions which will accommodate change and ensure stability.

Finally, even the rewards for princes and "founding fathers" are similar. If successful in their enterprise they will be called "fathers" of their country and honored by grateful citizens for as long as the state endures. Through the institutions they establish they are capable of transcending their own temporal existence and "living" forever in the minds of their countrymen.

VI

In their pursuit of stable social systems, Machiavelli and Madison are one in their observation that the control of conflict is the major task of politics. The sources of this conflict are many and varied, although both men see interpersonal relationships as a principal cause. Thus, the prime task of government is management of this conflict, and the development of a system of rules which will routinize it. As a contemporary student of social change has recently said, "In order to reduce the amount of violence among its members, a social system must eliminate some relations of conflict and 'routinize' others—that is, envelop them in rules accepted by both sides so that the relationship becomes competitive (a 'game') and not disorienting."[63] Both Machiavelli and Madison believe that the only way this "conflict management" function can be accomplished is through the establishment of a series of political rules—that is, we are not to expect societal integration through mere value agreement. This necessity of coercive force in a society is clearly seen in Machiavelli's reliance on the "man on horseback" as the only solution to chaos. Madison also maintains that the human propensity toward self maximization, if uncontrolled, inevitably produces societal chaos. Yet for both men coercion is not a sufficient base for establishing the desired stable regime. Machiavelli, in assigning his prince the final role of law-giver to a republic indicates that legitimated impersonal political rules are the only basis for enduring societies. We have

[63] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston, 1966), 35.

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seen that the Madisonian founding father performs the same function. Both men assert that the establishment of a common value structure whereby all individuals within the system "have a stake" in its continued viability is the only permanent solution to the perpetual problem of conflict. These individuals must be able to achieve their goals within the existing structure of political rules if instability is to be avoided. Varying processes of socialization are to be employed to ensure a continuing flow of citizens whose values and expectations will support the existing order. Above all, the system must be capable of adapting itself to an ever-changing physical and human environment. If, as we have argued, the environment is in a constant state of flux, one of the major functions of the political system is to make certain that the society has the capability of accommodating itself to these alterations.

It must be apparent that the above analysis is not at all dissimilar to much of the modern analysis of social stability and change. Surely the basic methodology is quite similar; on the basis of observation, isolate the factors conducive to social stability, attempt to describe their inter-relation, and set forth an analytical system of functions for the stable polity. For example, Talcott Parsons' four categories of functional prerequisites of societal existence (socialization, adaptation, goal-attainment, and integration) fit very nicely with the observations of Machiavelli and Madison.[64] For both men the system of political rules established by "founders" provides for societal integration through routinizing the conflicts which arise among private individuals so that they are permitted to maximize personal goals. In addition, the political structure is designed quite specifically for continued adaptation to environmental flux. Educational, religious, and military institutions ensure that behavior patterns in the society remain congruent with the prevailing value structure and that the values themselves are transmitted to future generations. If all of these functions are properly fulfilled, potentially destructive forces balance each other and society is both stable and enduring.

[64] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York, 1951); William C. Mitchell, *Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967).

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There is an obvious danger in reading too much of modern social science analysis into the work of the classical political theorists. However, there is utility in looking at their work through modern eyes if that perspective can shed new light on their investigations. Further, if it can be shown that the type of investigations undertaken by classical political thinkers are similar to more modern analytical attempts it is possible that the more sophisticated tools of modern social science may be used in examining their work and testing their hypotheses.[65] Hopefully, further investigation along these lines will lead to a greater appreciation of traditional thought as well as better understanding of political reality.

[65] Many of Machiavelli's observations are in principle empirically testable. For example, is it indeed true that citizen armies are more effective both in warfare and in socializing members of the state; is it necessary to have one-person dictatorial leadership in a state where the political matter is "corrupt" (i.e. there is little experience with self-government); is stability retained when adaptation to environmental change is hidden through the use of old and familiar institutions in new ways; are the people (Masses) wiser and more constant that princes (Elites) in producing societal stability? In the same vein, Madison's emphasis on the necessity of "external checks" to prevent tyranny lends itself to testing and raises a whole series of questions concerning the effectiveness of political rules and institutions in achieving stability.

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Book Reviews

The Strategy of World Order *edited by Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz. New York, World Law Fund, 1966; Vol. I,* Toward a Theory of War Prevention: *xx, 394 pp.; Vol. II,* International Law: *xiv, 382 pp.; Vol. III,* The United Nations: *xv, 848 pp.; Vol. IV,* Disarmament and Economic Development: *vii, 672 pp. $14.00.*

These volumes consist of extracts from the writings of a number of well-known authorities in the fields of international relations, international law, politics, sociology, and other disciplines on or around the subject of peace and war and the establishment of a more orderly world community. There are volumes on the "theory of war prevention," international law, the United Nations, and disarmament and economic development. The extracts are interspersed with short introductions and comments on each piece by the editors. There is undoubtedly value for students in having a considerable body of writings, from a variety of different points of view, brought together in this way. They will obtain at least a smattering of the ideas of many of the best known writers and thinkers (the two terms are not synonymous) in this field. It will not necessarily be a smattering characteristic of each writer, since the excerpts are naturally chosen for their relevance to the general theme of these volumes. But they may serve to give a fairly broad idea of the variety of views and ways of thinking about such themes.

There are almost insuperable difficulties about producing satisfactory collection on these lines. The most obvious is the inevitable "bittiness" of such volumes. Each book covers a field of such breadth that it would be difficult for even a single writer to confront it effectively and systematically. To attempt the same through a series of extracts (often small parts of works that had some other purpose) must

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inevitably produce a rather kaleidoscopic effect (this impression is intensified by the use of a photographic technique by which each piece appears in its original type-face and page format). The date at which the pieces were written varies over a period of twenty years, and racing through the years at this pace inevitably creates a certain travel-sickness for the reader. Finally, though the editors have done quite a good job grouping the issues logically by subject-matter, it is obviously impossible to follow any coherent train of argument in a series of extracts and this adds to the sense of incoherence. Incoherence is to some extent inevitable in any anthology, and it might have been less obtrusive if these books had been *presented* as an anthology. By the use of such titles as "Toward a Theory of War Prevention" and "The Strategy of World Order" and the talk in the preface of a "systematic study of world order," the editors seem to suggest a rather more organized and systematic approach than this method can possibly be expected to achieve.

Another drawback is that many of the pieces are at a level of such high generality that they cannot exactly be said to add to our knowledge. We would not be very much worse off without reading such statements as: "As a result of the far-reaching changes which have taken place in the relations within the human community, the universal common good gives rise to problems that are very grave, complex and extremely urgent, especially as regards security and world peace." In other cases, perhaps because the writers are often highly committed, the generalizations themselves are somewhat questionable. "The way to promote community is to have world government" is rather a statement of faith than a contribution to our knowledge of the international community.

If one last criticism may be raised, it is that an avowed object of the study is to examine the ideal system set out in "World Peace Through World Law," and to consider the means of securing a transition from the present state of affairs to that one (the volumes are published by the World Law Fund). "World Peace Through World Law" has justly achieved international fame, but it is questionable whether the most useful, or the most scientific, way of examining writings in this field is to test them against the formula set out in that book. It is true that the editors themselves seem, at least by implication, to question how far the goal there established is attainable or even desirable; but to adopt this framework nonetheless leads to a limitation of vision rather than a concentration of view. Most of the extracts themselves were written without any reference to "World Peace Through World Law," and it might have been more useful to analyze them in terms of different categories of approach to international relations rather than to this particular image of Utopia.

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Even with these reservations, there is no doubt that the volumes will be useful reference works for those active in this field. The volume on the United Nations in particular brings together a lot of valuable material, and having a more concrete subject matter than the others, is rather more manageable and coherent. The editors' notes and questions are always shrewd and stimulating. This is certainly a collection which should be available in university and college libraries.

EVAN LUARD, M.P.
St. Antony's College, Oxford

The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920-1926 *by Byron Dexter. New York, Viking Press, 1967.—xxiii, 264 pp. $8.50.*

The title of this book suggests the author's principal thesis, that the decisive turning point for the League and the peace of Europe—and of the world—came several years before Hitler gained power when Britain turned to a policy of disengagement on the Continent and assumed the role of mediator between France and Germany, and Germany was admitted to the League on terms that undermined the Treaty of Versailles and opened Eastern Europe to German adventure.

The author was for several years managing editor of *Foreign Affairs* and this book is to a large degree based on articles that appeared in that journal. His approach to the League experience is that of one who saw the Versailles settlement "in the main," as "a fair and moderate settlement" and who regarded the League of Nations as essentially a European alliance system for maintaining peace on the basis of the peace treaties through the collective action of the major victorious powers, especially France and Britain.

The author's perspective on the League makes it possible to understand why he attaches so much importance to what he sees as Britain's change of course. It can be questioned, however, whether the events of 1925 marked such a decisive turn and whether there had not been much earlier a movement of British policy in the direction of disengagement, evidenced by her refusal to go along with the French on the collection of German reparations and her unwillingness to accept French proposals for implementing collective security. In fact under the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Britain did assume specific commitments in Western Europe which, though not extended to Eastern Europe, did provide the French and their allies with enough added security to permit the initiation of general disarmament discussions.

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"The book does not speculate as to whether the League would have succeeded in its political objectives had the United States been a member" (p. x); the author is, however, definitely of the opinion (p. 71) that the depression of the 1930's was not responsible for the destruction of the League. This assertion is not supported by detailed analysis of the developments of that period. His scant review of events of the 1930's does not provide a very satisfactory answer to the argument that the direct consequences of the Great Depression—the rise of Hitlerism in Germany and aggressive militarism in Japan and the simultaneous weakening of the strength and will of the Western democracies were fatal to the League system of collective security. The author's thesis seems to this reviewer to be based on the complete acceptance of the League as an instrument to perpetuate the Versailles settlement and not to admit the possibility of a League which would be able to function as an instrument of orderly change. The political and economic consequences of the Great Depression, some would argue, precluded that possibility.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
Columbia University

Political Theory and Social Change *edited with an Introduction by David Spitz. New York, Atherton Press, 1967.—xii, 303 pp.*

This fine collection of essays on several topics of contemporary political theory counts among its contributors Hannah Arendt, C. B. Macpherson, and Paul Kecskemeti as well as Peter Bachrach, Judith N. Shklar, and Michael Walzer. The editor, unfortunately, although listed among the contributors, is not one of them; in a very brief introduction he explains that this book grew out of a program at a political science convention and that unfortunately only a limited number of the contributions actually made could be included. He explains that he sought "to avoid and by implication to deny the relevance of . . . the alleged cleavage between those who view the discipline as a science . . . and those who see it as an historical and normative enterprise. . . ." This is admirable, but it may be doubted that the adherents of the first view will be satisfied.

Hannah Arendt's paper, entitled "Truth and Politics," explores anew the ancient antithesis in terms primarily philosophical and literary, as is her wont, and concludes that despite temporary defeats, truth cannot be eliminated; the power-wielders may "destroy" it, but they cannot "replace" it. There is no "viable substitute" for it. Insisting upon the "non-political" and even the "anti-political" nature of truth, she considers the

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perspective of truth "a viewpoint outside the political realm." This position seems to me both self-contradictory and wrong. Contradictory, because if something is "anti-political," it is political; and wrong, because one of the core problems of politics is justice, and justice cannot be done unless truth is recognized, the truth of the propositions upon which actions are based.

Very different is the theme of Kecskemeti's paper on "The Static and the Dynamic Society." The author offers a series of pointed reflections upon the fact that modern man looks upon himself as "dynamic" as contrasted with static, traditional man. He rightly stresses the value placed upon change. To select one of his observations for illustration: "In principle, no part of modern legal systems has 'traditional' validity in the pure and simple sense that deliberate change is ruled out." But he immediately adds that "in practice the control over change in legal matters . . . includes a considerable amount of traditionalism." Thus, the dialectic of the two positions is adumbrated without being either transcended or resolved. A muted plea against overvaluing dynamism concludes these reflections.

David Kettler is concerned with political rationality and seeks to explore its ranges. Enamored of Lindblom's recent work on democracy, his is really an elaborate footnote on the significance of that work. Rejecting as false the dichotomy of the rational and the irrational, Kettler identifies three attempts "to specify and defend the dimension of the problem": the transcendent one, exemplified by the work of Dewey and others, the immanentist of Hayek and Lindblom, the latter much superior to the former in his view, and the revolutionary as seen in the Marxists. After much further work, Kettler hopes that a way may be found to combine these approaches!

A paper by J. Franklin on the implicit constitutionalism of the Monarchomachs ably restates a position first fully developed by Wolzendorf (not mentioned) and further elaborated by others; the author seems to be unaware of all these fellow laborers in the vineyard. This reviewer salutes him for discovering the truth for himself. But his failure to even hint at the position of Barclay, the man who coined the name, suggests a missing dimension in the fight over the right of resistance so well developed in the work of Jaszi and Lewis (not cited).

The problems inherent in this tradition are central to the papers by Christian Bay and Michael Walzer. They both deal with civil disobedience, Bay to argue that civil disobedience is a "prerequisite" for democracy in a mass society, Walzer that the obligation to disobey is usually a matter of loyalty and obligation to another group than the state and

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not one of individual conscience—a position which already Thomas Aquinas and other medieval writers were inclined toward when they stressed the role of the church in releasing men from their allegiance to a secular prince. Both essays make important, albeit not exactly novel points in the thoughtful yet ideologically committed manner one has come to expect from them.

One wishes there were space in which to say at least a word about the other contributors. Thus Peter Bachrach develops the dialectic presented by corporate "authority" to a democratic society, while Judith Shklar pleads for "facing up to intellectual pluralism," rather than either "regretting the end of a great tradition or pretending that it is still alive . . . or just around the corner." The massive theorizing in politics does not, she argues, together constitute a political philosophy, nor is it likely to do so in the future. This reviewer would agree with her. Therefore he welcomes this symposium as another major exhibit of the plural theories that today enrich the study and research in politics.

CARL J. FRIEDRICH
Harvard University

Political Theory and the Rights of Man *edited by D. D. Raphael. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1967. —viii, 151 pp. $5.75.*

"Natural rights," said Bentham, "is simple nonsense, natural and imprescriptible rights rhetorical nonsense, nonsense on stilts." Bentham's modern followers would surely continue to scoff at the notion of universal human rights as a metaphysical relic from the transcendental past. Alas, they will not be confounded by this new testament of faith in the ancient creed. What more could a legal positivist ask than the undeniable evidence this book offers that those who reject his cynicism about natural right fall out among themselves on virtually every point of definition?

The colloquy opens with a look at historical origins by C. B. Macpherson, Raymond Polin, and John W. Chapman, who manage without much difficulty to use texts as pretexts for debates over contemporary issues. Macpherson once more reduces modern liberalism to "possessive individualism" while Polin exalts it as a progressive balancing of individual and social claims limited only by its legalism, and Chapman sets out to rescue the doctrine-in-distress from the clutches of Macpherson's interpretations.

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Some of the contention turns on the textual axis of Locke's derivation of the right of property or estate. But Chapman realizes that a better way to counter Macpherson's gambit is to threaten with one of his own. He therefore resorts to modern economic theory to show that Locke's "contractarian" justification of unequal reward need not rest, as Macpherson claims, on an "invasive" view of freedom by which one man gains only by exploiting the labor of another. Locke himself believed, Chapman argues, that inequalities of possession were justified because they harmed no one. This view need not be thought naive, he points out. Assume an economy where there is genuine equality of opportunity; let returns to capital be taxed by the state and redistributed in services for all and compensation for "disutility" or inability to compete with some minimal success. Since everyone benefits from aggregate gains and since differential rewards vary according to marginal productivity, no one would be either exploiter or exploited. Because inequalities would serve a social purpose, they would be justifiable.

Thus limited, the market system would amount to no more than a device of economic rationality for sustaining a just and generally beneficial competition. Chapman observes that a limited market economy based on private ownership "is no more and no less 'invasive' than one founded on public ownership. . . . Each system would generate income differentials in the cause of economic effectiveness" (p. 31). But he also points out that a system with private ownership would be more likely to respect consumer sovereignty than socialism would be and does not require a concentration of authority in the hands of state planners. (Macpherson does not reply in this volume, but as his next-door office neighbor, I can assure all concerned that the match with Chapman has no more been adjourned than has that with Professor Peter Laslett.)

The controversy among D. D. Raphael, Maurice Cranston, Bernard Mayo, and Peter Schneider turns in the first instance on the analytical meaning of rights and, secondly, on the bearing that the definition has on the political protection due certain or all rights. Raphael asserts that all rights are, and have been traditionally regarded as, "rights of recipience"—rights which imply an obligation on the part of others to recognize one's claim. Some rights, however, are claims against all other persons (such as the right to life and liberty) while others are claims against a limited class of other persons organized collectively as the state. He thinks therefore that social, political, and economic rights, though claims upon the state rather than mankind, are properly included in the United Nations Declaration. Cranston demurs, on the

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ground that the second class does not meet the tests that must be applied (universality, practicability, and permanent importance). Mayo linguistifies the entire subject and concludes that all moral rights are claims upon the state on behalf of all men, so no distinction between classes is warranted. Schneider in effect suggests that the disputants could find terms of peace in the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic. There rights are understood to imply duties, in accordance with both natural law and natural right traditions, but a gradual evolution is recognized to have taken place through which the original claim to civil liberties has been broadened to include welfare rights. The stress, however, is placed on "defense" rights rather than "entitlement" rights in the belief that the individual should be encouraged to be responsible for himself rather than treated as a ward of the state. Of course this pragmatic approach can resolve none of the theoretical problems; at any rate it seems to hold no appeal for the other contributors.

The controversies recorded in this volume, as I hope I have shown, are lively and thoughtful. If they do not succeed in establishing a universally acceptable definition, at least they make us aware of many of the difficulties that beset such an effort. And they make all the more poignant the "whereas" clause preceding the thirty Articles of the United Nations Declaration which stress that "a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge. . . ."

SANFORD A. LAKOFF
University of Toronto

Politics Battle Plan *by Herbert M. Baus and William B. Ross. New York, Macmillan Co. and London, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1968.—399 pp. $7.95.*

The authors of this book are in the business of "merchandising" political candidates and political issues to the public. Basically the book is about how to do that. But it is more than a textbook or a how-to-do-it-yourself treatise. It is fascinatingly illustrated with stories of how this candidate actually did something "right" and that candidate did something "wrong." Most of the illustrations are well known to students of political history, but by no means all of them, and to the layman the book should prove fascinating.

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While in no sense minimizing the importance of the "image" that can be presented by a candidate on television or elsewhere if properly guided, the authors do not regard this as the only important ingredient for a successful candidate. For example, they state categorically that the most important of all campaign qualifications is a desire on the part of the candidate for the office and a willingness to go through the ordeal of a campaign. Close behind that is listed "integrity," although here I got the impression that what the authors meant was "integrity *or* the appearance of it."

They place a good deal of weight on the willingness of the candidate to risk everything on some daring move and seem to be quite impressed with Governor Hughes of Iowa as a prime example. But they make no pretense that the daring campaigner is necessarily a sure winner and point out that "politics is a numbers game—and the candidate who coolly counts before commiting himself to a showdown will sleep better during the campaign." They regard a power base of some sort as essential for a successful candidacy.

The importance of money to a campaign is spelled out with stark realism. Joe Kane, who was persuaded by Joe Kennedy to educate young John Kennedy in the arts and crafts of campaigning, is quoted as saying, "It takes three things to win: The first is money, and the second is money, and the third is money."

Throughout the book there are fascinating illustrations of good and bad politics drawn sometimes from the current scene (Nixon, Rockefeller, Goldwater, Robert Kennedy, and the like) and sometimes from an earlier era (McKinley, Hanna, and Harding), which enliven the book tremendously. Throughout the book it is clear that the authors have quite strong opinions about their clients and the competitors of these clients. For example, their estimate of Goldwater as a *man* is quite high, but their estimate of Goldwater as a *candidate* is very, very low.

There is an interesting chapter on the American phenomenon of the primary; they label it the "quicksand of political power" and point out that "to think that the general election is more important than the primary, as most voters do, is to magnify the wrong side of the political picture . . . primaries are really the key to the election."

They pay their respect to public opinion polls, but it is clear that they regard them neither as infallible guides nor as an unmitigated good for the body politic.

A great deal of the book is given over to an interesting discussion of all of the various elements needed to promote successfully a candidate—from grassroots volunteers to political propaganda. It is so complete

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that it requires two pages to give a condensed check list of the various things which needed to be done in connection with Richard Nixon's post-nomination "sentimental journey to Pat Nixon's hometown."

The power of the press does not go unnoticed, and former Governor Pat Brown of California is quoted as saying, "Never get into an argument with a newspaper unless you own it. A newspaper fails to get in the last word only if it goes broke in mid-debate."

This book makes a contribution to an understanding of today's political campaigns.

ELMO ROPER
New York City

Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress *by Harry M. Scoble. San Francisco, Chandler, 1967.—xviii, 298 pp. $5.75.*

Among the recent and welcome signs of a revival of concern for interest groups within American political science, this book will be one of the most welcome. It is a thoughtful and analytical study of one group, the National Committee for an Effective Congress. In it the author considers the organization and ideology of the NCEC and its electoral activities and strategies; less predictably, there are also serious attempts to gauge the electoral success and the legislative power of the NCEC. To say that much, however, does not suggest the intellectual richness of this short book. It is theoretically relevant—relevant at least to the "group theory" of David Truman. Its themes involve much of contemporary politics; the author relates the activities of the NCEC to the growth of ideology in American politics, and he notes the increasing tendency of such interest groups to usurp the traditional party activities. (He refers to the NCEC as a pseudo-party.) And, finally, the book touches effectively a number of tangential bodies of scholarly literature—those on political parties, Congress, and campaign finance, for example.

Very likely the aspect of the book most likely to attract comment and attention is its analysis. Given the poverty of the discipline's efforts in these directions with interest groups, the mere fact of the attempt should win the author a good measure of gratitude. Much of the early analysis of group theory is useful, both for its sympathetic treatment and its useful clarifications. And the data on the NCEC's electoral efficiency and efficacy is marshalled with fine effect. Not surprisingly,

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the assault on the measurement of power turns out to be more difficult. While it earns high marks for its willingness to seek empirical measures and for its many valuable insights, it is, I am afraid, ultimately unconvincing. The power indices are chiefly positional, and one wonders why the author completely neglects the behavior—especially the roll-call voting—of the men the NCEC supported. The analysis also disappoints somewhat in yet another way. After the early dedication to group theory, the author largely neglects it in framing his analysis and conclusions, and the reader is left to wonder whether group theory has not been rejected once again.

These reservations aside, this remains one of the best studies of an interest group in the literature. It is hard for me to imagine a serious reader not finding a good deal of stimulation in its pages. Even its less successful aspects command one's attention for their creative attacks on questions and methodological problems that have too rarely been under attack.

Adding to this book's special qualities is its prose style, a combination of the personal (and the first-person) and the formal and slightly academic. Unusual though it is, it "works" in that the result is both readable and communicative. The book concludes with two excellent indexes, one of names and the other of topics. At a time when indexing may be a dying art, the index of topics alone would justify the book if only a few dozen authors would take it as a model.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory *by Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967.* —vii, 233 pp. $6.50; *paperback*, $2.95.

Professor d'Entrèves' "introduction to political theory" is deceptively simple. Although he proclaims at the outset that his purpose is to defend a certain type of approach to political theory, the argument is never complicated or metaphysical. Yet, by the end of the book, even the unsympathetic reader must admit that he has met a formidable antagonist.

The titles of the parts of the book, "Might," "Power," and "Authority," indicate the author's approach. Force, legality, and legitimacy all play essential roles in political institutions. Any attempt to reduce politics to one or two of these elements must fail, as did the argument of

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Thrasymachus before the onslaught of Plato's dialectic. Although politics may be found at the substate and suprastate levels, it is only in the fully developed state that the optimum union of efficacy, validity, and legitimacy can be achieved. It follows that "realists," from Bentley to Easton, who make a point of developing systems of political theory that minimize or completely eliminate the notion of "the state" are doing a disservice by deflecting attention from the key role played by the sovereign polity.

For the most part, d'Entrèves' mode of argument is historical rather than philosophical. He does not attempt to vindicate the liberal values of equality and liberty by the use of arguments based upon the nature of man or the nature of the cosmos; but he shows that they are, by no means, of modern origin or confined to the order that has come to be known as "bourgeois." They have deep roots; they are the product of gradual, though uneven, development; and, significantly, they are the *only* set of fundamental political values to have gained enduring predominance, at least in the West, however great the shortcomings of actual political institutions.

Even Aristotle, d'Entrèves points out (save in the highly abnormal situation in which certain individuals are "utterly superior to others") believed that citizens must share equally in civic life. True, citizenship would be by no means universal. Even so, equality played an important role, a role which grew with the passage of centuries, while the opposite doctrine of inequality failed to gain ground. In modern times, racialism, because it brushes aside as irrelevant any recognition by those on whom the rule is imposed of the right of the favored race, boils down to reliance on force, without justification. (If there is a weak point in d'Entrèves' argument, it is here. If a race is in fact essentially inferior and undeserving of sharing in ruling, like Aristotle's "natural slaves," then does the justification of its subjection depend upon the subjects' recognition of the right of the rulers? This point at least deserves argument. The racialists' contention need not rest, as d'Entrèves says it must, upon the proposition that force is "the only relevant factor in politics" [p. 198]).

In continuing the argument, d'Entrèves neatly disposes of "elitist" theory by contending that the role of the elite must be either "imposed" or "proposed": that, if the former, it again boils down to reliance upon force, lacking justification, and, if the latter, "there must be one point at least where rulers and ruled are on a footing of equality" (p. 199).

It is a pity that space does not permit discussion of the author's treatment of negative and positive liberty and of the common good. Also, this review would be misleading if, in concentrating upon d'Entrèves' major

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thesis, it obscured the fact that most of the twenty-five chapters are devoted to a critical exposition of standard topics of political theory that is enlightening and insightful quite apart from the book's central message.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK
Swarthmore College

A Theory of Political Integration *by Claude Ake. Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press, 1967.—ix, 164 pp.*

Claude Ake wrote a dissertation for Columbia University that was an intelligent review of current literature on national integration, capped with an analytic expatiation on the term to show its component elements. So far, so good. Then someone suggested that the dissertation be "revised for publication," it appears. That, in this reviewer's opinion, was a mistake. Not that the book is bad or wrong (however those terms may be defined). It is just unnecessary, a product of the information explosion which leaves us no more knowledgeable by its publication. But let us let the author speak for himself:

> Our theory is that the political system undertaking social mobilization maximizes its capacity for carrying out the process and remaining stable despite the potentially disruptive short-run effects of social mobilization if it is authoritarian, paternal 'identific,' and consensual. If any of these four structural characteristics is absent and to the extent that functionally compensating factors are also absent, the destabilizing effects of social mobilizations are increased (p. 101).

"Authoritarian" means "large, concentrated and easily mobilized" power (p. 102); "paternal" implies "a political class . . . willing and able to lead" (p. 104) and is included in the full definition of the previous term; "identific" describes "mutual identity between the political class and the governed" (p. 108); "consensual" denotes political class solidarity (p. 111).

It does not seem to be an unreasonable abbreviation or caricature to add up these four elements and say that if the political class is large, united, and powerful and if the rest of the population identifies with it or, in the absence of these conditions, if there are "functionally compensating factors," then there is integration, or at least mobilization is smoother than if these conditions are absent. But who doubts it?

Even a commonplace or an identity may have some research value if

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there are guides to making it operational. Each of the theory's four components has been assigned some "empirical indicators," but they are in fact simply relevant questions rather than rigorous indicators or even new insights. From 1.1: "Are political resources [. . . such as money] concentrated in a few hands?" (p. 105) to 4.5: ("Is there a machinery for resolving conflict within the ruling elite?" (p. 113), the relevant questions are interesting but ordinary. Or we might hope to find an insightful application of a simple theoretical statement. But the last 33 pages of the book are spent in looking for integration in the U.S., U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Nigeria; the search is rather rapid and intuitive and could have been written without the preceding 116 pages.

Maybe this is being too critical; good and useful books have been written as a careful review of the literature. Ake spend his first 116 pages signaling the importance of integration in the search for modernization, noting the absence of sound theory on the problem, evaluating the charismatic and uni-party antidotes to disintegration, and contrasting the elite-mass gap and the traditional-modernistic stratification. Ake recognizes, in his review, that structural-functionalism does not hide the problem of change; that which poses the conditions for balance implicitly also poses the problem of imbalance. He also recognizes that the problems of mobilization (change) and stability go hand in hand. This said, the book is more of a review article than a theory of political integration.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
New York University

Newcastle's New York: Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 *by Stanley Nider Katz. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968.—xi, 285 pp. $6.95.*

Anyone who has ever tried to probe behind the formal public facade of political events will appreciate this book. It is difficult enough even in modern times to ascertain the covert relationships between politics and government—who is being rewarded for what past services, which relative or political crony has smoothed the way for an office-seeker, or what pressure group has managed to get the ear of a government leader—and how much more arduous it must be to disinter those private political deals when they have been buried for over two hundred years. Nonetheless that is the task Professor Katz sets for himself in this path-breaking study of Anglo-American politics in the age of Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle.

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The special subject of scrutiny here is the interaction between imperial and colonial politics and its effect on the colony of New York from 1732 to 1753. It is Katz's view that colonial and imperial politics cannot be far separated and that one cannot be understood fully without the other. The colonial administrative network was an important outlet for British patronage, providing a variety of lucrative and prestigious posts with which to slake the thirst for office of a host of English place-seekers. In the period from 1732 to 1753 four successful supplicants held office as governor of New York, wielding considerable power over the lives and fortunes of the provincials and in several cases inspiring a strong colonial opposition. Though Katz gives some attention to all leading figures on the New York political stage, his main interest centers on four protagonists—Lewis Morris, Governor William Cosby, James DeLancey, and Governor George Clinton. Discussing the Morris-Cosby conflict of the mid-1730's, he shows how the debenched New York Chief Justice, Lewis Morris, pulled every string and used every credit he had in England to regain his post and force the recall of Governor Cosby. Morris launched his campaign by forming an opposition to Cosby in New York, but when it became apparent that the real decisions would be made in London, he crossed the Atlantic to press his cause personally before the Privy Council. Morris's effort to cultivate influence in high places is an intriguing tale with a cast of characters ranging from a drunken Plantation Office clerk to the mistress of the Prince of Wales. In the second major episode, Katz shows the relationship between Governor Clinton and colonial leader James DeLancey to have been that of ruler and first minister until the friendship soured in 1746 and the two became implacable enemies. Thereafter the two men are found jockeying for position as each attempted to best the other at the influence game and gain the upper hand at Whitehall. In tracing the successes of the well-connected and the frustrations of those lacking such indispensable ties, the author demonstrates convincingly that New York politics "cannot fully be understood in terms of a closed provincial system."

By taking us behind the scenes of Newcastle's world of influence Professor Katz reveals a noteworthy aspect of eighteenth century political life. But this is not all Katz achieves, for his study turns out to have considerable relevance to the larger problems of eighteenth century imperial relationships. Because the author works within a spacious perspective, being free of the single-motive theories which once plagued colonial historiography and being fully attuned to the latest developments in the field, his study produces a variety of extra dividends. Let

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me list a number of examples. (1) "Evidence of political influence in England was the prerequisite for political mastery in America" where "signs of favor with the imperial administration provided a hedge against local political disaffection." This is shown by the way Lewis Morris's political stock rose and fell in New York with each reported gain or loss at Whitehall. (2) It becomes evident that executive authority in the colonies could be severely undermined by provincial politicians with a strong "interest" at home. There is no better illustration of this than James DeLancey's often-demonstrated ability to outflank Governor Clinton by applying to prominent DeLancey relatives or business connections to present his case in London. (3) There is an implicit correlation between the colonists' disgruntlement over a cumbersome and patronage-riddled imperial bureaucracy and their growing suspicion that a ministerial conspiracy was afoot to rob them of their liberties. It is little wonder that Lewis Morris, after being forced to cool his heels in London for nineteen long months while the Privy Council and the Board of Trade ponderously reviewed his case, became disgusted with the "Deceits" of a court and ministry who "seem less concerned in our contests than we are at those between crows and kingbirds." (4) The age of Newcastle marked the high point of influence-mongering in imperial administration. Katz detects a change after mid-century when the approaching war with France placed a premium on efficiency and responsiveness to imperial priorities which, in turn, compelled a tightening-up of administrative procedures. The implications of this for an increase of tension between the colonies and the mother country are fairly obvious. (5) A final bonus is the carefully annotated bibliography and the full and precise footnotes in which Katz shares his knowledge of many previously unexploited primary sources. For other workers in this realm, Katz has thereby performed the service of mapping a certain amount of territory which until recently was *terra incognita*.

Because the implications of this study are so wide-ranging and because the reader must constantly split his attention between London and New York, there is a certain diffuseness of perspective which at times can be disconcerting. Nor does the author relieve this ambiguity by offering a single neat statement of his thesis or a final quotable summary of his findings. That he does not is a reflection, first, of the very newness of informal Anglo-American politics as a field of study and, second, of what might be called the author's own "judicial restraint," which may in turn have something to do with Katz's considerable grounding in law. At any rate, history has often, in the absence of such restraint, suffered much distortion from hastily-manu-

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factured theories. That Katz leaves his study open-ended should encourage others to take up this imaginative line of investigation. Those who do will find no better model for virtuosity of research and thoughtful analysis than *Newcastle's New York*.

PATRICIA U. BONOMI
Lehman College of the City University of New York

Utopia and Reality: A Collective Portrait of American Socialists *by Betty Yorburg. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1969.—x, 198 pp. $7.50.*

The content of Betty Yorburg's book is a rich accumulation of interviews with present and former leaders of the Socialist Party on a wide variety of issues the author deems pertinent. The book presents a composite picture of the mentality of the Socialist Party leaders since the 1920's, rather than analyzing historical changes. It takes as its starting point the split of American socialism into wings, or rival parties—the Socialist Party and the Communist Party—and adopts the viewpoint of and deals with the Socialist Party without analysis. The causes are not examined, for example, of why the S. P. had greater influence than the C. P. during the 1920's, while the C. P. reversed the position in the 1930's. And why was the S. P. to the "left" of the C. P. at a critical period of its life? As a study of the confrontation, *Utopia and Reality* seems to this reviewer to be overly static and dealing in absolutes. Its revelation of the continuing heterogeneity of the S. P. leadership, its constant passion for splitting may go far for many readers to explain the shifting fortunes of the two wings of socialism during the period 1920-1945. Ultimately both wings of socialism were removed from influence or significance in American public life by their inability to talk to a nation in which socialist measures had been absorbed into the daily practice of the existing order without revolutionary upheavals, making meaningless the categories "capitalism" and "socialism." Socialism simply did not make sense when the existing economic and social order was a mixed one, and prosperous. Reality, without banishing conflict from the world, has rendered all kinds of socialism irrelevant. The classical formulas for thought and action often need to be recast. This thought presents itself to the reviewer as he ponders over the organization of the book into five chapters: "Self-Images," "The Decision to Join," "The Failure of Socialism

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in America," "The Future of Socialism in America," and "Conclusions." If this format is not conducive to producing a coherent pattern, it has real merit in that it leaves each reader to form his own judgment as to the future of the elusive term "socialism." An appendix on "Methods," another entitled "Coding Variables," and an Index complete the book.

EARL BROWDER
Princeton, New Jersey

Most Uncommon Jacksonians: The Radical Leaders of the Early Labor Movement *by Edward Pessen. Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 1967.—viii, 203 pp. $7.00.*

Since the end of the 1940's historians' understanding of the remarkable upsurge of economic and political activity by workingmen between 1827 and 1837 has been augmented and refined significantly by the writings of William A. Sullivan, Walter Hugins, Carl N. Degler, and Edward Pessen. They have made it quite clear that there was an authentic movement of journeyman mechanics, factory operatives, and urban laboring poor which stood outside the ideological consensus defined by such political historians as Hofstadter, Benson, and Meyers. On the other hand, they have revealed that this movement readily drew on journalists, aspiring politicians, small employers, and even occasional men of wealth to share its speakers' platforms, endorsements for public office, and leading positions with actual journeymen like John Commerford, William Heighton, and John Ferral. The criterion for accepting such men, argues Dr. Pessen, was not their occupation but their beliefs.

This slender volume explores the ideology of the mechanics' spokesmen. It does not pretend to be a social history of the working classes in this period. Whether they spoke with the paternalistic air of Stephen Simpson, the opportunistic cunning of Levi Slamm and Ely Moore, the refined dogmatism of Robert Dale Owen, the Old Testament fury of Seth Luther and John Ferral, or the intransigence of Thomas Skidmore, all these reformers rejected the optimistic, philistine egalitarianism which permeated the Whig and Democratic political rhetoric of the age. Rather than chant hymns to equal opportunity, they warned against the inequality of private property. Spurning the gospel of wealth, they denounced the corrupting spirit of avarice. In Dr. Pessen's view, they sought a vaguely formulated "form of socialist community."

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Most Uncommon Jacksonians is an introductory essay and valuable as such. Unlike Sullivan's *Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 1800-1840* or Hugins' *Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class* or even several of Dr. Pessen's earlier articles, it contains very little new in either fact or analysis. Its self-imposed limitations, furthermore, tend to inhibit or even distort its interpretation of leaders and beliefs. The book neglects the trade practices of the mechanics (offering only a brief and somewhat misleading description of the trades' union, the delegate body of trade society representatives) and persistently evades the problem of the actual economic circumstances of the working classes. As a result Dr. Pessen vacillates between the conclusion that his labor spokesmen were a handful of "disgruntled radicals" and the claim that they articulated the feelings of an "alienated" working class. His contention that a remarkable gulf yawned between these leaders' radical theory and "their sober and sedate labor activities" rests on no description of those activities. His conclusion retreats to consensus—an "unspoken faith" in the adaptability of American institutions—and to gently chiding John Ferral for calling the winning of the ten-hour day "our bloodless revolution." But the massive strike of tradesmen and laborers alike which won that victory in Philadelphia did have insurrectionary qualities. Ferral's Philadelphia County handloom weavers knew frequent battles with sheriffs and militia in their semi-annual disputes over prices with their masters and had made more than one physical assault on machinery. The 1836 demonstrations against the trial of New York tailors and the flour riots in that city the next year were hardly "sober and sedate." To relate theory to practice, we must know more about practice than Dr. Pessen has told us here.

DAVID MONTGOMERY
University of Warwick

The Brains Trust *by R. G. Tugwell. New York, The Viking Press, 1968.—xxxii, 538 pp. $10.00.*

In this lengthy memoir Rexford Guy Tugwell recollects his service as an idea man to Franklin D. Roosevelt during the seven months that preceded the election of 1932. As a member of what newsmen dubbed "the Brains Trust" (according to Tugwell, its other members were Raymond Moley, Adolf Berle, Samuel Rosenman, and Basil O'Connor and "as-

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sociates" Robert K. Straus, Hugh Johnson, and Charles W. Taussig), the Columbia economics professor was particularly concerned with issues relating to the depression and recovery. In company with "radical" intellectuals like John Dewey and Paul Douglas and the "collectivist" liberal bloc in Congress headed by young Bob La Follette, Robert F. Wagner, and Fiorello La Guardia, Tugwell held definite views on what was needed: deficit financing as a pump-priming device, large-scale federal public works programs, and the "concentration and control" approach to reforming the industrial structure, among other things. At times he felt that candidate Roosevelt understood and appreciated the arguments on behalf of those "advanced" views, or at least some of them, and he urged FDR to wage an "educational" presidential campaign that would prepare people for the drastic steps to be taken by the new administration. The result for Tugwell and his allies, however, was denial and frustration.

The author delineates at least four other "easier" approaches to the recovery issue that competed with his own for Roosevelt's ear during the campaign: the anti-monopoly or atomist position (Brandeis, Frankfurter, and most of the "old progressives" in Congress); the "business confidence" school (Bernard Baruch, Joseph P. Kennedy, and other Democratic Party "angels"); the gold manipulation panacea (Henry Morgenthau and the Cornell economists); and the "don't-rock-the-boat" approach of the political pros (Louis Howe and most of the Democratic "elders" in Congress). Roosevelt, governed by his own ideological limitations and his determination to keep all options open, extended some degree of recognition to all the contending factions, but the Tugwell school received the least. At the time Tugwell took his setbacks with good grace, felt that he was learning some valuable lessons in "practical politics," and assured himself that after FDR became president he would face up in a statesmanlike way to the hard choices confronting him. But as Tugwell makes clear here and in his other writings, those hopes never materialized. Roosevelt continued to temporize during the ensuing years, and consequently "the New Deal was a mild medicine."

Little that Tugwell writes of here will seem new to Roosevelt scholars, and his low estimate of the New Deal's significance seems commonplace at a time when many liberals, to say nothing of New Leftists, are fostering a downward revaluation of that reform era's worth in light of the crises of the 1960's. Yet it is important to know from first-hand reports such as this that advisers close to Roosevelt were urging *at the time* more radical alternatives upon him than the ones he chose in 1932 and thereafter. For there inevitably arises an argument over whether more radical measures, which may seem desirable from today's perspective, would

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have been "realistic" in terms of the national temper of thirty-five years ago. Tugwell's memoir supports the position of those who contend that much more in the way of fundamental reform could have been accomplished under the duress of the Great Depression, and in his opinion "Roosevelt erred . . . on the minimal side." All the more surprising, therefore, is Tugwell's conclusion that although the New Deal did not deserve the reputation that it achieved in the annals of American reform, "Roosevelt does." It seems to me that in view of Roosevelt's record of obstruction vis-a-vis the more radical elements in New Deal circles, one might legitimately maintain that the verdict should be just the other way around.

J. Joseph Huthmacher
Rutgers, The State University, New Brunswick

The Agony of the American Left *by Christopher Lasch. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.—ix, 212 pp. $4.95.*

As protesters spray slogans on concrete walls with aerosol cans, the disciplined writing of history would seem to be a barely excusable pastime. Can scholars really attend to the insinuating density of the past? Can they morally afford to detach themselves so as to place man's specific agonies in some larger historical scheme? Each present moment being painfully critical, threatening to extinguish the very possibility of a meaningful future, who would pause to take the measure of the past? We rush to make our point, hoping to remain relevant to the kaleidoscope of prevailing catastrophes. We search for symbols to manage our experiences, including those we might have had but were in fact denied. Respectably educated, we easily turn to the rhetoric of history, reluctant to give up a mode of discourse which has enabled countless writers to encompass and bear the disasters of their times.

Christopher Lasch, too, will not quite let go of the conventions of the discipline of history as he begins in the beginning—post-Civil War America—and ends with the blazing, incandescent present, the Chicago Convention of 1968. But he can hardly move himself to *order* the sequence of events. His subject, the agony of the Left in America, is reflected in his very style. Not that his sentences, his paragraphs, or even his chapters show him to be disorderly or frantic. Each of the components of what has been put between the covers of his book makes sense, illuminates, and clarifies. Yet there is no coherent whole, no

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discernible perspective which brings the elements he touches on in relation with one another.

This would matter less if Professor Lasch presumed merely to remark *ad hoc* on America's ailments, to provide an intelligent commentary on current events, or to exhort his fellow Americans to pull themselves together. But it is evident that he hopes to do more, to get some mileage out of the conventions of historical writing as he explicitly insists on his point: Americans need a mass-based radicalism, a program for social reconstruction. Such a program is missing, he notes, because intellectuals have betrayed their vocation. They have pursued narrow goals: when they have not attached themselves to the politics of the Soviet Union (and later Peking and Hanoi) they have become co-opted propagandists for the Cold War. Since the present institutional structure offers no channels for converting discontents into coherent policies, Professor Lasch urges the "intellectual class" to engage in rigorous scholarship. He summons intellectuals to reconnect with the usable past—with that time in American history when resistance to the status quo was offered by workers and farmers, the very groups victimized by the corporate system, when populism, feminism, socialism, and black nationalism provided feasible programmatic alternatives. Professor Lasch does not nostalgically dwell on this past. Nor does he seek to dramatize its specific ambiguities—the duplicities of its heroes, the inconsequence of its victories. He merely refers to it so that today it may serve to rehabilitate the Left, to give it the strength for reinventing a radical politics. Without a rediscovered past, no future. The initial need is to diagnose our contemporary ideological condition, to acknowledge that the *cause* of the present mindlessness lies in the sectarianism of left-wing movements and the treason of their intellectual leadership.

As diagnosis of America's failure to develop a comprehensive radical critique Professor Lasch's work is hard to fault, his cases in point (especially his account of the relations between the C.I.A. and the Congress for Cultural Freedom) making it plausible enough. But is it sufficient to explain the character of ideas and mass movements as the result of bad judgment, of mistaken decisions? Failing to cut deeper and expose a wider context, Professor Lasch writes as if neither Tocqueville nor Hartz had reflected on liberalism in America. Just as the Left has not formulated an effective program, Professor Lasch has not developed a perspective comprehensive and radical enough to transcend America's present ideological fixations. His work, accordingly, is at once a perceptive commentary on the agony of the American Left and one of its manifestations. Thus it implicitly makes the point that the discipline

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of history shares at least this with poetry and social science: it is an art form demanding more detachment and self control than one can normally expect of men writing under pressure in response to generous impulses.

HENRY S. KARIEL
University of Hawaii

Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution *by Richard R. Fagan, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968.—xii, 161 pp. $5.95.*

The authors set out to characterize the demographic composition and reasons for leaving Cuba of the "exiles" and accomplish that task more or less adequately. Their contribution, a modest but important one, is to provide an accurate portrayal of the prerevolutionary social origins and social status of the Cuban exiles. It is a study of quantitative data drawn from the records in the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami and from interviews with a sample of exiles resident in Miami. They tell us nothing startling, but given the magnitude of nonsense written about Cuba, it is nice to have this simple study as a reliable reference source. The authors demonstrate that "the poorer sectors of Cuban society, which constitute a majority of the island's population, have contributed only marginally to the exodus. . . . The great preponderance of the refugees are drawn from the wealthier, the better educated, the more urban, and the higher occupational sectors" (pp. 22-23). Residents of Havana itself are over-represented by three times and constitute 62 per cent of the refugees. This composition of the emigres, moreover, "was fairly constant through time" (p. 64). In addition, the authors' analysis of the exiles' "decision to leave" Cuba contributes to our further understanding of exile motivation and political behavior in general.

The nature of the data restricted the authors, but the authors also made restricted use of the data; they attend too little to analyzing the demographic interrelationships in their data. They fail, on several occasions, to test their interpretations of findings with their own data where this was clearly possible. For instance, they suggest that the more educated tended to be more likely to initially support the revolution; in part this reflects the occupational composition of the less educated exiles, a group which includes large numbers of uneducated military personnel and policemen and "successful" ranchers and farmers. However, there is no multivariate analysis of the relationship between education, occupation,

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and initial attitude—which could have been done easily. In general, the analysis of attitudes and political participation is limited to simple two-variable relationships. Moreover, most tables show only dichotomous measures of the dependent variable; and when the authors do use a trichotomy, unfortunately, they are inconsistent and confusing in their terminology. In Chapter III, p. 37, "more favorable" to the revolution refers to individuals with 3 to 4 points on their scale, while those with 0 to 2 points are defined as "less favorable." In Chapter IV, p. 52, those whose scores are 1 or 2 are suddenly grouped together as "more favorable," while 3 to 4 points becomes "most favorable." Such inconsistency, even when noted by the authors, is both silly and inexcusable. They could easily have used the following definitions, stated them at the outset, and been consistent throughout—least favorable: 0; more favorable: 1 to 2; and most favorable: 3 to 4. What was "most favorable" in one chapter could have been "most favorable" in another—which is not too much to ask.

The authors also are timid about stating the implications of their findings for understanding the revolution. While they do say they do not want to engage in speculation, they should have clearly stated that they have contributed to understanding the social composition of the *counter-revolutionaries*. Indeed, they have specific data on this question which they fail to analyze. While their index of "politically active refugees" dedicated to Castro's overthrow is weak, the fact is that they use it for some purposes, but do not analyze the social composition of this group of counter-revolutionary activists. They could, at least, have asked questions about this restricted group like the ones asked about the refugees as a whole. Considering that this study took five years from field work to publication and had three authors working on it, one might have hoped for a more complete and multifaceted analysis.

MAURICE ZEITLIN
University of Wisconsin

Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919 *by Richard A. Preston. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1967.—xxii, 576 pp. $12.50.*

This excellent, lengthy, and complex study of the origins of a defense

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organization for the British Commonwealth between the year of Canadian confederation and the establishment of the British Empire delegation at Versailles is a contribution of fundamental importance to at least four fields of study. The author, Richard A. Preston, now W. K. Boyd Professor of History at Duke University, had previously demonstrated himself to be a major military historian; he has now contributed in equally important ways to British imperial studies and to the history of Canada and of Australia. Nor will scholars interested in descriptions of how bureaucracies work, how commissions are appointed and proceed, and how military men are educated fail to find substantial evidence and discussion in this tightly-written volume.

Professor Preston's thesis constitutes a revision upon earlier views, especially those of Franklyn Johnson, John Ehrman, and W. C. B. Tunstall. In many ways the revision is one of nuances only rather than of major discoveries, and some of the revisions seem less fresh because of the appearance in 1965 of Donald C. Gordon's *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914*, although several of Preston's conclusions, especially for Canada, differ. The author's theses, stated in the Preface, are that ". . . the British Commonwealth military system was not a vestige of the earlier system of Empire defense but was created as a result of *ad hoc* decisions which resulted from the natural aspirations and needs of colonial peoples"; that ". . . too much attention has been given to imperial defense planning and too little to military and naval developments in the colonies themselves"; and that ". . . in view of the nature of the British Empire at the end of the century, imperial defense was unsound and inadequate for military as well as political reasons. Colonial rejection of imperial defense was not a mere result of local political opposition but came because history, geography, and constitutional development made voluntary military and naval co-operation more effective" (pp. vii-viii). This last reinterpretation is stated "tentatively," but it need not have been, for Professor Preston would appear to offer abundant proof for such a conclusion. Hence his quotation marks in the title, for he shows "imperial defense" to be, in fact, the coincidence of the needs of the colonies themselves as felt, expressed, and argued for at home rather than at Home, a distinction of fundamental importance.

The volume was richly researched in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Private papers as well as official have been used, and an extensive contemporary literature has been drawn from military and service journals, from the press, and from Parliamentary papers. The documentation is full, and the selective bibliography, while unfortunate-

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ly a listing rather than a critical discussion, is especially helpful on contemporary articles. Several theses and dissertations have been used to advantage and are scrupulously acknowledged, together with recommendations (in the footnotes) concerning publication. The index is a model of its kind, and the Duke University Press has done its usual clean job of production in this, the twenty-ninth volume in its Commonwealth-Studies Center Publications.

To ask for more in a book already so full, and so cogently argued, is to ask perhaps to gild a lily, but nonetheless one wishes for more. Perhaps the author was unable to gain access to the private papers of Alfred Deakin and Robert Borden, both under some restrictions at the time because of official biographies, but one would like to have seen the Chamberlain papers in Birmingham or the papers of Garnet Wolseley at Hove or any of several other private collections used. One is pleased to see Sir W. F. D. Jervois given a major role to play in the narrative and wishes that the discussion had been further enriched by use of his papers in England, South Australia, and Singapore. Joseph Lehmann's biography of Wolseley appears to have not been used, and clearly the research in New Zealand was circumscribed by time, for none of the quite important holdings of the Sir Alexander Turnbull Library have been exploited. Stylistically, one would like to see everyone introduced in full by title and office when first marched on stage ("Colonel Scratchley" must be sought out in the index before he becomes Maj. Gen. Sir Peter Henry Scratchley). Most important, one would like to see South Africa provided for a bit more fully in the story.

But these are complaints that merely reflect the strengths of the book. It is so full, persuasive, and uncluttered yet detailed that one simply wishes to see more of the same qualities. The book is excellent; it is not definitive, but it is as nearly so as anyone is likely to attempt for many years to come. It places Professor Preston in the company of two men he clearly much admires, Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Professor Norman Gibbs of All Soul's.

ROBIN W. WINKS
Yale University

Court and Country: 1688-1702 *by Dennis Rubini. London, Rupert Hart-Davis, 1967.—304 pp. 63s.*

This is a detailed and copiously annotated account of political allegiance,

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rivalry, and controversy in the reign of William III. It discusses in eleven chapters the factions of the period, their disputes about control of the purse, the duration of Parliament, the matter of treason, the disbandment of troops after the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, the disposal of Irish forfeitures, the Act of Settlement (reprinted and annotated in Appendix *C*), and ministerial responsibility. Appendix *A* re-examines party with reference to the evidence of two newly discovered listings of government and opposition members; Appendix *B* affords voting records and other data for the membership of the Commission of Accounts in 1690. An index and a very impressive bibliography of manuscript material from little explored repositories and a selected list of printed sources examined provide ample evidence of the author's labors and objectives.

Dr. Rubini has re-examined the composition and nature of the country or opposition party. His interpretation of the kaleidoscope of political divisions differs both from the assumptions and definitions of Macauley and Feiling and from the newer conclusions of Henry Horwitz and others. No one will now safely study the history of Parliamentary activities in the reign without reference to this careful work and the facts presented by it. The concentration is upon the record of members and little but peripheral attention is given to the extensive pamphlet warfare unleashed by the lapse of the Licensing Act, by some dissidents like the republican group, and by the machinations of men like Robert Harley, the future Tory prime minister but now a leader of the country-Tory amalgam and most active against the ruling *junta*. It should be noted that a typographical error (p. 133ff.) confuses Sir John, the secretary, with John Trenchard, the author of so many polemical tracts against a standing army.

On the whole Dr. Rubini thinks the country-Tory opposition managed to get its way in the diminution of royal power over Parliament, army, finance, and, to a degree, foreign affairs. This he explains, if I read his conclusion correctly, by the shifting nature of political loyalty. Voters in the House of Commons were seldom consistent save in the less important divisions. The designations Whig and Tory, court and country meant something to contemporaries, but their acceptance by no means insured a vote for or, as the case might be, against a government measure or minister. He brings an impressive amount of evidence to support his examination of the record but perhaps the problem of party in the period, even if his reasonable findings are accepted, is still not altogether settled.

CAROLINE ROBBINS
Bryn Mawr College

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Professional Men: The Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-Century England *by W. J. Reader. New York, Basic Books, 1967.—vii, 248 pp. $6.50.*

Once upon a time many a prospective Ph.D. looking out of his carrel or his laboratory despaired lest every problem be settled before he had his chance. His 1970 equivalent can scarcely experience any such fear; in every discipline new questions beg for answers. Nowhere is this change more apparent than in history which once seemed caught in its own conventions and now has boundless possibilities owing to infusions from bordering disciplines. The present book would not have been written a generation ago. To put it so is less to claim great novelty than to suggest how far social history has gone beyond gossip and statistics to appreciate the implications of Maria Edgeworth's observation (1814) that there are no longer such things as attorneys, "they are all turned into solicitors and agents, just as every *shop* is become a *warehouse*, and every *service* a *situation*."

The author effectively begins by assaying the transformation that marked the eighteenth century rise of the three "liberal professions," divinity, physic, and law, the nucleus about which the later professional class was to form. Although land was the social standard, many estates could not support the whole family in the manner to which it would like to be accustomed. The younger sons perforce turned elsewhere—church, state, trade, armed forces, medicine, law. They did not look for a job, they were provided for. They had no technical training; intent and gentility were grounds enough. Moreover, each profession had ranks to which no gentleman could descend and, conversely, status to which the lower ranks aspired. Consequently, the imposition of standards first came from these latter who desired to remove the stigma of social inferiority. As one must expect, the upper branches, jealous of their prestige, discouraged admissions. Discouragement, it must be emphasized, did not take the form of stiffer exams, for indeed there were few failures, but of rating personal knowledge, "character" (equated with gentility), and "the old school tie" above technical knowledge.

Necessity, circumstance, and competition, however, did induce change. Select committees and parliamentary acts, new professions, multiple exposures of inefficiency, and awareness of German technical advances, dearth of opportunities and inadequacy of schools, breakdown of the old hierarchy and burgeoning middle class entrance into the professions alike facilitated the triumph of competition. Not that triumph came easily. Would the competitive system actually produce good men, soon enough? Would it merely lead to cramming and disregard of man-

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ners, morals, health? The old public schools and Oxbridge obstructed reform by emphasis on the Christian gentleman, gamesmanship ("readiness, pluck, self-dependence"), the amateur, proving indeed that every profession is a conspiracy against the newcomer. Even the triumph of the competitive examination was less a leap forward than a slow rejection of the past. Apprenticeship, handicapped by protracted terms, bad masters, nepotism, and cost, long remained the leading principle. Matthew Arnold's rhapsody about Oxford's ineffable charm, her ideal of beauty nearer to truth than all the science of Tübingen did not prevent him from suggesting that both Oxford and Cambridge be broken up and their resources used for educational purposes. Oxbridge taught a man how to spend £1000 a year, Edingow how to make it. Moreover, progress in fact should not be equated with progress on paper. Professional opportunities kept pace neither with social need nor available candidates; pay was often disastrously low; snobbery remained a curse. Once the empire had provided a way out, for here pluck, physical fitness, and a sense of responsibility would go a long way; but in time, devolution and loss of a sense of mission reduced that outlet. Clearly this little book skirts if it does not penetrate many phases of English development. It has, to be sure, the defects of its pioneering virtues. Interesting and informing as it is, it could have been more so had the author exploited the riches of literature and the diffuse evidence of periodicals. Novelists describe contemporary circumstances; magazines testify to shifting attitudes through space and emphasis. *Iolanthe* satirizes the extension of competitive examination to a Duke's exalted station and inquires if peers be recruited entirely from persons of intelligence, of what use is a gentleman? Nevertheless the book, by revealing what needs to be done by supplying guidelines to accomplishment, is scarcely less valuable for its gaps than for its content.

CHARLES F. MULLETT
University of Missouri

Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik. Ein Sammelband *herausgegeben von Werner E. Mosse unter Mitwirkung von Arnold Paucker (Band 13 der Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts). Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1965. —xviii, 608 pp. $12.00.*

Objective studies of the so-called "Jewish Question" in Germany, the

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attitude of state and society towards the Jews during the past 150 years, were rare until the end of World War II. German scholarship either side-stepped the issue or, more often than not, treated it polemically. German Jews, in turn, eschewed a topic so conducive to futile and undesirable controversy. Only after the horrors of the Final Solution stood revealed did scholars direct their attention systematically to various facets of the Jewish experience in Germany, notably the period of extermination and the origins and nature of German anti-semitism. *Entscheidungsjahr 1932*, the first collaborative work of a projected multi-volume study of the Jews in Germany during the past two centuries, focuses squarely on the Jewish Question during a brief but crucial phase of German history. The authors explore the reasons why all hopes for the successful attainment of a harmonious German-Jewish symbiosis, to which the majority of Jews had continuously aspired, collapsed during the closing years of the republic. Although the discussions transcend the title of the book, 1932 remains the focal point as it was a decisive year both for Germany and its Jewish citizens. During its course, parliamentary democracy in the republic suffered its final breakdown against a background of economic depression and political violence, while the Jews encountered mounting, virulent anti-semitism accompanied by their growing isolation which heralded the ultimate collapse of a slow, tortuous, century-old assimilation process. The interrelationship of these developments forms the main theme of this volume, with each of its six sections concentrating on a special aspect of the problem. W. E. Mosse briefly surveys the situation of the German Jews since 1918 and stresses their increasingly precarious situation during the decline of liberalism and democracy in the early thirties. E. G. Lowenthal discusses the nature of Jewish participation in Germany's public life, and E. Bennathan the demographic and economic structure of German Jewry. Three contributions on anti-semitism explore its sociological roots in German society (H. P. Bahrdt), the socio-psychological structure of national-socialist anti-semitism (Z. Barbu), and the attitude of the political Right toward the Jews (G. L. Mosse). While H. J. Kraus, K. Thieme, P. B. Wiener, and H. H. Knütter examine the position of the churches and political parties to the Jewish Question, K. Loewenstein treats the Jewish response to the crisis of German democracy, and A. Paucker, in an extensive and penetrating essay, concentrates on the measures taken by Jewish organizations to combat anti-semitism during the final stages of the republic. The fruitless attempts by Jewish spokesmen to deal with the problem of anti-semitism through rational debates in various publications with prominent non-Jews is depicted by E. Reichmann; and in the concluding

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section R. Weltsch reflects on the failure of the German-Jewish symbiosis as revealed in the year of decision, 1932. Although the contributions differ in quality and depth, they convey collectively a convincing and tragic story: Germany's Jews, clinging desperately to their cherished German heritage, saw their claims to this heritage brutally refuted during the republic's declining phase by the same right-wing forces that simultaneously assailed the remnants of German democracy as a "Jewish-dominated" creation. By 1932, when many former supporters of the republic deserted its cause, they abandoned the Jews along with it. Confronted by anti-semitic attacks from the right and widespread indifference from the middle and left of the political spectrum, Germany's Jewish citizens experienced the dissolution process of Weimar democracy in virtual isolation. Although their organizations combatted National Socialism through legal actions and the printed word, this desperately waged struggle in defense of democracy and their own threatened position remained unsupported. Ultimately, the fate of the republic sealed also that of German Jewry as both fell victim to Hitler.

WERNER T. ANGRESS
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Spain: 1808-1936 *by Raymond Carr. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.—xxix, 766 pp. $12.50.*

There can be little doubt that this is the best general history of nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain in any language. Professor Carr's erudition is staggering. He seems to have consulted every important secondary source on almost every conceivable aspect of Spanish public life during the past two centuries and to have dipped extensively into primary sources as well. Still more impressive is his refusal to be led astray by the clichés of past Spanish historiography and his attempt to look at everything afresh from new perspectives. In some cases, as in his emphasis on the limited potential for growth of the Carlist movement even in the 1830's, the soundness of Carr's conclusions results from his ability to see events with a cooler eye than have most of his predecessors. In other cases, as in his treatment of *caciquismo*, his insights derive from an application to Spain of the experience of other nations in similar stages of economic and social development. This combination of erudition, an eschewal of ideological interpretations, and a deep consciousness of historical relativity is what makes this book so important. Insofar as his

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immediate subject is concerned, Carr's achievement, quite simply, is that of having rescued the historiography of nineteenth century Spain from the sterility and confusion which have characterized it for so long. To the broader world of scholarship, his work, by applying to Spain the standard categories of modern social and political analysis, opens a hitherto scarcely explored region for comparative study.

This is not to say, of course, that the book is without fault. Carr writes in a peculiarly convoluted style and often is cavalier in his neglect of narrative, with the result that his book makes for exceedingly difficult reading. His attempt to undo the old historiographical myths frequently lead him into what can easily be interpreted as a bloodless attitude, which treats the tormented Spanish past too much like a game of musical chairs and fails to grasp the depths of passion which motivated some of its principal actors. Nor is Carr completely successful in his effort to relate economic development to politics; his chapters on each topic can in large part be read independently, rather than as the inter-connected whole he intended. In trying to extract the fundamental essence of Spanish political behavior, Carr sometimes draws dubious parallels between nineteenth and twentieth century events. Finally, although Carr is right to assert that "the fascination of the early history of Spanish labour movements has obscured their insignificance" (p. 439), he falls into the opposite error of consistently underestimating the importance of the working masses, even during the twentieth century when the social problem became the central issue in Spanish politics. If some of these failings are serious, they are to a considerable extent inevitable in a pioneering work of this magnitude. By the richness of his synthesis and the courage of his effort to revise the traditional historiography, Carr has earned the admiration and gratitude of all who are interested in modern Spain.

EDWARD E. MALEFAKIS
Northwestern University

Histoire du Languedoc *edited by Philippe Wolff. Toulouse, Eduard Privat, 1967.—540 pp. Fr. 69.2.*

Edited by Philippe Wolff, the *Histoire du Languedoc* is a masterpiece of popularized local history. That the French are so good at this kind of history, so superior to the Germans, the English, or ourselves is a constant puzzle. The volume treats a seemingly heterogeneous area from the Stone Age to today, and the wonder of it is not only that every chap-

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ter is interesting, but also that a kind of provincial identity emerges. Especially interesting, also, is that this volume accents social and economic history, thus marking a change over the older emphasis upon political history in such surveys. Obviously, however, this cannot be altogether uniform or successful. Archeology and the peopling of the country dominate in the earlier chapters. Some of the latter ones suffer from too much detail about new industries, and so on, so that a reader loses the lines of overall change. Art, literature, and architecture are not worked into the general history—something the Germans do better than anyone else.

To this reviewer the high point of the book is reached in Wolff's chapter on the later middle ages and those by Le Roy Ladurie on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There, one can see the basic lineaments of society's growth and decline very clearly. Oddly, with all his *gâieté* and real sensitivity to social history, Le Roy Ladurie's description of what animates human history is both limited and evocative of despair. Repetitively, population grew to the point where it outran its supplies of equipment and nourishment. Weakened by malnutrition and increasingly enraged, it then fell easy prey to sickness or war, harsh phlebotomies that reduced the swollen body social. Forms of property and political form are purely secondary in this treatment. Even the religious or ideological change of the time largely reflects this ineluctable yin-yang of human birth and death. This vision is certainly both useful and profound, but one wonders if demographic change can be shown to be alone a sufficient cause. Surely the moments of bliss and tragedy it induces are related to, and even inspired by, traditional social patterns and hostilities, technological means and intellectual possibilities, systems of property and capitalization, and forms of political expression. If this is not so, if it is just pure birth and death, we are reduced to an older dream. To borrow from the Christian, what animates man's movements is nothing other than original sin and its punishment. But perhaps that does suffice.

JOHN H. MUNDY
Columbia University

The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in the Years of Desperation, 1930-1960 *by H. Stuart Hughes. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1966.—xi, 304 pp. $6.95.*

Professor H. Stuart Hughes' book is devoted to French intellectual life between the 1930's and the 1960's, and is organized around one central

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theme—the isolation and the provincialism of French intellectuals of these last thirty years. The fact that this idea is neither original nor very stimulating today does not prevent it from being true in many ways and especially if one takes as point of reference—which is normal in Cambridge, Massachusetts—the extraordinary flowering of American culture through the Russian, then German-Jewish diaspora of the period between the wars. Neither Max Weber, nor Cassirer, nor Wittingenstein, nor Keynes exerted genuine cultural influence in the France of that time. Not even Freud. But this kind of comparative evidence is interesting only when it is rigorously described or when one proposes a system of interpretation around it. Now, Professor Hughes' work gives us neither one nor the other.

At the descriptive level, first: one never knows exactly what the author is talking about, from one end of his book to the other. While he promises us an analysis of French "social thought," he begins with a survey of the revival of scholarly history by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, slips next to Catholic philosophy (Maritain and G. Marcel), passes to "heroic" literature (Martin du Gard, Saint-Exupéry, Bernanos, Malraux and among whom he rather curiously includes de Gaulle), gets into the heart of the subject with what I could call the "Sartre constellation" (phenomenology-Marxism-existentialism-psychoanalysis) to end with Lévi-Strauss and thus to give to the university, which had opened the cortege of despair, the task of linking up with hope.

Many of Professor Hughes' analyses in detail, concerning this or that personage of the panorama, are interesting, even though the author often falls into stereotypes, such as Bernanos' "spirit of childhood" or Malraux's "heroism"; but what one does not grasp is the overall design of the panorama. What is Maritain or Malraux doing between Marc Bloch and Lévi-Strauss? What permits linking Camus to Teilhard de Chardin? What subtle correlation, unless it is merely chronological illusion, ties together such diverse levels of French intellectual production? The problem is presumed solved. What constitutes, for the author, French intellectual society? According to whether it is a question of writers themselves (in the broad sense) or of the more or less extensive public whom they influence more or less directly, one may give more importance to Maritain, in the first case, or to Mounier, in the second; but one still ought to say which point of view he takes. Let us even accept the idea—implicit with Professor Hughes—that one defines the intelligentsia strictly as producers of ideas, people who write. Who designates them, who chooses them? In the United States, where intellectual life is less fragmented, less sectarian, less "literary" in a word, than in France,

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I am not sure for example that the life of little groups of New York intelligentsia obeys the same rhythms and undergoes the same kind of evolution as university research, and that it would be possible to study Norman Mailer and Paul Lazarsfeld together. All the more so in France, where the professor is more rarely an intellectual and is exceptionally a writer, in the meaning that one gives to these words in the cafés of the Parisian left bank.

It is true that upon this extraordinary methodological confusion in the way the very matter of the book is presented—in what historians call the "establishment of the facts"—Professor Hughes has superimposed an explicative principle: the chronology of French despair, 1930-1960. But I fear that his analysis gains nothing in conceptual rigor by that. "Despair" is already a rather vague idea in itself, with which one can do just about anything one pleases; the thought of Lévi-Strauss for example, which is held to bring this period of despair to an end, seems to me on the contrary more really desperate than that of Lucien Febvre of the inter-war period—unless "despair" is not diagnosed from the interior of intellectual life but deduced from general historical circumstances, the crisis, the World War and German occupation, etc. But then one should indicate what kinds of connection there might be between global historic reality and the intellectual output of an era.

But perhaps this general uncertainty of analysis is due to the fact that Professor Hughes' book is composed of a series of separate lectures, which he has tried to unify for better or worse—more worse than better; for it is not possible for a coherent book to emerge from an artifice of this kind. (*Trans. Robert Paxton*)

FRANCOIS FURET
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France and Algeria: The Problem of Civil and Political Reform, 1870-1920 *by Vincent Confer. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1966.—xi, 148 pp. $5.00.*

In this small book, whose title is a bit imaginative for a French reader, Vincent Confer proposes to study, after a brief presentation of the politics of the French in Algeria, the movement of opinion in favor of the Moslems and the reforms realized in their behalf in 1919. Despite the dates given in the title, the book concerns itself essentially with the campaign of the liberal French between 1911 and 1918.

The author bases his work on a rather extensive bibliography, though

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he has ignored several articles which would have been useful, but he has not been able to see the Algerian press, the Algerian archives, nor even the French national archives. These gaps are regrettable, but they do not vitiate the conclusions of the book. After having worked for many years on the same subject and having published recently two large volumes (*Les Algériens musulmans et la France* [1871-1919], Paris, 1968), I can testify that Mr. Confer's book is a serious and interesting work, though a bit too hasty.

Clearly the reader would have preferred to have more about the Algerian Muslims and above all about those "Young Algerians" who are seen only from the outside, those *colons* whose political strength is without doubt underestimated by those who have never lived in French Algeria. The actions of the liberal French are well presented, although the influence of political writers like Espé de Metz on the Guesdist Socialist Charles Dumas was much less than the author thinks. One may also be uneasy about the existence of certain imprecisions. When Confer speaks of the wave of good will at the end of the Grand Empire, of the new wave in the 1890's, it would have been useful to point out that this politics of good-will was the work of Napoleon III and the officials of the Arab bureaus only and that in 1891-92 it was only the hope of several politicians. If it is true that the authority of Napoleon III showed itself as weak as the criticism of Jules Ferry or the good intentions of Jonnart, how can the author regret the weakness of Clemenceau in 1918? These reservations having been stated, I can say that the book will certainly teach a great deal to American readers—and to French and Algerian—but it will provoke anger among the former Europeans of Algeria.

As to Mr. Confer's conclusions, I approve of them all the more since they seem to me very close to those I expressed myself in a study published in Paris in 1959 (the *Revue africaine* of the University of Algiers having refused to publish it in April 1958). Yes, the reforms of 1918-19 were insufficient, but it was impossible for a parliamentary government to have done more respecting an Algeria that since the beginning of the Third Republic had been entirely in the hands of the *colons* and that was represented in Paris by a powerful, efficient lobby. The claimed inevitability of Algerian independence is a retrospective illusion; it was, above all, the result of a series of lost opportunities. Perhaps Mr. Confer would agree with me that it was in 1919 that the politics of assimilation was lacking, not in 1936, at which time it was already far too late, for Algerian nationalism had been born.

CHARLES-ROBERT AGERON
Sorbonne

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Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944 *by John P. Halstead. Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs XVIII. Cambridge, Harvard University Press for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, 1967. —vi, 323 pp.*

Morocco serves as a further example of how European imperial policies have contributed to the modernization of "a truly medieval state" (p. 30) while they establish the conditions out of which nationalism emerges to the detriment of the occupying power. Although the phenomenon is scarcely new any longer, yet the author traces the process through its various stages with considerable thoroughness. A brief historical sketch of events (Part I) that led to the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912 is followed by a survey (Part II) of France's effort to transform Morocco into a modern state. It is the author's view that a miraculous change did in fact take place, but that in creating a nation, France inevitably created nationalists. That the French policy of *assimilation* in contrast to Britain's policy of anticipating "an evolution towards self-government" produced this result as the author suggests (p. 114) cannot bear close examination. Neither policy seems ultimately to have succeeded, for nationalists emerged in both French and British dependencies regardless of differing colonial policies.

In Part III of the study, the author surveys the main influences that molded Moroccan nationalist ideas: the Salafiyya movement, Arab nationalism, local nationalist ideas of the eastern Muslim states, and the whole range of twentieth century European ideas acquired by French-educated Moroccans.

Part IV deals with the stages through which Moroccan nationalism passed under the impact of the various influences discussed in Part III. In the earliest stage (1921-1930), the Salafiyya movement predominated. The author claims that France's assimilationist and Berber policies caused Moroccan nationalism to be far more deeply affected by the modernist ideas of the Salafiyya movement than occurred in the other nations of the Middle East. Undoubtedly, the existence of a mixed population in Morocco made Islam a sounder basis on which to build anti-French sentiments. The French recognized the danger and countered these efforts by seeking to isolate the Berbers from the rest of Moroccan society. The outgrowth of this policy of divide and rule produced a strong reaction and contributed greatly to moving nationalist development along more strongly political lines. The Moroccans now set about establishing political organizations and developing doctrinal ideas to pursue the strug-

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gle against France more effectively. Out of these developments there emerged a Plan of Reform in 1934 which Mr. Halstead analyzes at length. With France's rejection of the plan, the Moroccan nationalists turned to other methods involving a greater degree of political activism. Their failure to bring about reform in cooperation with the French finally convinced the nationalists that independence alone would serve the political objectives of Moroccan nationalism. By 1944, under the impact of events that marked the years 1937-1944, the nationalists felt sufficiently strong to issue a declaration in which the Moroccan Sultan was requested to begin negotiations that would lead to Moroccan independence.

In the final chapter the author summarizes very succinctly his findings regarding the stages of development of Moroccan nationalism. He concludes that Moroccan nationalism developed to ward off French assimilationist policies and yet ended by "assimilating nearly everything France had to offer" (p. 270). Links with the Muslim nations in the East remained, but "the spell of Europe" had left the "reborn Moorish nation" with one foot "no longer in Andalusia, but in France" (p. 270).

Although the author interviewed a number of the principal actors in the drama he describes, the narrative suffers from a regrettable lack of that third dimensional quality that makes the struggle for national liberation something colorful and exciting. As it is, the story recites the facts without providing the flavor that undoubtedly surrounded the entire struggle.

There are a number of important documents included in the appendixes as well as a list of French residents-general and a list of the Moroccan nationalists and the education they received. The work includes an ample bibliography, notes, and an index.

HELEN-ANNE B. RIVLIN
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The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050-1310 *by Jonathan Riley-Smith. London, Macmillan and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xv, 553 pp. $14.50.*

This book by Riley-Smith, constituting volume one of *A History of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem* under the general editorship of Professor Lionel Butler, is a remarkable achievement because of its fascinating topic and the masterly nature of its presentation. The book covers a dramatic phase in the history of the Hospitallers during which the fortunes of that first of the new international Orders of the

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twelfth and thirteenth centuries were inseparably connected with the activities of the Crusaders in the Near East. Founded in the last decades of the eleventh century in Jerusalem to provide facilities for pilgrims from Europe, the Order saw its status enhanced as a result of its contribution to the final success of the First Crusade. To promote the pilgrim traffic, the Hospitallers established their monastic bases all over Christian Europe. Apart from being the beneficiaries of the West European expansionist movement, the Knights of St. John asserted themselves as a predominant political, military, social, and economic factor in the life of the Latin Kingdom in the Near East. Although loyal to the Papacy, the Hospitallers constituted an important political force in the Crusader Kingdom, usually siding with the monarchy against the baronial and episcopal factions. They also influenced the strategy of the Crusaders, as evidenced by their effective pressure in favor of a daring—though ultimately unsuccessful—invasion of Egypt in 1168. In the middle of the twelfth century the Hospitallers were entrusted with several strategic fortresses, thus assuming the role of fierce professional warriors fighting against the Moslem enemy. Furthermore, the Order contributed to the well-being of the Crusader society by organizing medical facilities and services, sometimes involving large hospital centers. To finance these diverse activities the Hospitallers had to depend on substantial and incessant economic aid from Europe. As a result of eleemosynary grants and legacies, various fiscal privileges, and many sources of revenue acquired in the territories conquered from the Moslems, the Hospital became the richest of medieval corporations. The activities of the Knights of St. John in Syria and Palestine ended with the collapse of the Crusader Kingdom in the waning years of the thirteenth century.

On reading the eloquent narrative of the author, rigorously supported by an extensive critical and bibliographical apparatus, one is tremendously impressed by his masterly control of the vast array of textual and archaeological sources of diverse philological and alphabetical derivation. Although the author emphasizes the need for respecting the factor of mutability in the study of historical phenomena, he has nevertheless succeeded in producing an analytical treatment of the functional aspects of the Order, the gradual stages of the growth of its internal organization, the institutional evolution of the rank and file of its members, as well as of many other administrative and economic details.

Added to the main body of the text are a list of the territorial possessions of the Order in the Levant, eleven lucid maps, a rich bibliography, and a general index, all of them produced with impeccable editorial accuracy.

ANDREW S. EHRENKREUTZ
University of Michigan

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Cyprus, Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958 *by Stephen G. Xydis. Columbia, Ohio, The Ohio State University Press, 1967. —xviii, 704 pp. $15.00.*

A number of books—mostly by British authors—have been already published about the first Cyprus conflict (up to the Zurich and London agreements of 1959, a new and quite different dispute having developed in recent years), but Mr. Xydis' bulky volume is the first scholarly and thorough study to be devoted to this relatively minor but rather fascinating problem. The author—a professor of political science at Hunter College, with experience in the Greek Foreign Service and the United Nations Secretariat—has been allowed to use a large treasure of primary and unpublished sources: the personal papers of Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, who was Foreign Minister of Greece almost uninterruptedly from 1956 to 1963. He is thus able to give chapter and verse on many diplomatic exchanges, private talks, confidential approaches, and backstage maneuvers, which had been hitherto either poorly documented (for instance, the British attempt at convening a new tripartite conference in August 1957) or unknown even to experts. This wealth of new data alone would make Mr. Xydis' book extremely valuable to the student of international affairs in the eastern Mediterranean. However this book does not cover the whole of the Cyprus conflict, even during the period 1954-1958, which its subtitle mentions. The author's main interest lies in the United Nations, in the part it played in the dispute's development and in its working as a machinery for "parliamentary diplomacy." Moreover, he concentrates on the debate which took place at the twelfth session of the General Assembly late in 1957 when Greece came closest to having her demand for self-determination for the Cypriots endorsed by the U.N.; three-fifths of the book are devoted to the preparation and development of the debate, while the four other debates on Cyprus at the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth sessions are much less thoroughly analyzed; the intensive study of the conflict is therefore restricted to the year 1957. Moreover, Mr. Xydis' main source being Averoff's papers, his picture is "presented mainly as seen through the eyes of the 'External-Decision-Maker' of Greece"— a skillful negotiatior and a master in ambiguity and double-dealing; the emphasis is on the deeds of Greek diplomacy, and the policies of the other parties to the conflict—the British and Turkish minority—are often seen from outside, with little analysis of their motivations (still there is a good deal of useful, if scattered data on U.S. policy, which persistently countered Greek efforts). Now, though "the Greek government's behavior . . . had served as a stimulus for the

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responses" of the other governments, the British held a key position, both as being in possession of Cyprus, and as the initiators of the various negotiations and "plans" (Radcliffe, Foot, Macmillan), which were intended to settle the dispute. On the other hand, any reader who is not too familiar with the intricacies of the Cyprus imbroglio, would have liked some comprehensive survey of the problem as it stood when Mr. Xydis starts its narrative, while, after an introduction on the origins of the U.N. involvement in the conflict, he is plunged at once in the debate of February 1957 and the vote of Resolution 1013 (XI), with several flashbacks later to earlier developments such as the London Conference of 1955 and the Harding-Makarios talks.

However, despite these limitations, this is an important book. It gives a detailed, step-by-step account of diplomatic activity—both open and secret—over Cyprus during a decisive stage of the conflict, and also it is a valuable addition to the literature devoted to the United Nations. Mr. Xydis keeps in mind the political scientist's interest in generalizations and deduces from its thorough, factual analysis a number of stimulating theoretical conclusions. He sees recourse to the U.N., such as was made by Greece, as a response to situations in which traditional diplomacy is fruitless and war unthinkable (Cyprus was an "imperfect dispute," in which the antagonists would, otherwise, be not foes but allies) and motivated not by the belief that the U.N. would provide a solution, but by a sense of frustration, a desire to act, to do something, in the face of rising pressures from public opinion. "Parliamentary diplomacy" in the General Assembly is a substitute for violence, but also an incentive for the use of force (as a matter of fact the Cypriot terrorist organization EOKA was established with the express purpose of attracting U.N. attention to the island); it is a substitute for diplomatic negotiations and also an incentive to negotiate. On the other hand, a "non-caucusing" micropower member, such as Greece, is unable to achieve in the U.N. its maximum resolutionary goals and can hope only for side-effects, though they may be not unimportant, with a major pay-off in publicity. So there is a shifting of goals during the U.N. debates, and especially during the process of revolution-drafting. Still, while stressing that Assembly resolutions are "pseudo-agreements," Mr. Xydis sees them as commitments to try to agree, and as being thus able to decrease tension. So, in his view, the U.N. is quite capable of functioning, to some degree at least, as an agency for conciliation, a center for harmonization.

François Crouzet
University of Paris, Nanterre

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The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-75: A Study of British Colonial Policy in West Africa, Malaya, and the South Pacific in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli *by W. David McIntyre. London, Melbourne, and Toronto, Macmillan and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—x, 421 pp. $11.00.*

The "new" African history—and the counterparts it must have in Asia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America—has presented challenges and problems to those who in earlier decades had no difficulty knowing what it meant to call themselves historians of the British Empire or students of imperialism. Not that the new approaches have destroyed the earlier field; just because Western scholars have finally recognized the obvious—that the history of the world outside Europe cannot be told in terms of European actions and motives—this does not mean that those European actions, motives, and policies are no longer a legitimate subject for study. McIntyre has chosen to write on what seems at first glance a "traditional" topic, as his sub-title suggests. What is different is that he obviously knows about the "new" non-European histories. He accepts the validity of the new approaches, for himself as for those who study the non-Western world. He does so even though it means complicating both his research and his presentation. And he has produced a book that says much to those interested in the British Empire in the 1860's and '70's; to those who want to know *specifically* the stances of particular politicians and officials in England and on the spot; and to those who would continue evaluating theories of imperialism. Not least is this book important for those who write the "new" histories. They need the dimension of imperial policies made at "home" and implemented also in places other than the one they study, just as imperial historians of yore needed to understand the cultures and histories of peoples their protagonists met overseas.

McIntyre has a central thesis: that the three "experiments" he writes about, all "launched in 1874 . . . all inaugurated by the same ministers in London . . . all formed part of the general problem . . . of the expansion of the frontiers of Empire" (p. 4); that, however, "far from Disraeli initiating an imperial 'forward movement' in 1874, his Government merely went ahead with policies worked out by their Liberal predecessors" (p. 5); that the "new policies were, in fact, the culmination of a period of tentative innovation [in dealing with the frontier problem] rather than the beginning of a forward movement" (p. 6), where the frontier "was a vague zone, adjacent to . . . territory under British sovereignty" (p. 8).

But that is only the beginning. Through four parts, dealing with the Formulation of Colonial Policy, the Dilemma [of the Frontier], the New

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Experiments, and the Frontier in Perspective, he takes up all sides of the problem, within a broad, slowly-moving chronological framework. For almost any reader, the two middle parts will be the most difficult to follow. They are, however, essential to the author's purpose; without them he would be placed where he is determined not to be: among those who, like "most mid-Victorian writers, and indeed many modern historians of imperialism . . . lacking direct experience in colonial problems . . . theorize" (p. 12).

These sections contain the case studies, based on primary sources and, except for a few oversights, the latest and best secondary work on West Africa, Malaya, the South Pacific. For the historians of the Empire, for specialists in any one of these places, all or some of these detailed regional accounts will be hard to follow. This is not because McIntyre's exposition is not clear and straight-forward, for it is. It is because few readers are well-acquainted with the geographical and cultural cues that make the intricacies easily comprehensible. But this is not a soluble problem, at least not by the author. A reviewer whose field is West African history can, however, suggest that time spent on the unfamiliar cases is as rewarding as seeing the familiar ones quite well-handled. Indeed, it is precisely because McIntyre gives a sense of total policy while being insistently specific and empirical that his conclusions are compelling.

For in his last two chapters he turns to traditional, theoretical matters. He takes on those who would explain imperialism in cosmic terms, from Seeley and Hobson through to Robinson and Gallagher. He sees "informal empire," a term that has lately been applied to the years before the "new imperialism," as overly simple, not doing "justice to the possible techniques . . . considered" (p. 371).

He takes the theories one at a time and examines them against his case studies. He finds none of them applicable alone and in all three instances (p. 377). He states that what the generalizing theories have neglected is "the human factor. The new experiments in the tropics were on the periphery of affairs and depended largely on the work of comparatively obscure individuals . . ." (p. 380), men on the spot who were not the "great and famous 'empire builders'," men whose importance came from the fact that "Britain's initial political intervention nearly always took the same form. Her representatives 'took sides' in a local dispute" (p. 381). It was usually the "comparatively obscure individuals" who chose the side, men "untrained in the history and workings of West African, Malay or Melanesian and Polynesian institutions" who made "incredibly delicate decisions" (p. 382).

In this connection McIntyre draws a conclusion that should start some

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new thinking in regional history and political analysis. "Colonial nationalism," he writes, "has not always grown simply as an opposition to European imperialism. Imperialism sometimes was a response to nationalism" (p. 383). For this reason, the author insists that the intricacies of regional politics must be understood in their own terms, by historians of the Empire as much as by historians of the regions. This recognition will make their work, as his, more difficult. But it will make it, as it has made his, better—because less myopic—historical writing.

JEAN HERSKOVITS
The City College of New York

Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study of the Ideas Expressed by the British Official Classes in Planning Decolonization, 1939-1964 *by J. M. Lee. London, Oxford University Press, 1967.—viii, 311 pp. $7.20.*

Professor Lee's scholarly analysis of Colonial Office records, Kenya government files, and the private papers of the late Arthur Creech Jones may well be the most authoritative statement extant of the British view of the ways in which decolonization was prepared for and managed during the period from 1939 to 1964. It is in any case a serious and disinterested attempt to understand and to draw the significant lessons of the experience of perhaps the world's most successful imperialist power in the surrender of its imperial obligations. In a more fundamental sense, it is a history of the evolution of British thought with respect to the duties of the metropolitan power toward its colonial wards. It is in this last sense that the book bears its greatest relevance to the problems of the 1970's.

There is clear evidence in Professor Lee's researches that while many Colonial Office administrators, and some politicians, early recognized symptoms indicating that the colonial era was drawing to a close, there was not very much sensitivity to the urgency of political time. It was somehow assumed that decolonization would be a protracted process, that the British presence would be required for a very long time, and that the colonies and the colonials would stand patiently for the outworking of decolonization processes. All of these assumptions turned out to be in error, and in some cases the error was substantial.

When the rush of events inundated the careful and leisurely plans of the Colonial Office, the reaction was again somewhat out of line with

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the practical requirements of the situation. In the countries which achieved independence first, precipitate nationalization of the civil service organizations resulted in the overly-rapid departure of the expatriate officers and consequent political and administrative chaos. This was especially true in the African colonies, and it was not until the lessons of experience in transfer gained in Malaya and West Africa were available that more orderly procedures were applied in East and Central Africa.

The basic difficulty in the nationalization of the governmental machinery of the new countries probably derived from the structure of the old imperial administrations. Typically, the colonial administrators not only provided direction and control of governmental activities in the colony, but for all practical purposes they were the government itself. To be sure, they were accountable to the Colonial Office and eventually to Parliament, but all this was at considerable remove from the day-to-day business of government policy and management and went almost unnoticed by the colonial populations. Senior civil servants even in such sophisticated colonial regimes as undivided India frequently occupied political posts such as Minister or Member and were in any case almost completely in command of the policy processes. When the time came to transfer power, it involved not only shifting administrative control from Colonial Office bureaucrats to local civil service organizations, but also shifting political control from the same bureaucrats to local politicians. In these circumstances, it is not to be wondered that both the local civil servants and the local politicians sometimes became confused and that notions about the independence and neutrality of the civil service, on the one hand, and the subordination of the civil service to political control, on the other, tended to disappear. This natural confusion, moreover, became compounded by the frequency with which political organization in the new countries emerged in the form of one-party states.

The hopeful aspect of the book is contained in its portrayal of the evolution of British attitudes toward their sometime colonial wards. It is a long way from the eighteenth and nineteenth century assumptions that colonies should pay their way—that is, defray the costs of their exploitation for the advantage of the metropolitan power—to the contemporary acceptance of the obligation to assist former colonial areas in their economic and social development and in the attainment of integral political independence and self-government. The development decade of the 1960's is behind us, marked by some successes and many more disappointments. As we confront the 1970's the issue is whether the metropolitan powers have the political sophistication to direct an adequate portion of their resources to the development of the poor nations and whether the poor

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nations have the wit to use outside assistance without losing their hard-won liberty.

ROWLAND EGGER
Princeton University

African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union *edited by Arthur Hazlewood. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967. —xii, 414 pp. $12.00.*

It is particularly important because the civil war in Nigeria has focused so much attention on the divisions within an African state that we gain a much broader perspective on the process of integration and of disintegration in sub-Saharan African-controlled states and the causes of both types of change. It has been all too easy for opinion about independent African countries to swing from its early euphoria about their prospects to an equally complete negativism. As the series of detailed case studies in this volume shows, the balance sheet is a much more complicated one, showing positive as well as negative developments. What is also highly important is that the detail and historical perspective provided in most of the studies enable us to identify many of the more significant factors underlying these developments.

As the editor of the volume, Arthur Hazlewood, Senior Research Officer of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics and a former adviser to the Kenya and Nyasaland governments, points out, the process of economic integration within and between African countries that could underpin political integration is hampered by their salient characteristics. All of them are at a low level of industrial development, highly dependent on foreign trade and with relatively little exchange of production among themselves. Virtually all have small populations, most of which exist at low levels of income. Coupled with the natural reluctance of entities, ethnic or state, to give up to others or even to share meaningfully with them newly acquired political power, it is hardly surprising that the process of aggregation has been less noticeable than that of disaggregation.

Hazelwood stresses in his introduction, however, the urgency of stimulating the process of economic integration before the potential markets

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of the future are fragmented beyond recall through establishing unnecessary duplication of productive units. While customs unions are conventionally endorsed because of the larger market they provide for existing enterprises, their major advantage for countries at as low a level of development as are almost all those in Africa is likely to be to stimulate new productive capacity, particularly in manufacturing. Only with this kind of growth can they begin to pass out of the relatively unstable intermediate stage of development that interposes itself between stagnant subsistence and politically stable and economically viable units.

The individual case studies included in this volume examine critically the degree of economic integration in equatorial Africa, East Africa, and between Senegal and Gambia and the factors working against it; the political and economic causes of disintegration in Nigeria and the Central African Republic; the relatively successful integration and reunification in Somalia and the Cameroon; and the limited and halting experiences of integration in French-speaking Africa and through pan-Africanism. The detailed economic statistics stop at 1964 but the political analyses extend through 1966. What has occurred since then accentuates the trends that are indicated rather than changing them.

Unfortunately the editor has not drawn any general conclusions from the very useful material described in these sections. Thus the reader is left with some very interesting insights in regard to particular situations but without the summing up that would seem to be the obligation of an experienced economist who has brought together such a wealth of significant information.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
Northwestern University

National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States *edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1966.—xiii, 565 pp. $10.00.*

This volume is the third and concluding of a series which also includes *African One-Party States* (1962, new edition 1964) and *Five African States: Responses to Diversity* (1963). Each book consists of a number of long essays on different countries, presenting an outline of the political processes and problems together with a sketch of the historical and social background. In this final installment we have accounts of Nigeria (by R. L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker), of Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Chad and

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the Central Africa Republic (by J. A. Ballard), of Niger (by Virginia Thompson), of Uganda (by D. Rothchild and M. Rogin), and of Ethiopia (by R. L. Hess). Each of these is competently done, furnishing an up-to-date general introduction for the student, who is also provided with a useful bibliography for further reading. Such wide-ranging accounts inevitably present a somewhat fragmentary appearance, since they attempt to give over-all coverage. Consequently there is little to attract the reader at the theoretical level, since the individual chapters are not oriented towards the consideration of particular problems.

Some effort is made to remedy this situation, for this volume, unlike the earlier ones, has a conclusion written by the editor and one of the contributors (Hess), which specifically sets out to assess the problem of national unity and regionalism. These conclusions are in general eminently sensible. If they lack bite, it is because like so many statements concerning political systems, they are phrased in a way that is too hazy to be subjected to more rigorous testing and hence are difficult to disprove. In any case, the predictions are hedged about with too many "may's" and "perhaps's." The final paragraph begins "It is still possible, however, that nationalist sentiments may develop within one or more of the polyethnic states of tropical Africa. If it should, it remains to be seen . . ." (p. 554).

It can be argued that the time-factor of the post-independence period is too short to permit of more positive predictions. But one suspects that it is the kind of generalized investigation the authors have undertaken that makes this kind of crystal-gazing so hazardous an affair. It was perhaps unfortunate for the authors that their contributions were written in the opening phase of post-independent governments in Africa, when the role of force (particularly in the hands of the military) was as yet little emphasized. There is no analysis of the role of the army in some of the states (including Nigeria) nor is there yet any general discussion of its relevance to the general theme. Stability is rather seen to reside in political arrangements in a more limited sense. Contrasting those states that have chosen to "maximize the powers of the chief executive in order to cope with their political problems," with those where the power of the center is "checked and balanced" by regional authorities (e.g. Nigeria and Uganda), Carter and Hess conclude that "such counterpulls may lead in the long run to a more genuine stability than does total centralization of power" (pp. 549-50). Leaving aside problems to do with the notion of "genuine stability" and the length of a long run, the examples chosen by the editors, namely, Nigeria and Uganda, would not now seem to lend much support to their hypothesis.

I am not concerned to pick out a hypothesis that time has disproved

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in order to point to the motes in the eyes of others, but rather to raise the question of whether the social sciences are in a position to learn from their discarded hypotheses. Since this generalized level of discourse must surely remain very much a hit-and-miss affair, would it not be better to put one's research eggs in slightly less capacious baskets.

JACK GOODY
St. John's College, Cambridge

Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria *by Gerald K. Helleiner. Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, 1966. —xx, 600 pp. $9.25.*

Helleiner's book is the best introduction to the Nigerian economy since the World Bank's *Economic Development of Nigeria* was published in 1954. It is also a study in the causes of Nigeria's economic growth between 1900 and 1966. The statistical appendix of over 200 pages is the best single source of Nigerian economic statistics and will be very valuable to many scholars of Nigeria. The study was undertaken for Yale's Economic Growth Center (the statistical appendix employs the Growth Center's format). Helleiner also spent a year at the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research.

Nigerian economic growth has been led by the rapid expansion of exports, according to Helleiner, and the efforts of enterprising peasant farmers account for the rapid expansion of exports. Farmers' responses to incentives were "truly phenomenal"; export volume increased fivefold between 1900 and 1929 and continued to grow rapidly during the thirties, despite deterioration in the terms of trade. (Most of the price and volume series which underlie this argument were constructed by Helleiner.) The incentives to which farmers responded were provided by the expansion of European commercial firms into the interior and by government, which Helleiner credits with a role in Nigerian development comparable to the role of the farmers. One major governmental contribution was the expansion of the transportation network, especially the railway, into the interior. More recently, government has stimulated industrial output.

These arguments rely on formal tests only at a few points. Specific problems are examined with the aid of whatever pertinent information is available. The analysis is generally careful and shows a remarkable mastery of materials. Helleiner's conclusions on the role of peasants are fairly well established, particularly since they are supported by the re-

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cent work of other writers. They would also apply, with few changes, to several other African countries where peasants produce the major portion of exports. The benefits of government activity are less well established. Helleiner's own criticism of the development corporations is one indication that government's record is spotty.

Several of Helleiner's conclusions are contrary to views held by a number of development economists. Particular areas have labor surpluses, while others have surpluses of land and shortages of labor. It would probably be more accurate to classify the country as a whole as a land-surplus country than as a labor-surplus one, in spite of a rapidly growing population (pp. 51-55). The remarkable increases in agricultural output were due to changes in the terms at which leisure could be traded for material goods: the improved terms encouraged farmers to increase their working hours, as well as to bring more land under cultivation (p. 11 and chap. 4). Helleiner holds that food supplies are not a bottleneck; rather, "the agricultural sector can be expected to continue to meet the urban sector's needs without difficulty for many years to come" (p. 143). (Other students of Nigerian agriculture, for example R. Guesten, disagree). Even among peasant farmers, there is considerable concentration in land-holding. For example, 10 per cent of the farmers held 41 per cent of the cocoa land in the early 1950's (p. 78 and Table II-C-3). Nigeria's marketing boards reduced fluctuations in producer prices, but they helped stabilize producers' incomes only in the case of palm kernels; the boards destabilized the incomes of peanut and cotton producers.

The book is not without flaws. Helleiner's measure of the marketing boards' impact on fluctuations in producers' incomes implicitly assumes that the boards' stabilization of producer prices did not affect production and world prices. His description of land tenure is too simplified and fails to take account of the important work of Paul Bohannan and others. The discussion of plan implementation is too pessimistic in some respects. There is a lack of neatness in the explanation of how massive urban unemployment co–exists with a positive marginal product of labor in agriculture. Finally, few clues are provided regarding the economic problems which contributed to the national crisis which began in 1966, the year of the book's publication. In spite of these few flaws, students of Nigeria and of economic development will find this careful and wide-ranging study exceptionally valuable.

EDWIN DEAN
Queens College
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The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya *by Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham. New York, Frederick A. Praeger* for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, *1966. —xviii, 427 pp. $7.50.*

This book seeks to prove the thesis that Mau Mau was a product of African nationalism in Kenya, a violent culmination of the Africans' resistance to imperialism precipitated in the 1950's by settler intransigence and European resistance to demands for gradual political reform. The second part of the two-part title is thus explained. But what is the "Myth of Mau Mau," and what is its connection with nationalism in Kenya? According to the authors, the myth developed from the following beliefs held by Europeans in Kenya: "(1) an implicit conviction that the colonial system was perfectly capable of responding to the legitimate social and political grievances of Africans; (2) the belief that "Mau Mau" was but another manifestation of earlier African religious movements; (3) and the belief that in employing secret oaths, the African was rejecting modernity and reverting to primitive behavior patterns." Because of adherence to these beliefs, the Europeans in Kenya failed to take timely steps to meet the political demands of the African nationalist forces. It is implied that the myth was in the main the result of faulty analysis by the Europeans. They were merely mistaken in their views. Their beliefs, though honest, rested on an imperfect understanding of African religious behavior or an understandable misinterpretation of the Kikuyu oathing ceremonies. The authors' endeavor to prove this thesis is not successful. In fact one is tempted to suggest that the words in the title should be transposed to read: "Mau Mau" in Kenya: the Myth of Nationalism.

For a number of reasons the authors have great difficulty in demonstrating that African resistance to English rule comprises the "building blocks" for their model of nationalism in Kenya and that Mau Mau was the violent explosion which took place when the "critical mass" was achieved in 1952. The activity in opposition to Europeans during the first five decades of occupation which the authors regard as nationalist is so only if "nationalism" is given a breadth of definition which renders the term useless. As Oginga Odinga points out in a statement quoted by the authors, such manifestations of opposition as occurred were tribal and not nationalist. Also, treating the indications of nationalism—political associations and alliances, the activity of charismatic individuals, participation in elections—rather than hunger, human bondage, individual opportunism, class cleavages and competition between social groups and social strata, opposition to the theft of land, and resistance

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to the destruction of traditional customs as the motive forces of society results, as William Wertheim points out in his writing on nationalism, in incorrect analysis of social movements.

A number of erroneous conclusions arise from the authors' use of the nationalist model to analyze Mau Mau. Some of the most startling are: (1) that the Africans accepted the legitimacy of British rule until after World War II; (2) that the violence which characterized the Mau Mau stage of anti-colonial activity was initiated by the Africans and not the settlers; and (3) that the beliefs about Africans which caused the Europeans to resist political reform were the result of unconscious error. Certain events when placed in proper perspective require conclusions contrary to those arrived at in this book. For example, when the trade union leaders, by far the most radical and potentially effective anti-colonial African group, attempted to organize the agricultural workers, the settlers determined to destroy them. It was not a matter of misinformation about African behavior or of introducing social change at too slow a rate. They began efforts to take away the few civil liberties and social benefits which the Africans possessed, and they publicly called for the liquidation of the trade union leaders and for a return to pre-war conditions. In 1952, in collusion with the Colonial Secretary, Lyttleton, the Governor in Kenya issued the Declaration of Emergency which resulted in the arrest of the African leaders. Some Africans resisted incarceration by fleeing to the forests. Others joined them later to oppose the British by means of armed struggle. African violence was, in general, a response to assaults of European origin and was at all times on a smaller scale than was the unabated terrorism practiced by the government forces upon the Africans.

The myth of Mau Mau, that is the consciously created stereotype of Africans reverting to savagery, could be accepted without much difficulty by the European mind. It was the culmination of the racist ideology developed by the British as part of their effort to legitimize their subjugation of Kenya and used by them as an effective device to forestall African independence.

The research and documentation in this investigation are uneven. The narrative of resistance to British rule in the early years is closely documented and the discussion of the relationship between European missionaries and the Kenya political scene based upon sources not hitherto reported upon in the Kenya literature is an important contribution. The research for the Mau Mau chapters, however, is superficial and the documentation sparse. The authors indicate that they conducted interviews

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in Kenya but do not reveal how many interviews were held or with whom. The names of a few interviewees are disclosed in the text and footnotes, but Kenya scholars will regret that full and systematic disclosure of the interview data is not made.

BARBETTE BLACKINGTON
American University

Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooué *by Brian Weinstein. Cambridge and London, The M.I.T. Press, 1966.—xiv, 287 pp. $12.50.*

Though Gabon, that most equatorial of African states, has had the advantage of some of the most interesting of African observers from Richard Burton to Albert Schweitzer, it has remained for students of social science virtually unknown. This book by Brian Weinstein answers therefore to a real need. It sets out to give a comprehensive view of the actualities of developing nationhood on the Ogooué, the search going on there for a new kind of order. This is the order which the nation rather than the king-group, the tribe, or the region as the supreme loyalty group can offer. The author considers the nation the most important and the most efficacious system available today for African consideration. Perhaps he is right although the possibility of pan-national systems in Africa have long challenged European and African alike and seem to offer a higher dispensation than nationalism conceived along the lines of inherited colonial boundaries. But pan-nationalism we now see has not worked out very well and surely not for Gabon which, as one of the wealthiest of African countries, has resisted any attempt to bind her effectively with her much poorer neighbors in Equatorial Africa. Historically, as Weinstein effectively points out, the Gabonese have felt they were exploited in the colonial period for the sake of the other states in French Equatorial Africa. They still feel that any pan-national system would tend to the same leveling of their privilege.

This sense of historical injustice and of contemporary covetousness in surrounding countries is one important binding idea in Gabonese national culture; it is more difficult to identify other widely accepted ideas except those put forth in official pronouncements by the ruling party. In fact, even to talk generally about the Gabonese is, as the author's

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method makes clear, too much of a simplification. The mobilization of shared experience and the creation of a national culture is proceeding quite differently in the three different zones of experience: the experience in heartlands where one tribe predominates almost to the exclusion of other tribes; the experience in contact zones where one tribe is assimilating other minority tribes; and the experience in nationalizing zones where no tribe predominates and where much greater possibilities of mobilizing shared experience on a national basis would seem to be present.

The author employs a social communication methodology. He visited each of the zones noting the attitudes towards the main ideas of national culture and the sense of shared national experience that prevailed there. The mobility and stability of the population in the various zones is checked out in relation to census materials. One of the most interesting aspects of this study is its discussion of the politics of the various zones. The politics of a nationalizing zone—most of the decisions affecting the whole country are made there it is argued—cannot be that of a heartland. And one of the problems of Gabon and perhaps of many African countries is that the politics developed in nationalizing zones have never had easy acceptance in the heartlands and vice versa. Partially this is simply a struggle between tribal and pan-tribal views. But more fundamentally it is a matter of the kinds of social communication to which inhabitants of each zone have become accustomed.

The author's notions of nationalizing zones are thus a useful device for breaking down the nation-building experience into its various arenas. But while the distinction may be necessary to our understanding, it is not sufficient. The author himself clearly indicates that though the national zones offer the greatest possibility of shared experience, they also offer the greatest possibility of inter-tribal violence and retribalization. Peoples in the nationalizing zone may come to share an experience of ethnic hostility and mutual deprecation of which peoples in heartlands have only an abstract awareness. Mobilization by shared experience can work in various directions!

This book undergoes something of a sea change. It starts out, I believe, with optimism, pointing out the breakdown of king-group and tribe as almost inescapably leading to the new order of national goals and a national culture. But it ends up with only a hopeful, perhaps Hobbesian, pessimism in the face of the many threats to national order and national cultures which are detailed and the authoritarian means for coping with them which are illustrated. These threats are those of generational con-

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flict, the resentment of continual colonial privilege, the malaise between men and women, the resentment and deprecation between civil servants and populace, and the lack of a spirit of self-sacrifice fostered by disappointment in the results of independence and a confusion about who gets the benefits of one's labor.

This discussion of threats to national order and the authoritarian response of political leaders focuses upon Leon Mba, the first president of Gabon, active until 1965. One is reminded how fast the political scientist who strives for contemporaneity has to move and how concealed emerging power structures can be. No mention is made in this book, for example, of Albert Bongo, the southerner who has taken over the reins of power from Mba. His emergence challenges the author's notion that the Fang (Mba was a Fang), as the majority and also the most dynamic tribe, must play a leading role in the creation of national culture. But the challenges facing Bongo are well defined in this book.

At a time when very large grants were being given out for the study of African nationalism the author on very limited resources hiked, hitched, and peddled around Gabon with an umbrella and a knapsack talking widely with all elements of the population. Something of the Odyssey of that grounded inquiry is present in this book and is part of its interest. Moreover the book is written with a certain artfullness that I find illuminating and productive of an insight into the materials that the full panoply of scholarly style and lexicon does not always so well engineer. The book is to be recommended as giving a most plausible ordering to the emerging facts of Gabonese nationalism.

J. W. Fernandez
Dartmouth College

South West Africa and its Human Issues *by John H. Wellington. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967.— xxiv, 452 pp. $13.45.*

Do we really care about South West Africa, or is it merely a strategic pawn to be used in protecting or attacking the racial policies of South Africa? Let it be said at once that John H. Wellington cares about South West Africa itself and that his new book is devoted to making clear the facts about South Africa's international responsibilities and "moral turpitude" in misusing the trust. This message will surprise few people outside South Africa, but the marshalling of details of geography and de-

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velopment of race relations represents a welcome contribution to our basic understanding of how environment and colonial policies, under both German and South African administrations, have coincided to ensure an especially cruel disparity between white and non-white peoples.

Wellington, Professor Emeritus of Geography at Witwatersrand University, spends nearly one-third of the book on "the geographical setting," incorporating a thorough physical description, before going on to the story of colonial policies and economic development. Africans *per se* receive but superficial consideration except where they become locked into the colonial structure. The pattern of white supremacy, it is made clear, dates form German times, but increased in the time of the mandate with active promotion of settlement of white South Africans, as a consequence of which the Namas, Hereros, and Basters have been largely relegated to virtual wastelands. Wellington demonstrates that the theory of apartheid as separate but equal development cannot possibly be justified in South West Africa. Even an approximation of equality would require a radical change of policy to create a neutral administration, reapportion land, and provide educational facilities for Africans.

Quite obviously, the preparation of this book occurred while South Africa was being charged in the World Court with neglecting the welfare of the indigenous peoples of that mandated territory. Had the case gone against South Africa, this book would have contributed to the discussion in South Africa of "What next?" Wellington, with more than a trace of old-fashioned humanitarianism, believes that reform would have been possible. To make his position as palatable as possible in South Africa, only impeccable sources are cited; nowhere do we find reference to the work of left-wing or "subversive" figures. Michael Scott is mentioned only once in the text.

In a final chapter, something of a post mortem, Wellington discusses the refusal of the Court to rule on the merits of the South West Africa case. The lawyers for Liberia and Ethiopia surrendered on the question of the specific injustices in the territory and turned down the offer of investigation on the spot, basing their argument instead upon the more amorphous principle that apartheid in general offends accepted international standards and legal norms. The retreat from concern for South West Africa itself helped the Court to retreat from involvement and gave South Africa the opportunity to continue unreformed policies. Wellington's book is, therefore, of more academic than political interest. As such, it is easily the best available introduction to the realities of South West Africa and will not soon be outdated.

MARCIA WRIGHT
Columbia University

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India and Ceylon, Unity and Diversity *edited by Philip Mason. London and New York, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1967.—xiii, 311 pp. $6.50.*

Challenges in India *by Taya Zinkin. New York, Walker & Co., 1966.—248 pp. $6.50.*

The essays in Professor Mason's book are generally of a high quality. They tackle different aspects of that great and sometimes disturbing theme of Indian studies—how can the diversities of India be held in bounds and a new unity evolve? Philip Mason makes clear that although these papers focus on India, they are part of the larger effort by the Institute of Race Relations to study numerous situations where different ethnic groups inhabit the same state. He distinguishes five types of diversity—a) religious, b) linguistic, c) regional, d) the special distinctiveness of the tribal peoples outside the money economy and Hindu society, and e) India's untouchables. His own essay is an admirable summary analysis of all five of these diversities, and it forms the framework for the whole study.

His associates are already prominent or are well on the way to being so. Percival Spear writes knowingly of the position of the Muslim, ambivalent and diverse as it is. Morris-Jones investigates linguistic and regional differences. He notes their intensity and the dangers implicit in them, but he concludes with some optimism deriving largely from the seasoned wisdom of many of India's politicians and administrators. Professor Srinivas succinctly restates his sanskritization thesis, and concludes with the aspiration that sanskritization can play a cohesive role in Indian society. Andre Beteille examines in one essay the future of the backward classes and in another gives quick and suggestive sketches of the characteristics, recruitment, and roles of differing elites—businessmen, military officers, members of the Indian administrative services, the professionals and intellectuals, and the political elite of active politicians. Dennis Dalton traces the change in Gandhi's views on caste and assesses the net effect of Gandhi on present caste roles. He believes Gandhi would be deeply discouraged by the extent to which caste has now found its self-confirming assertion within Indian factional politics. Adrian Mayer's paper also stresses the important role caste plays in local politics. But by contrast, he speculates with Srinivas that there are bound to be divisions and whether it matters if factional divisions focus on caste rather than on class or other kinds of differences. Von Furer-Heimendorf analyzes the separateness of India's tribal peoples. He stresses the impossibility of generalization about these matters in India and raises serious ques-

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tions about how the tribal peoples will relate themselves to the wider Hindu population in the future. He gives the Indian government higher marks for sensitively and imaginatively dealing with the tribal peoples than do many Indian critics, but he lays much of the persisting difficulties at the feet of the lower level caste-bound Indian officials who cannot help but disdain the primitive tribal peoples. This paper, like several others, is accompanied by an excellent bibliography.

T. B. Bottomore discusses education, professional ambiance, or common political activity as unifying factors within India's political and administrative elites. He stresses the unifying experiences of education and of having a share in responsibility, which contribute to elite unity. The very proliferation of cross-cutting differences discredits, in his view, the dire hypothesis of Selig Harrison.

A. Arasaratnam's essay on "Nationalism, Communalism and National Unity in Ceylon" is among the best analyses of the multiple factors at work shifting the balance of political power from the all-Ceylon, English-educated elite to the Sinhalese majority-community and the Sinhalese-Buddhist-oriented leadership that followed. This is by now a familiar story, but it is uncommonly well told against a background understanding of the political, economic, and religious forces at work. Owen Lynch discusses India's cities and their relationship to the countryside. Hugh Tinker's concluding paper asks the great question: Is there an Indian nation? Understandably, he gives an equivocal answer.

The scope of this collection is thus broad, but each paper focuses on one aspect of the central theme. Together they form an excellent collection useful as introductory material for beginning students, yet sufficiently fresh and insightful to deserve the attention of serious students as well.

Taya Zinkin's *Challenges in India* reflects a sensitive and well-informed journalist's report on a return visit to India after a number of years absence. It is reportage at its best. She discusses the early dismay, the relief, and hopes which accompany news of Nehru's death. In vivid detail, she provides one of the best discussions of corruption this reviewer has seen. She writes knowingly of the temptations implicit in the tradition of *nazarena*, giving a gift as a token of respect to a superior; the network of favors which, in a situation of acute scarcity, accumulates into obligations only the few dare break when asked for a favor in return.

Her description of three steel complexes—Bhilai, Rourkela, and Durgapur—brings home more incisively than any macrostatistics can, why India's steel industry is so laggard, considering the millions of ru-

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pees it has already absorbed. And she nicely demonstrates from her own observations why the Russian turn-key and training operation at Bhilai is the best of the lot. She communicates the impatience, verging sometimes on despair, of the dedicated young Indians and shows, as most close observers conclude, why generalist Indian administrative service personnel and administrative practices are totally inappropriate for the management of steel factories.

She is excited by the promise she perceives in India's coming generation, so much less imitative, so much more activist, impatient, and energized to push the changes they believe are necessary than were their fathers. In a final chapter, she describes the Kaira District outside Bombay, where a group of energetic, innovative farmers have established a milk producers cooperative along most modern, efficient—and profitable—lines, dramatizing in this way what India could be like.

This is not a theoretical treatise, with neat boxes making up complex "systems." It is an antidote to these, highly recommended for social scientists who need to have some flesh and bones to help them understand the reality their disciplines try to analyze more systematically. And the interested layman will find it highly informative and a pleasure to read.

HOWARD WRIGGINS
Columbia University

Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress *by Myron Weiner. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press; Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967.—509 pp. $12.50; 90s.*

Myron Weiner's third and most detailed study of political participation in Indian democracy is as crowded with facts and teeming with ideas as the reality it seeks to describe. The method of the book is to enrich political development concepts with anthropological data and to base conclusions on the twin supports of development theory and five in-depth case studies. The result is 496 pages of dense prose, liberally but randomly leavened with insights. It is probably as good a book as will be written about Congress party life and as a result is filled with the paradox, immense complexity, and confusing arabesques of idiom that characterize India's baroque society. One despairs at a lack of neatness.

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The author's quest is for the reasons for Congress party success, with success defined as effective recruitment, victory at the polls, and internal party cohesion. Alas, since the 1967 elections and subsequent period of "defection politics," it appears to have been premature to judge the Congress as a successfully established *corporate* element in Indian political life. Nonetheless, this book stands as an impressively detailed study of "on-the-line" politics in India's formative first two decades of democratic experience. And since the political analysis sails so close to the winds of social processes, the epi-phenomenon of Congress party evolution is only one part of a broader analysis: "Congress is primarily concerned with recruiting members and winning support. It does not mobilize; it aggregates. It does not seek to innovate; it seeks to adapt" (15), and in aggregating and adapting it comes to reflect India's segmental society.

The intellectual themes of the book concern the central questions of the Indian political experience with party organization: to what degree do ascriptive group (castes, language groups, religious minorities) loyalties organize political competition and frame policy choices? What are the stakes and the arenas of significant political competition? What is the integrative and disintegrative effect of factionalism in Indian party life, and to what degree do factions reflect policy choices or historical social cleavages? How do parties relate to policy execution as well as policy formulation? What instruments do party leaders wield to induce recruitment, penalize failure, and enforce discipline? What is the range of variation in effective political organization tolerable in the Congress party and in the Indian federation?

The great strength of this book is that Professor Weiner raises these fundamental questions, relates them to the broader theoretical concerns of political participation, and illuminates them with reportorial intimacy in the case studies, two chosen from Indian cities and three from rural districts. It would be too much to expect explanatory simplicity in answer to these questions in any political society, much less in India where continental scale, multi-societal and multi-communal structure, and economic poverty compound the management tasks associated with the differentiating effects of cultural change. Nor has Professor Weiner simplified the Indian political process by concentrating on the synapse process between the muscles of social life and the nerves of political activity, but he has provided a rich portrayal of it. And in his communication of the coarse texture of Indian politics, he provides a useful corrective to those who have mistakenly seen the level of analysis problem as the *sole* "missing link" of our understanding of Indian politics. Social scientists will find it infuriating to contemplate mapping Indian political diversity with the patience and skill exhibited in this work, but Myron Weiner makes

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a persuasive case for its unavoidability for all those who would do local political surveys. The educative value of this achievement is hard to overestimate.

WAYNE WILCOX
Columbia University

Laos: Buffer State or Battleground *by Hugh Toye. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1968.—xvii, 245 pp. $5.95.*

Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography *by Jean Lacouture, translated from the French by Peter Wiles. New York, Random House, 1968.—313 pp. $5.95.*

Of these two books, Hugh Toye's *Laos: Buffer State or Battleground* is by far the better. Jean Lacouture, the French journalist, writes from a deep regard for Ho Chi Minh as a person and as the most prominent leader of his people. Lacouture has himself interviewed Ho, and he has culled over all the other interviews, memoirs, reports of Ho's comments at such meetings as the Socialist Congress at Tours in the nineteen-twenties. All of this is stitched together in chapters entitled "The Peasant," "The Emigrant," "The Militant," "The Prisoner," and so on to "The Victor." But the portrait of the man that emerges is thin, uncritical, and unconvincing. Even worse, there is only sketchy insight into the effect of the larger political context on Ho and his policies. Of the international context there is little—either in terms of Hanoi's delicate relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union or in terms of the ancient rivalries with the Thai, the Lao, and the Khmer. And of the internal context, the forces within Vietnam itself and the deeper, more fundamental struggle over who shall be the voice that defines the emerging nationalism of Vietnam, there seems to be even less. Lacouture's book is interesting, but superficial. Aside from nuggets of quotable material for pamphleteers its one solid contribution is that the important point does come through that it is possible to be both a Communist and a nationalist.

High Toye's *Laos: Buffer State or Battleground* is more scholarly, more sophisticated and penetrates more deeply into the fundamentals of the struggle—which long antedate the coming of communism to Southeast Asia. Hugh Toye is a regular soldier in the British Army with long experience in Southeast Asia. He saw many of the events of which he writes first-hand during service in Laos in 1960-62, and he followed this

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with prolonged historical study in Paris and as Research Fellow at Oxford. The result is not a detailed history of Laos, but an unusual insight into the deeper motivations not only of the different factions in Laos—Souvanna Phouma and the neutralists, the Communist Pathet Lao, and the rightists led principally by General Phoumi Nosavan—but also of the international actors—Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and China. Toye deals with the history of Laos up to the Second World War in two brief chapters, concentrating on the factors most salient to the problem today, the historical role that Laos played as a buffer. The remaining chapters have the following titles: "Laos in the Second World War," "Laos and the Indo-China War," "The Problem of Neutrality" (in the period immediately after 1954), "The Laotian Civil War" (beginning in 1960), and "The Geneva Conference 1961-62 and the Renewal of Conflict."

Toye sees the problem of Laos, internally and internationally, as much more fundamental than the simple Communist aggression and subversion that has so preoccupied the Western press and many officials in Washington. Internally, the problem derives from ancient family rivalries which combine with regionalism growing out of the old principalities and kingdoms, out of the political consequences of the peculiar Lao version of Buddhism, and out of the ethnic differences between the hill tribes who look to their relatives in Vietnam and the ethnic Lao who live along the Mekong and look toward their kinsmen in Northeast Thailand. Internationally, the problem derives, Toye argues, as much from fears and ambitions rooted in history as from the contemporary threat of Communism. China and the United States might continue to be satisfied with a neutralized Laos, but for Thailand and Vietnam the issue is more complex. Thailand might accept a neutral zone in the highlands, but, given her own Lao population, she seems bound, Toye believes, to demand a special relationship with the Lao people in the Mekong valley. The Vietnamese, on the other hand, "view Siam and Laos with the same jaundiced eye. . . ." Any Lao control of the traditionally neutral hills is risk enough as far as the Vietnamese are concerned, and continued Pathet Lao control of the hills is probably a minimum demand.

Toye's is a useful book. There are many lessons to be learned from the 1962 Geneva negotiations on Laos and subsequent events that are pertinent to the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. And, as Toye says, it is perhaps inevitable that a further attempt will be made to solve the Laotian question internationally—if not at Paris, then in its wake.

ROGER HILSMAN
Columbia University

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Agricultural Production and the Economic Development of Japan, 1873-1922 *by James I. Nakamura. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xxiii, 256 pp. $7.50.*

Mr. Nakamura sets himself two major objectives in this volume: first, to throw doubt on the official statistics concerning Japanese agricultural production in the Meiji period and to put forward alternative estimates of his own and second, to throw doubt on the, by now, conventional assessment of the Japanese success story of development and to propose an alternative interpretation. On the data side Nakamura advances two basic propositions: that the original official agricultural output data were understated by as much as 30 per cent mainly due to the desire to evade the land tax based on the initial cadastral survey of the late 1870's; second, that the extent of under-reporting declined with time as the fear of a follow-up reassessment faded and inflation eroded the real incidence of the tax. Moreover, while others, including Ohkawa (Kazushi Ohkawa *et al., The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy Since 1878 [Tokyo, 1957]*) and Lockwood (William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan* [Princeton, 1954]) have long been skeptical of the official figures, Nakamura must be credited with going beyond to present alternative estimates.

His figures yield an historical agricultural growth rate of close to one per cent annually, compared with 2.4 per cent according to the official statistics—no mean difference. No wonder that while they have themselves come under severe attack, Nakamura's findings have had the salutary effect of shaking producers and users of these data out of their complacency. We don't have space to detail the controversy here, but, by his own admission, Nakamura had to make his own "assumptions guided by judgment." Base period aside, one is entitled to ask, how Nakamura arrives at his continuous rate of decline over time in the fear of a second cadastral survey, leading to a continuous decline in the extent of under-reporting, especially when the rate of land tax was itself adjusted upward in the 1880's; secondly, how well does his indirect evidence on the absence of technological change, for example in the form of new seeds, stand up against the findings of Hayami and Yamada ("Technological Progress in Agriculture" in *Economic Growth: The Japanese Experience Since the Maiji Era,* [eds.] Klein and Ohkawa [New York, 1968]) and others to the effect that agricultural productivity increases in the nineteenth century occurred less as a consequence of improvements in best practice and more as a consequence of the inter-regional spread of best practice via the demonstration efforts of "veteran farmers." Finally, if

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Nakamura's figures are correct, they imply an increase in the food supply at about the same rate as population growth; in a growing economy —and even he doesn't deny that per capita income was increasing substantially during the period—this would imply, in the absence of food imports and marked rises in the relative price of food, a rather unbelievable set of demand elasticities for food. Certainly, Nakamura won't deny that a relative shift of the labor force from agriculture to non-agriculture took place during this period and that there existed a rather substantial unskilled labor wage gap between the two sectors. How, then, were the resulting demand pressures satisfied? If agricultural wages are determined by institutional forces—and only affected by agricultural productivity increases via the pressure for occasional upward revision of the institutional wage—then contrary to Nakamura's claim, the observed near-constancy in the real wage is as consistent with the official figures as with the Nakamura figures. For all these reasons one's gratitude to Nakamura for having effectively questioned the conventional wisdom does not lead one to find Nakamura's own more acceptable. The issue has not been settled—and cannot be with any certainty; small wonder that most students of the period have more recently tended to find comfort in an "intermediate" series presented by Hayami and Yamada which give an annual agricultural growth rate of approximately 2 per cent.

Nakamura's second objective—based on his statistical revisions—is to cast doubt on the conventional explanation of the Japanese development process, to wit, that agricultural productivity increases generated the surpluses essential for overall growth during the period from the Restoration to World War I. Two strands—not always fully compatible —are discernible to this reader. On the one hand, Nakamura seems to be saying that there really isn't that much to explain; that is, not only agricultural but non-agricultural growth rates have been exaggerated, and for somewhat similar reasons. But Nakamura clearly doesn't want to deny the incontrovertible fact that agricultural savings, channeled partly via the land tax and partly via private (landlord) hands, comprised much of the society's investment fund. Instead a second strand of the agreement becomes necessary, namely the role of agricultural savings is admitted but their source is ascribed not to increases in agricultural productivity but to the redistribution of assets and income from warrior to landlord classes coupled with a greater efficiency of resource allocation. It is, of course, theoretically possible for the saving rate to rise out of virtually stagnant, and very low, per capita incomes but it is also not very likely. The argument would have to be that thirty years of sustained growth—at whatever rate—can be generated by shifting income (not

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assets which surely are once-and-for-all) from high consuming warriors (what vast quantities of luxuries not revealed in the trade statistics were they consuming, incidentally?) to high-investing landlords. Moreover, the *samurai* had been economically disfranchised long before the Meiji Restoration, mainly by the *chonin* or merchants who benefited from the breakdown of the feudal structure with the penetration of the money economy during the late Tokugawa period. That efficiency of the channelization process increased with post-Restoration growth and diversification of the financial intermediates is beyond dispute; but how does Nakamura explain the mushrooming of rural industry, mainly in silk and cotton textiles, virtually all as a consequence of direct private saving/investment decisions, in the absence of substantial increases in agricultural output and income?

When all is said and done, the uniqueness of the Japanese experience and the question of its possible relevance to contemporary developing countries surely does not depend on the precise size of the agricultural surplus but rather on a number of interrelated factors, including the maintenance of the unlimited supply of labor condition with only modest increases in wages and consumption; the ability to adopt labor-intensive production functions in the non-agricultural sector; and the continuously flexible and efficient participation in the international economy. Students of Japanese growth indeed owe Mr. Nakamura a vote of thanks for his painstaking efforts which remind us of the dangers of an uncritical acceptance of historical data and force us to re-examine our interpretation of historical events; but at least in this reviewer's judgment, these "rumbles in the rice fields," as Rossovsky (*Journal of Asian Studies* [Feb. 1968]) put it, remain just that.

GUSTAV RANIS
Yale University

Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations *by Robert M. Spaulding, Jr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.—xiv, 416 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Spaulding has presented us with an excellent and exhaustive monographic treatment of the prewar Japanese civil service examination system. Bibliographically impressive, its documentation is extensive and judicious and extremely illuminating in view of the manifest complexity of the subject matter.

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The initial portion of the book contains a short resumé of the historical development in Japan of the ideas of political recruitment by merit and by examination and a description of the process of establishment of both by the Meiji government after a period of debate and experiment which lasted until 1899. Part II examines the prewar twentieth century as a time of changes in the structure, content, and concept of examinations in the face of rising protest against the inequities and insufficiencies of the system. Part III focuses upon the examinations themselves—their structure, rates of passing and failing, the problem of corruption—and the examiners—their background, function, importance—and, to a minor degree, the examinees and the strategies to which they resorted in their efforts to succeed. The fourth portion of the book is a series of appendixes, including sample questions, graphic representation of the examination system as it changed through time, and data on successful candidates which, in combination with a large number of figures and tables throughout the text on composition of the bureaucracy and patterns of change in the system and those who confronted it, increase the lucidity of the discussion.

The focus upon the examination system, however, necessitates a certain narrowness of scope. The *non*-examination bureaucrats, especially the *shinnin* (the highest echelon of the civil service, "appointed" by the Emperor), are hardly mentioned and their interaction with the "examination men" not at all. There is also too little discussion, in this opinion, of the examinees, both successful and unsuccessful. Finally, the book is almost entirely descriptive and weakest where it attempts to analyze the significance of the examination system for the Japanese polity in general and the Japanese civil service in particular. In one short chapter entitled "The Significance of Examinations," the author admits (p. 322) that his data does not permit of any conclusions about "what happened *after* examinations"–patterns of promotion, functional specification and specialization, and decision-making—and then proceeds to make several sweeping and undocumented generalizations about the significance of the examinations. Practically nothing is said of the output or application of policy by the Japanese civil service; however, "it can hardly be doubted that the examination-centered bureaucracy of imperial Japan comprised an effective government," the "equal of any contemporary government in the ability to make decisions and carry them out" (p. 322). Effective at what, and at which types of decisions, and relative to which other governments?

Explicitly, no effort is made to analyze differences within the various divisions of the civil service (p. 322); nevertheless, the author states that

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the elimination of the highly career-relevant diplomatic preliminary examination "can only be considered a mistake" (p. 202). What constitutes a mistake can only be judged from the objectives of the civil service and government and the consequences for the diplomatic service of the elimination, and neither of these matters is dealt with.

The significance of the examination system for the operational style of the Japanese government is also treated unconvincingly. "The Higher Examinations slowly but surely transformed the character of government in Japan" (p. 123), but one never learns how. One such transformation might have been the "shared experience of legal education and the trauma of the [examinations, which] created a new *esprit de corps* and a new stability within the higher civil service" (p. 323), except that no evidence of either *esprit* or stability is adduced, nor any link between them and shared previous experience. What stylistic characteristics of the civil service are discussed—preferences for collective action and consensual decision-making and inhibitions upon innovation (p. 321)—can be, and are, explained culturally without reference to the civil service recruitment process.

Much emphasis is laid by the author upon the evolution of the concept of recruitment by merit in Japanese government, but one wonders if the Meiji examination system does in fact constitute such an egalitarian break with the past as is suggested (pp. 64, 99). Merit was definitely an element in political recruitment before the Meiji period, as Professor Spaulding agrees. Indeed, according to his account (pp. 31, 32, 33, 75, 92, 306), when changes in the bureaucratic recruitment structure were debated during the Meiji era, the idea of merit recruitment was seldom at issue; considerations of national autonomy and attainment or maintenance of governmental power appear to have been paramount. How, then, did the oligarchs "arrive," by the end of the nineteenth century, at a "consensus" regarding the desirability of a career bureaucracy chosen without regard to class on the basis of "merit" as determined through examinations (pp. 125, 220, 307)? One is never told, but the suspicion arises that consensus long preceded the establishment of the examination system, although neither the earlier nor later conceptions of "merit" were without particularistic presuppositions. Just as eligibility for merit appointment before the Restoration presupposed inherited rank (p. 18), so did eligibility for the civil service examinations presuppose an educational background which was by no means equally accessible to all; the Higher Examinations served in large measure simply to corroborate the assumption that those who managed to get that far had already undergone a certain process of education and socialization which

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rendered them eligible for selection on the basis of merit. Even Professor Spaulding notes that "impartial treatment in one stage [the examinations] could not redress the inequity of discrimination in a prerequisite lower stage" (pp. 299-300). The Meiji change was perhaps less in the concept of merit recruitment per se than in the content of the tacit presuppositions of the concept, in its limitations, its operationalization, and in the persons who defined it.

These are little more than suspicions, however. This book is but the first step in a larger study of civil service recruitment and career patterns planned by Professor Spaulding, and, if this initial work is any indication, one may look forward to authoritative answers to questions such as those raised here and to firm documentation of more analytical generalizations than he has attempted to date. Moreover, this book is the type of richly empirical monograph without which the efforts of others to study comparative bureaucracy and political recruitment are in vain; as an addition to this area of literature Professor Spaulding's work is of the highest value.

JAMES W. WHITE
Stanford University

Modern Japanese Leadership: Transition and Change *edited by Bernard S. Silberman and Harry D. Harootunian with Ten Collaborating Authors. Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1966. —433 pp. $7.50.*

Given the widespread recognition of the critical role played by the Meiji elite in shaping modern Japanese society, it is somewhat surprising how few detailed studies of late nineteenth century Japanese leadership are available in Western languages. The publication of these twelve papers (originally presented at the Conference on Nineteenth-Century Japanese Elites held at the University of Arizona in 1963) affords hope for the eventual rectification of this situation. The contributors represent several academic disciplines and have focused on a variety of aspects of the subject. If this has led to what the introduction terms "an anarchy of approaches," the authors do share in common a high level of sophistication in the concepts of contemporary social science coupled with an intimate acquaintance with modern Japanese history. Furthermore, the editors have performed their tasks admirably by providing succinct introductory and concluding essays synthesizing the major themes of the separate papers.

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The main features of the composite portrait of nineteenth-century Japanese leadership that emerges from these studies is already familiar: 1) the predominance of younger, lower ranking members of the *samurai* class; 2) their traditional orientation toward achievement in public service combined with a willingness to entertain visions of a radically different national future; and 3) their pragmatic approach to achieving national strength in a world dominated by Western military and industrial power. The contribution of the volume lies not in the broad outlines but in the fullness of detail and the insights into the significance of these features. The papers by Professor Silberman and Sidney D. Brown on government bureaucrats offer important statistical evidence to substantiate the image of youth and relative low rank within the traditional power structure. Joyce Lebra's data on the Kaishintō, one of the two political parties formed in opposition to the Meiji oligarchy, reveals the degree to which those who challenged the government shared similar traits. The dynamic tensions within the value orientations of these members of the traditional *samurai* class are explored in the papers by Harry D. Harootunian on Tokugawa social thought, Eugene Soviak on the political theorist Baba Tatsui, and Irwin Scheiner on *samurai* converts to Christianity. Professor Harootunian's essay on the intellectual response to the transformation in pre-Meiji society—a transformation that threatened the traditional elite with deprivation of status as well as loss of function—is an especially subtle and penetrating analysis of a complex topic.

Also of considerable interest are the three studies describing how the character of Meiji leaders and their perception of the problems Japan faced combined to influence their approach to foreign affairs. James Crowley has provided a succinct summary of the formation of the Meiji military establishment and the premises that shaped its view of its national mission. Ardath Burks and Marlene Mayo offer insights into the operations of Meiji diplomacy. The latter's lengthy treatment of the question of the purposes of the Iwakura Mission sent abroad in 1871 clarifies a great deal about early Meiji attitudes toward relations with the West. Finally there is a fourth set of papers on rural elites by Harumi Befu, John Cornell, and Alfred Clubok. The case study by Clubok on the differences between Socialist and Liberal-Democratic party membership in rural Okayama is the only article on postwar Japan in the collection.

The only serious criticism I would make regarding the volume concerns not the quality of the contents but the delay in publication. In view of the importance of research on these topics, I would hope that the three

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years which elapsed between presentation of the original conference papers and the date of publication will not become the normal gestation period.

BYRON K. MARSHALL
University of Minnesota

China in Crisis, Vol. I: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System *edited by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou with a foreword by Charles U. Daly;* Vol. II: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives *edited by Tang Tsou with a foreword by Charles U. Daly. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968. Vol. I, Book One and Two:—xiv, —x, 803 pp.; Vol. II: —ix, 484 pp.*

The mountain has labored and brought forth not just a mouse but about five dozen (I may have counted some of them twice) of these vivacious, often predictable, occasionally quite unpredictable, but above all fast-breeding little pets. How can one do justice, in a short review, to such varied talent, and so much of it?

There is a good starting point in a footnote by Herbert Franke, a German contributor, early in Part I of Vol. I. Discussing the "old hands" who knew a country well before it had its revolution, he recalls "all those China experts who have maintained that the Chinese will never become Communists because they are 'too individualistic' and family-minded." He goes on to note that "the fatal and disastrous failure of Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union" was "in no small degree" due to experts who "spoke Russian perfectly and had known pre-Soviet Russia but had failed to realize . . ." etc. This observation defines the parameters (excuse the jargon) of the quicksands in which American policy is floundering.

The amount of money being spent on the study of China must already exceed what was spent on Soviet studies between the wars. The amount of information from monitoring operations in Japan and Taiwan, and from keyhole-peeping in Hongkong, is colossal. U. S. government-backed research has expanded; university departments have been enlarged and new ones have proliferated; foundations have been known to suggest projects and offer grants without waiting to be asked; and other Asian studies, together with Soviet studies, have been very usefully linked up with China studies. The most obvious weakness is the failure (evident in

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this book and at the Chicago conference on which it is based) to make use of some of the excellent work, based on direct observation in China, that has been done in France and the ignoring (perhaps because they are considered "biased") of Americans who went to China, or stayed on there, after 1949.

There is another problem, less obvious to the layman, serious for the professional. The American experts on China are divided into two groups —the seniors, who were in China before 1949 but haven't been back there for twenty years, and the juniors, often magnificently trained in the language and one or more disciplines but showing the marks of bookishness and lack of the "feel" that can be acquired only by living in a country. To these must be added a third group, the Chinese expatriates, who would never have been admitted to America if they had not been considered politically respectable—i.e., non-Marxist and anti-Peking.

A new administration has taken over in Washington. Reconsideration of China policy is in the air. How much can its diplomats and bureaucrats count on the academics for pertinent information and relevant insight? Judging from this impressive collection the American academic experts, different though they are among themselves, are all maimed by the consequence of long isolation from China and the consequences of kinds of thinking that became ingrained—often unconsciously—under the pressures of the Cold War. These marks are borne even by men who would eagerly and sympathetically visit China if they possibly could and who are against the Cold War. Confronted by mountains of printed and recorded material, but unable to discuss or argue with a Chinese Communist, a live human being, what can an expert do? Inevitably, he analyzes the material, looking for theories that will account for the way in which the material is presented. Because of the Cold War he must also get ready with some counter-theories, in case he is accused of being taken in by the wily communists.

There is a feedback from this kind of closeted research and analysis which contributes to the assumption, now almost universal in America and widespread also in Europe, that communists and communist parties are concerned almost exclusively with power, exercised by creating first small elites, then using the leverage of these elites to indoctrinate a larger following of troops and civilian cadres, and then by techniques of hypnotic "brain-washing" backed by force, reducing whole populations to docile subservience. Even so enlightened a scholar as Franz Schurmann plays about with ponderous "sociological" differentiations between "power" and "authority" and comes up with the learned notion that

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"social control thus is a product of socialization: internalization of values within the family, inculcation of public values and norms through education, and finally adjustment to the work situation . . . [which] serve to bring about compliant individuals" (Vol. I, Book 2, p. 528). This kind of stuff leads on to the dangerous ground of stunt politics—the "battle for men's hearts and minds," "counter-insurgency," and investment in puppet regimes.

Men have hearts and minds before politicians engage in battle for them. Revolutions are made by men and women whose class interest and class hostilities (the Marxist terms are here valid) move them to look instinctively for a certain kind of leadership, to recognize it when they find it, and to go astray when they do not. The revolutionary theorist is only a theorist unless he is born into an age which is looking for revolutionary action. Unless the new administration in Washington recognizes this (and there is far too little to help them in these learned volumes) it could get deeper into, instead of out of, the morass into which the previous administration led us. It is noteworthy that the indexes do not list the two books by American authors which offer us the deepest insights into the Chinese Revolution as a wave-motion succession of mass-movements—Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China* and William Hinton's *Fanshen*.

OWEN LATTIMORE
University of Leeds

The Soviet Military and The Communist Party *by Roman Kolkowicz. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.—xvi, 429 pp. $9.00.*

The Role of the Chinese Army *by John Gittings. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967.—xix, 331 pp. $8.50.*

These masterly monographs advance our knowledge of the complex interplay of military and party elites under revolutionary conditions in industrializing societies. Gittings provides a compact history of the place of the military and of the military instrument in the rise to power of Chinese communists. Kolkowicz summarizes Soviet Russian history and provides a generalized treatment of party-military dynamics.

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Both Communist regimes share an explicit ideology of party supremacy over the military or over any elite of specialists. Generalized doctrines are not unique in the history of political myth; hence, the interesting question is whether effective operations conform to articulate principle. As Kolkowicz indicates, the problem of the scientific observer is to discover to what extent the military establishment submits to the party and to identify the factor-cluster that accounts for whatever degree of civilian supremacy is maintained at any given time. Two broad sets of factors are continually at work: the *predispositions* of the participants at the beginning; the *environment* provided as the situation unfolds. The environmental factors include the ways in which the participants present themselves to one another and the natural surroundings.

How did the institutional practice of party supremacy become consolidated as part of the predispositions of the Russian and Chinese models? In Russia the critical moment was when Trotsky, the military amateur and loyal exponent of party dominance, successfully led the civil war against counter-revolutionary armies. In China the critical period was 1928 when Chu Teh became commander-in-chief of the Fourth Red Army and Mao took over the office of political commissioner. In both cases, the doctrinal myth was enriched by reaffirmation, by elaboration into specific formulas, and by experience with operational procedures that yields a sufficient degree of perceived success to crystalize supporting miranda among elite, mid-elite, and rank and file.

Gittings and Kolkowicz emphasize that the professionalism of the military is a complex factor that generates tension in every political and social order. Kolkowicz proposes five characteristics of any military establishment: "(1) institutional closure, (2) detachment from the rest of society, (3) an elitist value system, (4) a hierarchical structure of authority, and (5) limited possibilities for employing the soldier's professional skill in civilian life" (p. 333). In a Communist system that remains true to its ideology, these tendencies are especially prone to generate tension whether the system is exposed to an internal threat or is passing through an inter-crisis period. If a war crisis erupts suddenly, the party elite, automatically protective of its power, promptly imposes precautionary measures on the military, even at considerable risk to the security of the state. If the prosecution of the war renders it necessary to concede wide latitude to the military, the end of the war is followed by party efforts to deprive the military of any monopoly of glory or a predominating voice in decisions. During the first few years after seizing power the predispositions of the Chinese elite, thanks to the disci-

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pline of the long march, were sufficiently homogeneous to maintain party and civilian supremacy by less severe means than the Russians used in the postwar Stalinist period (1945-53).

By the late fifties the industrialization of the Soviet Union was far enough advanced for some of the leadership led by Khrushchev to plan the next phase of Socialist education and to aim at toning down the expansion of heavy industry. Kolkowicz substantiates the hypotheses about Khrushchev's initial role in exploiting his wartime opportunities when he acted as political representative of central authority to consolidate the "Stalingrad Group." It becomes clear that Khrushchev eventually dug his political grave by alienating several elements all at once instead of dealing with them one by one. As Robert Michels pointed out years ago, the "accordion rhythm" of a totalitarian regime depends on a dynamic behavior of forces that oscillates and hence does not permit any trends toward decentralization, pluralization, or individualization to work themselves out smoothly.

How is it possible to account for the remarkable effort of Chairman Mao to head a new revolution from above, the "Cultural Revolution," in the hope of re-radicalizing China? There is no doubt of the intensity of Mao's ideological commitment to an equalitarian regime in which tendencies to specialism are kept in check. Mao appealed over the heads of the top circles of party, army, and bureaucracy to the whole of society and particularly to the group. The strategy was to call into being a new control structure that would restore the heroic dynamic of revolution. That such a strategy was undertaken at all is probably to be understood as an indication of the continuing intensity with which pre-industrial ideologies are held. The "voluntarism" of man is not yet disciplined by exposure to a man-machine environment. The current question is whether the confusions of the double "Leap Forward," "Cultural Revolution" will permit the military to resume its historic role of picking up the pieces of a shattered structure.

Any estimate of the future of centralized authority and control, whether it is exercised through party, military, or bureaucratic channels, must take into account the new instruments of "the computer revolution." Initially, at least, these instruments can provide central elites with an image of the whole that enables them to economize the means at their disposal for protecting and extending the domain of effective control. As Janowitz wrote, the tension tightens between the demands of heroism and the requirements of knowledgeable negotiation and guidance. Will the upshot prove to be a structure of control that usually

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stays in the hands of the sophisticates, though occasionally subject to a paramilitary coup by squads of frustrated heroes and alienated students?

Gittings and Kolkowicz have provided two indispensable studies of the complex interrelations between the specialist on the instruments of violence and the politician who seeks to perform an integrative function in the flow of public decision.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Yale University

The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927-1932 *by Loren R. Graham. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.—xi, 255 pp. $6.50.*

Professor Graham's book is of great interest from two points of view, the informational and the ideological. Regarding the former, the author explains that the book is based on studies of the Soviet literature assisted by personal research in the U.S.S.R. in 1963. He applied for but was not given access to the archives of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. As he demonstrates, the literature is much richer than has generally been realized by students in capitalist countries. In the period 1921-34, many volumes of surveys were published on the scientific personnel and institutions of the U.S.S.R. which were remarkable in detail and awareness of the potential of science and scientific institutions. As one of the editors of these volumes, published under the auspices of the State Planning Commission in 1930, observed: "A statistical study of scientific organization is a necessary advance toward a planned organization of science." The extensive inquiries included, for example, data for the study of the social and genetic sources of creativity. This was a decade or more before the Science of Science movement arose in capitalist countries.

Professor Graham presents the old Imperial Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg as an institution which rather effectively expressed the cultural scientific values of tsarist society. Science was cultivated as one of the fine flowers of leisure and personal independence. The academicians were princes in their sphere with the same social prestige as princes of territory; indeed, some were both. According to tsarist cultural values, they excelled in abstract and descriptive sciences, such as pure mathematics and natural history. Even in 1928, eleven years after the Revolution, not one of the academicians was a communist. With the

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effective launching of the first Five Year Plan in that year, such a situation had become absolutely impossible. For those who believe that it was the social duty of the academicians to come to the help of the socialist state, the reform of their institution to this end, as related by Professor Graham, must appear to have been carried out with remarkable patience and understanding by the Soviet authorities.

This raises the question of ideological perspective. Judging from the general frame of thought of his book and his quotations from Barber, Merton, and de Solla Price, Professor Graham belongs to what is sometimes called pluralist liberal American society. Its intellectual climate is almost immeasurably different from that of the U.S.S.R. in 1929-30. At that time there were still patent signs that the Soviet Union was in danger of relapsing into social democracy, that is, a capitalist production system under a socialist political control. The strenuous social changes which began in the second half of 1929 preserved the socialist state. Then, in 1934, came the threat of Hitler Germany and finally the invasion of the U.S.S.R. These three crises were overcome through the policy of the U.S.S.R. under the leadership of Stalin in science and technology as well as in other fields. Professor Graham does not sufficiently evoke the intensity and immensity of the social temperature in his account of the first of these three major events, and without this social consciousness it is not possible to assess the creation of Soviet science adequately.

J. G. CROWTHER
London, England

Fiscal Harmonization in Common Markets, *Volume I:* Theory; *Volume II:* Practice *edited by Carl S. Shoup. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.—xx, 468 pp.; xxi, 674 pp. $30.00.*

This two-volume study presents the findings of studies undertaken in the framework of the International Economic Integration Program at Columbia University under the direction of Carl S. Shoup. The purpose of the program was to increase our understanding of problems of fiscal harmonization in free trade areas and customs unions. The theoretical contributions of the first volume are concerned with the economic effects of intra-union differences in indirect taxation, government expenditures, social security regulations, and regional policies. The second vol-

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ume deals with the practical problems of harmonizing indirect taxes in European, Latin American, East African, and East European integration projects. It also contains a study devoted to the harmonization of business taxes in the Common Market.

In Volume I, of special interest to the economist are Douglas Dosser's analysis of the welfare effects of tax unions and Hirofumi Shibata's contribution to the theory of free trade areas. However, William M. McNie's discussion on transport costs and Norbert Andel's chapters on the harmonization of government expenditure and social security policies are more taxonomic than theoretical. McNie reaches some commonsense conclusions in a rather laborious way but does not consider the possibility of increasing returns which provide an offset to transportation costs in determining location. In turn, Andel fails to give much content to the newly-coined term "expenditure union" and neglects the distorting effects on resource allocation of social security contributions that affect the supply of labor.

Nevertheless, Andel's chapters provide much useful information on government expenditure and social security policies for the political scientist. And while parts of Dosser's study are heavy going for the noneconomist, his discussion of the community welfare function with alternative combinations of economic and non-economic objectives is of general interest. Finally, Richard M. Bird's chapter on regional problems in a union gives food for thought for the political scientist and the economist alike.

Much of Volume II deals with the Common Market and the United Kingdom, with an eye on British entry into the EEC. Clara K. Sullivan's chapters relate indirect taxation to the goals of the Common Market, compare the indirect tax systems of the EEC countries and Britain, and discuss the consequences of the adoption of a value-added tax by all the Common Market members. The latter is of especial interest since the changeover to value-added taxation has been carried out in the meantime.

In Volume II, the palm should go to Peggy B. Musgrave for her contributions to the theory of direct tax harmonization, for the introduction of new concepts to evaluate the burden of direct taxes, as well as for pioneering estimates made by utilizing these concepts. This reviewer was less impressed by G. K. Shaw's efforts to appraise the impact of economic integration on the effectiveness of countercyclical policies.

Other case studies deal with tax harmonization in EFTA (Hirofumi Shibata), the fiscal aspects of the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area (Marion Hamilton Gillian), tax harmonization in the East African Common Market (John F. Due and

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Peter Robson) and in the Comecon (Richard M. Bird). These studies show a wide variety of approaches to fiscal harmonization—EFTA restricts itself to matters which interfere with free trade, CACM concentrates on an agreement on fiscal incentives for investment, LAFTA and Comecon pay virtually no attention to fiscal harmonization, while there was common administration of income taxes and excises in East Africa. All these studies should be of interest to the student of economic integration, whether he is a political scientist or an economist. We should be thankful to Professor Shoup for undertaking and successfully bringing to completion this mammoth project.

BELA BALASSA
Johns Hopkins University

Development Projects Observed *by Albert O. Hirschman. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967.—xiv, 197 pp. $6.00.*

In this examination of eleven World Bank projects Professor Hirschman of Harvard University has followed the path begun in his *The Strategy of Economic Development* (1958). Here he plunges more deeply into the jungle of interdisciplinary analysis of the economic development process, seeking to find some order in the apparent chaos of political, administrative, social, and other conditions which affect the success of development projects and of the side-effects by which the contribution of projects to the development process should in part be judged. The cases are not examined in detail but serve as an example from which the author seeks to distill some generalizations to guide the decision-maker in the design and appraisal of projects. They constitute a good cross-section of the World Bank's activities, the bulk of them falling in the public sector (electric power, railways, irrigation, river valley development, highways) and only one in manufacturing. This balance is significant, since it suggests that the possibility of identifying and appraising (if not quantifying) the importance of such factors as tribal conflicts, attitudes toward land reform, corruption in public administration, and the like may be greater in projects in the public sector. In the industrial sector one suspects that such factors are more likely to be swamped by the measurement of discounted cash flow (amended, perhaps, by "shadow prices" and the like) and by the backward and for-

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ward linkages of projects on which Professor Hirschman placed such emphasis in his earlier work.

Professor Hirschman has always had a good instinct for paradox (his analysis of unbalanced growth having shown that invention may sometimes be the mother of necessity) and he does not fail us here. He observes that if the World Bank officials had known in advance all the difficulties and troubles lying in store for a number of the projects, they probably would have vetoed them. In hindsight this would have reflected in some cases an unduly gloomy view of the country's ability to overcome these difficulties by calling into play administrative, technical, and political creativity. This unintended triggering of a Toynbeean mechanism of challenge and response is labeled the "Principle of the Hiding Hand."

While not ignoring the cases where in fact disaster followed optimism, Hirschman's point is that the developing countries and their advisers have a systematic pessimistic bias about the capability to respond creatively to the manifold difficulties that confront development projects (at least in the non-industrial field). The point is not that a new scientific principle on a par, say, with the law of diminishing returns is being enunciated, but rather that Professor Hirschman sees virtue in a mechanism which compensates for the developing country's inferiority complex. Seen in another context, this view asserts that countries are more the product of what they do than what they are in terms of natural resources endowment. This essentially optimistic leaning, supported by a positive attitude toward technology and modifications in project design that may induce a sequence of useful change in local skills and inputs, underlies much of Hirschman's approach to development policy.

In a chapter on project appraisal much attention is given to the theory and practice of measuring the indirect or side-effects of projects. Professor Hirschman convincingly attacks the theorists of modern cost-benefit analysis of river basins and the like who have applied their reasoning to the less fortunate developing countries where assumptions of full employment or perfect mobility of capital and people are invalid. At the same time he disclaims the possibility of quantifying all the considerations that should go into the making of an investment decision; and he dismisses the quest for a unique ranking device for projects as clearly futile.

Despite the absence of any conclusions which offer sweeping principles of practical applicability, the study, which Hirschman modestly refers to as an essay, abounds in stimulating insights. These range from a rather critical appraisal of the autonomous public agency as an ad-

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ministrative device for development projects to a refreshing re-examination of the differential side-effects of agricultural versus industrial projects and a candid confession that earlier enthusiasms over the assumed stronger side-effects of the latter were largely unrealistic.

The practical issue is the extent to which some of the "other things" impounded by economists in the *ceteris paribus* jungle or vaguely acknowledged can be analyzed in such a way as to contribute to a better process of decision-making by those who have been habitually adding an intuitive "seat-of-the-pants" judgment of these factors to the more prosaic measure of profitability in the form of an estimate of discounted cash-flow. One suspects that reactions will vary from those practitioners who will find many useful guidelines in this volume to those practitioners who will claim that they have been speaking much of Professor Hirschman's prose all their life.

WALTER A. CHUDSON
Columbia University

Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Foundations of Benefit-Cost Analysis *by Jerome Rothenberg. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967.—xiii, 277 pp. $6.75.*

The subtitle of this book must be taken seriously. Professor Rothenberg has laid down the conceptual foundation for a benefit-cost analysis of urban renewal; he has not attempted the enormous empirical task of actually carrying out such a study. As a distinguished theorist in the field of welfare economics, Rothenberg is well qualified to lead us through the combination of careful distinctions and rigorous theoretical deductions that are required in order to estimate the effects of urban renewal on the welfare of the metropolitan population. He examines the probable impact of renewal not only on land values and housing quality but also on the distribution of real income among social classes and on the relative financial positions of central city and suburb. Although he focuses the analysis on residential redevelopment projects of the "bulldozer" variety that were especially dominant in the earlier years of the federal program, he does not neglect alternative policies such as rehabilitation, code enforcement, and housing subsidy that might reasonably be proposed as alternative means to the same ends. His study thus has considerable breadth.

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While occasional passages may baffle the uninitiated, Rothenberg's argument is not highly technical as economics goes these days. The book contains an extensive bibliography and frequent (though by no means exhaustive) footnote references to relevant literature. It should therefore prove both accessible and stimulating to social scientists in all the disciplines that deal with urban renewal.

There are weaknesses, however. The inevitable price of Rothenberg's commendable urge to examine every implication of renewal is an occasional lapse in the quality of the argument. For example, one of the claims for renewal is that it will tend to improve fiscal balance between central city and suburb. This leads the author to examine the effect of commuters on the financial problems of the central city. He notes that commuters impose service costs but inexplicably neglects to mention that their presence also enlarges the central city tax-base. Whether the tax-base effect is sufficient to offset the burden of service costs is a question that cannot be answered *a priori*. Rather it requires, and has elsewhere received, empirical analysis, but Rothenberg nowhere refers to any of these empirical studies.

On the other hand, I do not count it a weakness that Rothenberg fails to carry out the quantitative work necessary to complete an actual benefit-cost analysis. That task is extraordinarily difficult because the impact of a redevelopment project ramifies in such a complex way through the metropolitan economy. Let me suggest just a few of the complexities. Land-uses among the parts of the metropolis are obviously interdependent so that redevelopment in one neighborhood inevitably affects the course of change elsewhere. Consequently one must take care in measuring the land-productivity gains from redevelopment to count not only the on-site gains but also the associated gains or offsetting losses elsewhere in the city. But these off-site changes, though possibly important, are apt to be thinly spread and hence virtually invisible given the multitude of other forces working simultaneously on land values.

Much the same problem arises in tracing out the effects of renewal on the quality of the housing stock. As households move about within the city the housing market operates like a game of musical chairs. But in this version of the game, houses as well as tenants "move," in the sense that the type and quality of housing service offered in each building adapts to the needs and rent-paying ability of its clientele. Redevelopment under urban renewal procedures typically replaces low-rent housing with new units that rent at a much higher average level. Inevitably this sets off a chain reaction of tenant moves, the ultimate effects of which on the quality and cost of housing services within the metropoli-

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tan area and, equally important, on the real incomes of tenants by income class, it is exceedingly difficult to measure.

It is hardly surprising, then, that Professor Rothenberg stops short of attempting a full scale quantitative application of his analytical method. He offers instead (in chap. XI) "an illustrative exercise, designed to indicate in a preliminary fashion the directions that statistical procedures might follow," which deals with five redevelopment projects in Chicago. But this exercise, as Rothenberg himself stresses, omits so many important refinements that the outcome cannot be regarded as a valid benefit-cost calculation. Indeed, one comes away from the book with the conviction that the renewal problem is theoretically so complex that a thoroughgoing empirical analysis may remain permanently out of reach. That is not Professor Rothenberg's fault, however, and whether or not urban renewal proves ultimately tractable to benefit-cost analysis, we will remain greatly indebted to him for this penetrating study.

JAMES HEILBRUN
Columbia University

Why Growth Rates Differ *by Edward F. Denison assisted by Jean-Pierre Poullier. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967.—xxi, 494 pp. $12.50.*

This study applies the methodology previously developed by the author for evaluating the sources of U.S. growth (Edward F. Denison, *The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us*. Supplementary Paper No. 13. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962) to an analysis of sources of economic progress in the U.S. and eight economically advanced European countries during the period 1950-1962. In the course of the study, the growth rate actually attained by each country is allocated among twenty separate sources of growth; a special effort is made to evaluate the effects upon growth of both quantitative and qualitative changes in the utilization of inputs. The overall theoretical framework of the study is that of a generalized theory of production in which changes in output are related to variation in the quality and quantity of physical inputs (capital and labor) as well as to those changes in technology and economic institutions which affect the productivity of resource use. The framework employed is quite similar to that which has been utilized since Adam Smith for analyzing the economic growth of nations. (For a discussion of this point see I. Adelman, *Theories of Economic Growth and Development*. Stanford:

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Stanford University Press, 1961.) The novelty of the study lies in its empirical implementation.

Denison finds that, from 1950 to 1962, the growth of total factor inputs accounted for 58 per cent of total U.S. growth and for only 36 per cent of growth in northern Europe. Thus, during this period, a considerably larger share of European growth came from gains in efficiency. Increases in labor input were responsible for 33 per cent of total income expansion in the U.S. (18 per cent in northern Europe) and increases in capital for 25 per cent (18 per cent in northern Europe). The major contributors to the rise in labor inputs were the growth of employment (27 per cent in the U.S. and 15 per cent in northern Europe) and the increase in education of the labor force (15 per cent in the U.S. and only 5 per cent in northern Europe).

Increases in the productivity of resource use accounted for 42 per cent of total U.S. growth; by contrast, they accounted for 64 per cent of northern Europe's growth. In the U.S., advances in technical knowledge (23 per cent) and economies of scale (11 per cent) were the most important sources of productivity improvement. In northern Europe, economies of scale (20 per cent), decreases in the time lag in the application of technical knowledge (12 per cent), reductions in the age of capital (11 per cent), and relative contraction of agricultural production (10 per cent) were the most significant components of productivity growth. During this period, therefore, much of northern Europe's superior growth performance represents a "catching up" effect.

The study is careful and sophisticated in the handling of empirical data. While many ad hoc approximations are made in an effort to account for the more qualitative sources of growth, the approximations do not appear unreasonable, and the sensitivity of results to their magnitude is investigated in each case and found to be relatively small within empirically relevant limits. The book is written in such a manner as to enable the non-economist to read it with great benefit. The book is a must for those interested in the postwar history of Europe.

IRMA ADELMAN
Northwestern University

Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth: Essays Presented to Maurice Dobb *edited by C. H. Feinstein. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967.—x, 367 pp. $8.50.*

The practice of marking the retirement of a distinguished scholar with a collection of essays by his colleagues and former pupils is both human

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and considerate. There is a special term for such collections in German, *Festschriften*, so perhaps the tradition originated in Germany; it certainly dates back to the nineteenth century and the changes that have taken place since then, both in the academic environment and in the character of scholarship, have had their effects on the quality of the papers contributed. When first originated, *Festschriften* may have possessed some unity of content and approach and may in fact have provided a vehicle by means of which individual scholars could both pay homage to a retiring professor and bring to the attention of the academic community the results of their own researches. But with the development of a whole host of academic journals and the changes that have occurred in publishing techniques, *Festschriften* no longer serve this purpose. The scholar who has something of value to impart will turn to a journal where he is assured of a wider readership, a more certain circulation, and a niche in which his contribution can more easily be found by later generations. *Festschriften* do not provide that circulation necessary to bring one's results to the attention of one's colleagues; but that is what is required if only to establish and enhance one's academic reputation. Consequently, the pieces that are included in twentieth-century *Festschriften* are usually those for which no other outlet can be conveniently conceived—speculative essays, elucidations of secondary theoretical points, and so forth. They are occasional pieces. In the collection of essays that have been published in this guise in the past two or three decades, perhaps two or three papers have some permanent academic significance—and they have suffered from their location. The present collection is no exception: there is nothing here that will become an indispensible source. On the other hand, as a consequence of the book's commemorative nature and Maurice Dobb's particular status as one of the few Marxist economists—if not the only one—with a position at a major western university, it does contain contributions from both sides of the ideological divide, from all three worlds. Some of the East European contributions are of interest to the specialist in what one may call "Soviet area studies," but they have little to interest the general economist. The same may be said of the American contributions; while they add footnotes to current controversies they are almost incomprehensible to those who have not kept up with the literature. Some years ago, one might have suggested that *Festschriften* might provide a suitable context for inter-bloc dialogue, but as the possibilities for contributions increase—from eastern scholars to western collections and vice versa—so do other channels of communication. Western academic journals are more freely available in Eastern Europe and Eastern aca-

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demic research is becoming more accessible through a variety of joint publication arrangements. While one approves of the principle and is pleased that Maurice Dobb should be honored in this way, there is nothing in this volume that can be recommended as essential that cannot be found elsewhere in a more accessible form.

ALASTAIR N. D. MCAULEY
Princeton University

Personality, Power and Politics: A Social Psychological Analysis of the Italian Deputy and His Parliamentary System *by Gordon J. DiRenzo. Notre Dame and London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.—xv, 254 pp. $7.95.*

On the face of it there is no reason to believe that any single constellation of personality traits distinguishes those people the world happens to call politicians from their brethren. This is not to say that "personality" and "politics" are unconnected, but rather that the connections are complex in ways that need to be anticipated if political personality analysts are to get at the root of their subject matter. For example, politicians may perform roles that make such vastly divergent personal demands as sinecure-holding and revolutionary agitation. And any single set of personal qualities—for example, the restless, power-hoarding propensities of a Lyndon Johnson—may be channelled into politics, but may also find non-political outlet.

A principal difficulty of the present study is that the author did not conceive of his research in a way that takes sufficient account of such contingencies. Professor DiRenzo introduces his analysis of a highly enterprising study, in which 129 members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies were persuaded to respond to a shortened form of the Rokeach dogmatism scale, with assertions such as the following (p. 20):

> Hypothesis I
>
> The political personality is characterized by a structural syndrome of authoritarianism or dogmatism to a relatively strong degree.
>
> Hypothesis II
>
> There is a significant difference in the dogmatic personality structure between politicians and nonpoliticians such that the former are more close-minded than the latter.

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Apart from their syntactic shortcomings, these assertions about politicians as a general class simply do not provide adequate lenses through which to view the interaction of politics and personality: it is far more fruitful to relate personality factors to specific kinds of political role performance. This follows, for example, from the important study by Rufus Browning and Herbert Jacob ("Power Motivation and the Political Personality," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 [1964], 75-90) which found that politicians in the aggregate did not differ from non-politicians on a number of personality measures, but that the subgroup of politicians who were active seekers of power and advancement did in fact have distinctive personal qualities. DiRenzo's reference to this study revealingly consists only of the somewhat cryptic assertion that Browning and Jacob "reportedly" found no differences between the politicians and non-politicians (p. 11); he makes no reference to their positive findings. Similarly, he cites James D. Barber's *The Lawmakers* without alluding to Barber's elegantly argued theory of why the vicissitudes of full-time political life make for the recruitment of politicians who cover a wider range of personality types than is to be found among the politically active members of the general population. Barber argues that the individuals who become sufficiently strongly motivated to cross the difficult threshold between political activism and, say, candidacy tend to be either inadequate people who have failed to make their way satisfactorily outside of politics or highly competent persons in search of new challenges.

Consistent with Barber's thesis, when DiRenzo compares his deputies with a somewhat haphazardly collected, largely middle-class group of Italians from the general population, he finds more variance in the political sample (the standard deviation is 6.75 for the politicians and 5.36 for the comparison group). What he chooses to emphasize is the higher mean dogmatism scores of the politicians, but the intellectual interest of averages—of mean scores—is thrown wholly into doubt by the further findings he presents on partisan variation in dogmatism scores. In his general population sample, there are no significant variations in the dogmatism scores of supporters of the different parties, a finding that is fully consistent with the familiar assumption that political preferences in mass electorates are so weak and mutable that they do not reflect personality differences. But the deputies from different parties *do* differ in their dogmatism scores: taking only the four parties represented with more than a dozen cases in DiRenzo's sample, the Nenni Socialists and (especially) the Communists score lower in dogmatism than members of the general population; the Christian Democrats and (especially) the

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neo-fascists (MSI) score higher. Thus, if DiRenzo's findings are meaningful at all, their significance resides in the distribution of personality scores, not their average values. In discussing this and other aspects of his findings, DiRenzo has to engage in a good bit of weaving and bobbing that would not have been necessary with a clearer and subtler initial statement of the terms of the investigation.

But *are* DiRenzo's observations meaningful? The finding that Communist deputies are low on dogmatism and neo-fascist deputies high is inconsistent with Rokeach's assumption that Left and Right converge in style of belief-holding, and that the Dogmatism Scale traps this convergence, although the finding is one that may be consistent with the actual role played by Italy's large heterogeneously based Communist Party. At any rate, the dogmatism measure is a prototypical can of worms. Rokeach's original validation of his assumption was most unconvincing; his criterion group consisted of a mere thirteen British Communists, and many of the scale items that earned the Communists high dogmatism scores were not the same items that led to high scores on the part of the right-wingers with whom they were compared *(The Open and Closed Mind*, 413-15). Furthermore, DiRenzo's short form of the Scale drops some of the items on which the British Communists received high scores.

More fundamentally, one is bound to reserve judgment until further evidence is in on the diagnostic validity of either version of the dogmatism instrument. To take the present version, what we have, after all, are ten Delphic apothegms to which agreement or disagreement can be registered—assertions about whether the world is a lonely place, whether we should rely on our leaders, whether "attacking those of similar beliefs" is "the worst crime." Response to such items can readily be a consequence of one's ideological beliefs rather than an indicator of personality patterns that cause them. And in the present study, the dogmatism items are for all practical purposes the only indicator of political personality. The author's preoccupation with mean dogmatism scores keeps him even from extracting maximum meaning from the ten dogmatism items. An appendix reporting deputies' item scores by party (p. 237) makes it clear, for example, that the Communists were higher than the Christian Democrats on some items as well as lower on others. Therefore, it would have been desirable to compare the parties by item-by-item profiles as well as by mean score. In short, the mean is less than completely revealing, even when party is controlled.

The tenor of this review has been critical, but hopefully constructively so. This is an enterprising contribution to a class of inquiry which

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David Riesman once described as having more critics than practitioners. No wonder. There are great intrinsic difficulties in thinking clearly about political personality, much less measuring it. Professor DiRenzo's work helps clarify what some of these difficulties are and how they may be surmounted. One looks forward to his further contributions to what hopefully will be an expanding community of scholars who are progressively able to advance knowledge of the personal determinants of politics.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Wesleyan University

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Book Notes

Two essays and a collection of documents form *Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance* (New York, Columbia University Press for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969; viii, 200 pp., $7.50 clothbound, $2.50 paperback) by Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, both members of the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics. According to Windsor's substantial "Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe and Détente," the Czechoslovak program of January-August 1968 was an attempt to give permanent meaning to socialism, as distinct from the "transitional" forms of communism in effect since 1917. The author credits Alexander Dubcek with striking a delicate balance between domestic pressure for reform and Soviet and East European over-reaction to that reform. Although Dubcek's regime scrupulously observed the ground rules set by the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, its experiment ultimately became untenable because pressures from above and below interacted to radicalize the Czechoslovak population against the increasingly tough position of the Soviet bloc. In conclusion, Mr. Windsor feels that the invasion casts uncertainty upon the continuing process of East-West *détente*. The basic premises of the Western advocates of *détente*—the growing embourgeoisement and relaxation of control in the Soviet Union, and the attendant acceptance of national roads to socialism—must be re-examined, for it now becomes apparent that these very factors created strong tensions and a conservative backlash in the Soviet Union. Roberts' "Czechoslovakia: Invasion and Resistance" at-

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tempts to show that the Soviet Union was militarily but not politically prepared for the intervention, and that Czechoslovak resistance, although unorganized and without centralized leadership, was nonetheless effective in frustrating Soviet plans. There was no *ralliement* of the anti-Dubcek forces and no quisling government. Mr. Roberts offers Czechoslovakia as a strong case for the planning of civilian resistance, "especially in those countries most likely to face assaults comparable to the one which Czechoslovakia is having to face" (pp. 142-43). It is not quite clear which countries ought to take the author's admonitions most seriously.—ISTVAN DEAK, *Columbia University.*

The second volume of Arnold Brecht's memoirs, *Mit der Kraft des Geistes: Lebenserinnerungen Zweiter Teil, 1927-1967* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967; 496 pp. DM 38), opens with the author's move from the civil service of the Reich, to which he had belonged since 1910, to that of Prussia. He became Prussia's permanent representative to the Reichsrat, the upper house of the Weimar Republic's legislature, and rapporteur for the Republic's budget. Brecht recounts in fine detail the functions and proceedings of the Reichsrat and the preparation of the budget. He reconstructs the general reform of Germany's federal structure, which he planned in committee, and defends the Prussian government, as he defended it before Germany's highest constitutional court, against Papen's attempt to dismiss it in July 1932. When the Prussian government was finally dissolved in March 1933, Brecht came to the United States, where he accepted an appointment at the New School for Social Research in New York. After the war he served as a consultant to the occupation forces in Germany, and he describes the Americans and Germans' joint planning for the second German republic.

But by far the most valuable part of the book is Brecht's analysis of the vicissitudes of the Weimar Republic, which he experienced at first hand. The question of why it was Hitler who emerged triumphant from the political crisis of 1932-33 is central to his book. In assessing the degrees of responsibility for what happened, he examines the alternatives available to the republican governments and surveys the influence of voters, political parties, and politicians. He takes the opportunity, moreover, to comment generally on the difficulties and dilemmas of liberal democracy in crisis.

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Brecht was a dispassionate and enlightened observer of the Weimar Republic. The information he offers on the Reichsrat, the politics of the budget, and the semi-clandestine efforts by the Prussian government to break the spell of Nazi propaganda is to be found nowhere else. His sketches of the ministers and higher civil servants of Prussia are vivid and pertinent. As a document of the era, these memoirs of a German democrat who reflects without remorse and with amazing recall on the career and demise of the first German republic, are unmatched.—C. M. KIMMICH, *Columbia University*

This country survey—*Mauritania* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967; x, 243 pp., $6.00) by Alfred G. Gerteiny—is the only book on the subject available in English. It contains much useful information that is not readily available in any other single volume about one of Africa's largest, least known, and most sparsely populated new political units. The author gives brief, rather awkwardly written summaries of Mauritania's geography, history, people, economy, and recent political evolution. So far as the reviewer can judge, the facts have been reliably reported, but there are no hypotheses, comparisons with other African states, or even underlying themes of analysis. We are told that democracy in this single-party state is "both a luxury and a right to be acquired," but that "one indispensable prerequisite for loyal opposition and political responsibility . . . is still missing—national consciousness" (p. 162). The discussion of Mauritania's ethnic and linguistic cleavages is interesting, but the analysis of the country's "dilemma of democracy" seems superficial and somewhat irrelevant. The author's treatment of historical and contemporary relationships between religion and politics also leaves much to be desired; his criticism (p. 146) of religious provisions in the constitution of the "Islamic Republic" of Mauritania is lacking in comparative perspective. Less attention to formal structures and more discussion of their interactions with the traditional society would have made the book more exciting. Still, though almost as fragmented as the society it is describing, this survey is a useful compendium for future scholars, diplomats, or conscientious tourists.—CLEMENT H. MOORE, *University of California, Berkeley.*

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